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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
I. NEW EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
STANDARD-PREJUDICE REQUIRED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cooper v. Fitzharris, I 
expressly adopted the standard of "reasonably competent and ef-
fective representation" of counsel, thus joining the majority of 
other circuits in abandoning the "farce and mockery of justice" 
standard.2 The standard is derived from modern notions of the 
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The 
court further held that once defendant has shown that counsel 
was ineffective, relief will be granted only when defendant was 
prejudiced by counsel's conduct. 3 By requiring prejudice, the 
court places a heavy burden on a defendant who first must prove 
ineffective counsel, and then must prove prejudice. 
Troy Cooper, a state prisoner convicted of burglary, as-
sault, robbery and rape, filed a habeas corpus petition. He al-
leged that he had not been afforded effective assistance of coun-
sel at trial. Cooper cited counsel's failure to object to admission 
of certain evidence that was gathered as a result of an allegedly 
unlawful search of his home and person, failure to move to 
supress his statements to the police, failure to object to testi-
mony regarding his identification at the pre-indictment lineup, 
and failure to inform him of his right to appeal. 4 Cooper also 
criticized his attorney's failure to stipulate to his prior burglary 
conviction.5 
The district court dismissed the petition on the grounds that 
the challenged acts and omissions of counsel were neither preju-
dicial nor did they reduce Cooper's trial to a "farce and mock-
ery" of justice. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to 
the district court for a factual determination as to whether 
1. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir., Dec. 1978) (per Browning, J.) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 
U.S. 974 (1979). 
2. See cases cited at note 29 infra. 
3. 586 F.2d at 1328. 
4.Id. 
5.Id. 
75 
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Cooper was deprived of his sixth amendment right to reasonably 
effective assistance of counsel during his state trial.8 
On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit traced the devel-
opment of the doctrine of effective assistance of counsel and held: 
(1) the sixth amendment requires that persons accused of crimes 
be afforded "reasonably competent and effective representa-
tion"; and (2) the accused must establish that counsel's errors 
prejudiced the defense.7 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
In 1932, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama,8 first rec-
ognized the right to effective assistance of counsel. Without di-
rectly addressing the question of what constitutes ineffective rep-
resentation, Powell nonetheless became the foundation for 
defendants to challenge their convictions on the grounds of de-
fense counsel's incompetence.s In Powell, the Court recognized 
that the duty to provide counsel "is not discharged by an as-
signment at such time or under such circumstances as to pre-
clude the giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of 
the case."IO The Court indicated the right to counsel was a fun-
damental right, protected also in state courts by virtue of the 
fourteenth amendment due process clause." 
Thirty years after the Powell decision, the Supreme Court 
articulated the right to effective counsel in Gideon v. Wain-
wright. 12 Gideon represents the first step by the Supreme Court 
6. 551 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1977). 
7. 586 F.2d at 1327. 
8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
9. See generally Bazelon, The Defectiue Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 
(1973); Simpson, Standards of Attorney Competency in the Fifth Circuit, 54 TEX. L. REV. 
1801 (1976); Comment, Ineffectiue Representation as a Basis for Relief from Conuiction: 
Principles for Appellate Reuiew, 13 COLUM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 1 (1977) [hereinafter 
cited as Ineffectiue Representation]; Comment, The Right to Competent Defense Coun-
sel: Emergence of a Sixth Amendment Standard of Reuiew on Appeal and the Persistence 
of the "Sham and Farce" Rule in California, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 355 (1975); Com-
ment, Defects in Ineffectiue Assistance Standards Used by State Courts, 50 U. OF COLO. 
L. REV. 389 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Defects]; Comment, Criminal Law: Effectiue 
Assistance of Kansas Counsel, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 635 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Criminal 
Law). 
10. 287 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added). 
11. Id. See also Note, Effectiue Assistance of Counsel: A Constitutional Right in 
Transition, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 509 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Effectiue Assistance]. 
12. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
1980] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 77 
toward a stricter demand that appointed counsel render effective 
representation. 13 The Court stated that the source of the right to 
assistance of counsel was the sixth amendment, which is made 
obligatory on the states by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. U In Gideon, the Court recognized the impor-
tance of the right to counsel and held that assistance of counsel 
in criminal cases is a necessity rather than a luxury.15 When 
Gideon made the sixth amendment directly applicable to the 
states, the circuit courts were forced to re-evaluate their due 
process standards for ineffective counsel claims in light of the 
stricter sixth amendment requirements. lo Gideon clarified the 
Powell principles; the sixth amendment right to counsel was 
deemed a fundamental right and not just a necessary aspect of 
due process. 17 
A problem that resulted from Gideon was that, although 
Gideon emphasized the importance of the right to counsel as a 
sixth amendment right, it did not have immediate impact on 
cases alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. I8 Courts contin-
ued to apply general due process concepts either directly through 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments or indirectly through the 
sixth amendment. 19 
Powell and Gideon were instrumental in establishing the 
right of a criminal defendant to effective assistance of counsel. 
The decisions, however, offered little guidance on the quality of 
the assistance that makes that right'meaningful. 20 Gideon was 
also the precursor of the Supreme Court's decision in McMann v. 
Richardson. 21 McMann extended the sixth amendment guaran-
tees of effective assistance of counsel by specifically stating that 
the right to counsel means "effective assistance of counsel."22 
While the Court rejected defendant's claim of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel,23 the Court nevertheless recognized the inherent 
13. See Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 510. 
14. 372 U.S. at 343. 
15. [d. at 344-45. 
16. See Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 515. 
17. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. at 342. 
18. See Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 510-15. 
19. [d. 
20. See Ineffective Representation, supra note 9, at 6. 
21. 397 U.S. 759 (1970). See generally Criminal Law, supra note 9, at 636. 
22. 397 U.S. at 771. See also Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. 
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). 
23. 397 U.S. at 773-74. In McMann, the prisoner alleged counsel's ineffectiveness 
3
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risk that the good faith evaluations of a reasonably competent 
attorney will tum out to be mistaken either as to the facts or as 
to what a court's judgment might be on a given set of facts.24 
The Court concluded that counsel's advice should be within the 
range of competence demanded by attorneys in criminal cases.25 
Thus, the McMann Court alluded to minimum levels of 
competency. 
An issue unresolved by the McMann Court was an explana-
tion of the duties which defense counsel must perform in order to 
be considered competent. No subsequent Supreme Court case 
has resolved this issue, thereby leading to the inevitable result 
that lower courts have developed their own standards for deter-
mining the minimum degree of competency necessary for effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 
The "Farce and Mockery of Justice" Standard: The Due Process 
Right to Counsel 
Based on the Court's ruling in Powell, a standard developed 
based on the fourteenth amendment due process clause.28 This 
standard holds that representation is ineffective only where it 
reduces the trial to a "farce and mockery of justice" such that it 
shocks the conscience of the court. '1:1 The defendant bears the 
burden of showing that defense counsel's conduct reduced the 
entire trial to a "farce and mockery of justice" so as to deprive 
the defendant of his or h~r day in court.28 
because counsel suggested that the prisoner enter a guilty plea based on the erroneous 
belief that the prisoner's confession was admissible. 
24. Id. at 770-71. 
25. Id. The "reasonably competent" attorney standards appear to have been derived 
from McMann when it stated that counsel's advice be "within the range of competence" 
of other criminal attorneys. Id. The Court, however, left to the state and lower federal 
courts the responsibility to establish specific standards. 
26. See generally Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 516. For a general discussion 
tracing the development of the farce and mockery standard see Bines, Remedying Inef-
fective Representation in Criminal Cases: Departures from Habeas Corpus, 59 VA. L. 
REv. 927 (1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 CORNElL L. REV. 1077 (1973); 
Simpson, supra note 9; Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, 
New Problems, 19 ARIz. L. REv. 443 (1977); Ineffective Representation, supra note 9; 
Effective Assistance, supra note 11. 
27. 586 F.2d at 1328. One of the first cases to articulate the "farce and mockery" 
standard was Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 
(1945); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 445 (1940). 
28. Judge Bazelon has stated that "the mockery test requires such a minimal level 
of performance from counsel that it is itself a mockery of the sixth amendment," 
4
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Several problems are created by linking effective assistance 
of counsel to the due process clause. A finding of unfairness in 
the conduct of the trial due to ineffective representation would 
require a reversal on the ground that defendant was deprived of 
due process. On the other hand, if the result of the trial was oth-
erwise fair to the defendant, the conviction would be upheld, de-
spite the lack of effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the 
underlying determination of whether an attorney had been effec-
tive is entirely subjective, thus providing no clear guidance by 
which to measure an attorney's representation. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that the Ninth Circuit in Cooper has joined the 
other circuits in rejecting the "farce and mockery of justice" 
standard and adopting the "reasonably competent and effective 
representation" standard based on the sixth amendment.29 
The "Reasonably Competent" and "Effective Representation" 
Standards 
Since the McMann decision, which directly linked the right 
to effective assistance of counsel to the sixth amendment, lower 
courts have developed their own standards based on the sixth 
amendment.3o Although no one sixth amendment standard has 
been consistently applied, two types of standards have 
emerged.31 
"Reasonably effective assistance under the circumstances of 
Bazelon, supra note 9, at 28-29; see also Ineffective Representation, supra note 9, at 26; 
Defects, supra note 9, at 400. 
29. See cases cited at note 39 infra; currently the First, Second and Tenth Circuits 
still follow the "farce and mockery of justice" standard. See, e.g., United States v. 
Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 683-84 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Burbar, 567 F.2d 192, 202 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977); United States v. Riebold, 557 F.2d 697, 702-
03 (10th Cir. 1977). The First and Second Circuits have begun to waver. The First Cir-
cuit left open the possibility of adopting a more lenient standard used by the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuits which looks to "reasonably effective assistance." Compare United States 
v. Wright, 573 F.2d at 684 with United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 886 (6th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 (1978) and United States v. Carter, 566 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978). The Second Circuit has refrained from specific-
ally adopting, but has made reference to the District of Columbia's more stringent stan-
dard of "reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as his diligent conscien-
tious advocate." Compare United States v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir. 1978) 
and United States v. Tolliver, 569 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1978) with United States v. 
DeCoster, 487 F. 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
30. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d at 1329. See also Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 
730 (3d Cir. 1970); see generally Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 530-37. 
31. Although courts have characterized their standards by different names, generally 
the standards fall into two categories. 
5
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the case" is the first standard.32 Courts which have adopted this 
standard determine reasonableness by hindsight rather than by 
considering defense counsel's conduct at the time legal services 
were rendered.33 If subsequent events at trial minimize the un-
reasonableness of defense counsel's actions, counsel's representa-
tion is found to be effective.34 Defendant is required to show a 
causal relationship between defense counsel's unreasonable con-
duct and the resulting unfair tria1.35 
This standard also presents problems. The hindsight ap-
proach of the standard limits the examination of counsel's ac-
tions to the cold record which does not contain a complete cata-
log of counsel's actions. In addition, a case by case analysis of 
the standard may cause unfair and uneven results. Finally, the 
standard places a heavy burden on the defendant to prove the 
causal connection between the attorney's actions and the unfair 
tria1.38 
"Reasonably competent assistance" is the second standard. 
Courts that use the "reasonably competent" standard describe 
minimum duties and guidelines that a defense attorney must 
perform.37 By creating duties and guidelines, these courts do not 
have to determine whether counsel was reasonable in each case 
as they do with the "reasonably effective assistance under the 
circumstances of the case" test. Rather, defendant must only 
show that the attorney violated a guideline or failed to perform a 
duty in order to show inadequate representation.3s 
32. See generally, Defects, supra note 9, at 402. 
33.Id. 
34.Id. 
35.Id. 
36. Id. at 403. 
37. Several courts have adopted the ABA Standards as guidelines. ABA STANDARDS 
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION fuNCTION AND THE DEFENSE fuNCTION § 4.1 (Approved draft 
1971) reads as follows: 
It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation 
of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues 
leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. 
The investigation should always include efforts to secure infor· 
mation in the possession of the prosecution and law enforce· 
ment authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of 
the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of the 
facts constituting guilt or his stated desired to plead guilty. 
See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 216·17 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. 
DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203·04 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
38. See Ineffective Representation, supra note 9, at 53; Defects, supra note 9, at 404. 
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The problems that arise from applying the "reasonably com-
petent assistance" standard are (1) the inflexibility of a minimal 
list of specific duties may serve only to create more elaborate 
rituals to satisfy sixth amendments requirements, and (2) there 
is a danger that the guidelines will be viewed as the maximum 
performance an attorney has to give rather than the minimum 
performance.39 
C. THE Cooper ANALYSIS AND ADOPTION OF REASONABLY 
EFFECTIVE AND COMPETENT DEFENSE STANDARD 
In Cooper, the Ninth Circuit traced the development of the 
"farce and mockery of justice" standard and noted that there 
has been a gradual shift toward the "reasonably· effective assist-
ance of counsel" standard.40 The court also observed that there 
has been confusion in the use of the term"· Finally, the court 
stated: "[W]e believe the differences are of sufficient importance 
. . . to justify deliberate rejection of the 'farce and mockery' 
verbiage in favor of a statement of the test in terms of reasona-
bly effective and competent defense representation."42 The 
court's adoption of the "reasonably effective and competent de-
fense representation" standard was based on the following: (1) 
the standard links both the sixth amendment guarantee of effec-
tive assistance of counsel and general requirements of due pro-
cess; (2) the standard focuses inquiry on the subject matter of 
,the sixth amendment guarantee, i.e., counsel's performance; and 
(3) the standard avoids the misleading implication that all that 
is relevant to a determination of counsel's performance is what 
occurred at trial and is in the record.43 
39. See Bazelon, supra note 9, at 33. 
40. 586 F.2d at 1329 & n.6. The "farce and mockery" standard has been abandoned 
by most of the circuits. Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543-44 (4th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rei. Wil-
liams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 641 (7th Cir. 1975); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 128 
(5th Cir. 1974); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974); United States 
v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1973)opinion after remand, No. 72-1283 (D.C. 
Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing en bane granted, No 72-1293 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1977); 
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (en banc). 
41. 586 F.2d at 1329. See, e.g., de Kaplany v. Enomoto, 540 F.2d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 
1976) (en banc) (interchangeable use of the terms "farce and mockery of justice" and 
"reasonably effective assistance"); United States v. Miramon, 470 F.2d 1362, 1363 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (synonymous use of the two standards); Leano v. United States, 457 F.2d 1208, 
1209 (9th Cir. 1972) (sYnonymous use of the two standards); Kruchten v. Eyman, 406 
F.2d 304, 312 (9th Cir. 1969) (interchangeable use of the two terms). 
42. 586 F.2d at 1329. 
43. [d. The court further stated that the "reasonably effective and competent de-
fense representation" test is an objective standard as opposed to the "farce and mockery 
7
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The Ninth Circuit's adoption of the "reasonably effective 
and competent defense representation" standard is, in effect, a 
combination of the two general tests that circuit courts have de-
veloped under the sixth amendment analysis of the right to 
counsel. But, in combining the standards, i.e., "reasonablyeffec-
tive assistance under the circumstances of the case" and "rea-
sonably competent assistance," the Ninth Circuit failed to iden-
tify what the necessary elements are to assert ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
The "reasonably effective assistance under the circum-
stances of the case" standard generally requires an examination 
of the trial by hindsight.u In Cooper, however, the court explic-
itly stated that its standard was designed to avoid the mislead-
ing implication that all that is relevant is what occurred at trial 
and appears on the face of the record,45 Whatever else is neces-
sary, in addition to the events at trial and what appears on the 
record, is left undefined by the Cooper court. 
The "reasonably competent assistance" standard generally 
delineates specific duties and guidelines.4ft In Cooper, the court 
recognized that some courts have "particularized elements of 
minimal performance."47 While acknowledging that such a 
checklist might enhance the objectivity of the general standard,48 
the court opted for a less rigid approach. In so doing, the Cooper 
court adopted the McMann rule that the determination of coun-
sel's competency should be "left to the good sense and discretion 
the trial courts."49 However, the Ninth Circuit's failure to sug-
gest guidelines in Cooper has the potential of confusing lower 
courts. For example, a court may combine elements of both stan-
dards, decide to favor one standard over another, or fashion its 
own test, unrelated to the precedents established in other 
circuits. 
of justice" standard which is "peculiarly subjective." [d. See also Marzullo v. Maryland. 
561 F.2d 540. 544 (4th Cir. 1977). 
44. See Defects. supra note 9. at 403. 
45. 586 F.2d at 1329. 
46. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra. 
47. 586 F.2d at 1330. See also United States v. DeCoster. 487 F.2d 1197. 1203·04 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). opinion after remand. No. 72·1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19. 1976). rehearing 
en bane granted. No. 72·1293 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17. 1977). Coles v. Peyton. 389 F.2d 224. 
226 (4th Cir.). eert. denied. 393 U.S. 849 (1968). 
48. 586 F .2d at 1330. 
49. [d .• quoting McMann v. Richardson. 397 U.S. at 771. 
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Finally, the court proceeded to define the constitutional 
standard of "reasonably effective and competent defense repre-
sentation," holding that the "fact that counsel erred is not alone 
enough to establish a denial of the constitutional right."50 Since, 
infallible representation is not guaranteed by the Constitution,51 
the accused "assumes the risk of ordinary error in ... his attor-
ney's assessment of the law and facts .... "52 To rise to the level 
of a constitutional violation "[d]efense counsel's errors or omis-
sions must reflect a failure to exercise the skill, judgment, or dil-
igence of a reasonably competent criminal defense attor-
ney-they must be errors a reasonably competent attorney 
acting as a diligent conscientious advocate would not have made, 
"53 
D. THE Cooper COURT'S REQUIREMENT OF PREJUDICE 
The requirement of preju_dice based on claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel was the major area of controversy con-
fronted by the Cooper court. Other circuit courts have disagreed 
on whether a separate showing of prejudice is required. M This 
precise issue has not been addressed by the Supreme Court. The 
Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in Cooper held that a showing 
of prejudice is required where a claim of ineffective counsel is 
based on an attorney's specific acts and omissions. 55 However, 
where counsel is not present or has been prevented from carrying 
out a vital function, automatic reversal is required.58 
The dissenting opinion rejects the majority's distinction and 
bases its theory on procedural fairness. 57 Once a defendant has 
made a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance, the dissent 
50. 586 F.2d at 1330. 
51. [d. See also Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir.1963). 
52. 586 F.2d at 1330 quoting McMann·v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 774. The Cooper 
court, in developing the constitutional standard further discussed the importance of 
counsel's ability to reasonably foresee that prejudice might arise as a result of his or her 
actions. [d. at 1330-31 n. 10. See generally Effective Assistance, supra note 11, at 542-44. 
53. 586 F.2d at 1330. 
54. See, e.g., McQueen v. Swensen, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974) (prejudice required); 
Beasley V. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (automatic reversal-no showing of 
prejudice); United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), opinion after re-
mand, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), rehearing en bane granted, No. 72-1293 
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1977) (counsel must conform with ABA standards quoted at note 37 
supra). 
55. 586 F.2d at 1331. 
56. [d. at 1332. 
57. [d. at 1334. 
9
Roper et al.: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
84 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:75 
asserts that automatic reversal should be required.58 The remain-
der of this Note will focus on the reasoning of both opinions, an-
alyzing their merits and weaknesses. 
The Majority Opinion 
The. majority held that a showing of prejudice is required 
when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel rest on specific 
acts and omissions of counsel at tria1.5v The court distinguished 
cases like Cooper, based on specific acts and omissions, from 
cases where no counsel is present or where counsel has been pre-
vented from carrying out vital functions. Based on several Su-
preme Court cases where counsel's effective assistance was pre-
vented, the court would not require a showing of prejudice. 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis with Chambers u. Ma-
roney,80 in which the defense counsel met with the defendant 
only a few minutes before trial. As a result of the belated ap-
pearance, counsel failed to object to certain adverse evidence. 
The defendant petitioned for habeas corpus relief asserting inef-
fective assistance of counsel. The petition was dismissed on the 
ground that the defendant had not been prejudiced. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, stating, "we are not disposed to fashion a 
per se rule requiring reversal of every conviction following tardy 
appointment of counsel in all cases. "81 
I 
This particular language in the Chambers opinion has been 
criticized as being ambiguous,82 and therefore, subject to various 
interpretations.83 Specifically, in Cooper, the majority interprets 
58.ld. 
59. Id. at 1331. 
60. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
61. Id. at 53·54. 
62. See generally Ineffective Representations, supra note 9, at 76. 
63. The majority and the dissent cite the following circuit court cases for differing 
propositions. United States ex rei. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970) (the 
Third Circuit considered the impact of counsel's failure to investigate an alibi defense); 
United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1966) (the Court held that the absence 
of counsel on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.) See also McQueen v. Swenson, 560 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1977); Cheely v. United 
States, 535 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976); Loftis v. Estelle, 515 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975). 
The majority cites Rundle and Crowley as holding, in line with Chambers, that reo 
versal is not required where the defendant suffered no prejudice from that error. 580 F.2d 
at 1331 n.11. The dissent, on the other hand, stated that the Third Circuit in Rundle and 
Crowley expre88ly adopted the automatic reversal rule for constitutionally ineffective 
counsel cases. Id. at 1337 n.6. According to the dissent, Rundle held that where an attor. 
10
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the Chambers rejection of a per se automatic reversal rule in all 
tardy appointment cases as standing for the proposition that, 
where counsel's specific acts and omissions have not prejudiced 
the defense, counsel's performance will be viewed as harmless er-
ror.64 Thus, the Cooper court rejects a per se rule of automatic 
reversal and embraces the harmless error doctrine, which mea-
sures the prejudicial effect of trial court error, assuming that 
some trial errors are too insignificant to require reversal of the 
trial judgment.65 
The Cooper court distinguished Gideon v. Wainwright68 
where no defense counsel was present. In Gideon, the defendant 
was charged with a non-capital felony. He appeared in state 
court with neither funds nor counsel and therefore, asked the 
court to appoint an attorney. Since state law only required the 
appointment of counsel on charges of capital offe~ses, the court 
denied his request. Upon exhaustion of defendant's state court 
remedies, the United States Supreme Court held that the right 
of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to have the assis-
tance of counsel is a fundamental right, made obligatory upon 
the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.67 
Next, the Cooper court distinguished a series of Supreme 
Court cases which warranted automatic reversal. In these cases, 
the court pointed out that counsel was prevented from carrying 
out a vital function. In Powell v. Alabama,68 the trial court judge 
generously appointed "all the members of the bar" to represent 
the defendants. 6D The Supreme Court found that since no lawyer 
was designated to represent the defendants from their arraign-
ment until trial, the period when vital consultation, investiga-
tion and preparation occur, defendants were not afforded the 
ney's failure cannot be determined, ineffective assistance is presumed and reversal is reo 
quired. Id. The dissent further counters the majority's interpretation of Crowley, stating 
that the Third Circuit limited the consideration of harmless error to the particular fact 
situation where counsel is absent for a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. 
64. 586 F.2d at 1331·32. 
65. 3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 851 (1969). See generally Mause, 
Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. 
REv. 519 (1969); Comment, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and the Harmless Error 
Rule: The Eighth Circuit Abandons Chapman, 43 GEO. WASKo L. REv. 1384 (1975). 
66. 372 U.S. 335 (1942). 
67. Id. at 339. 
GB. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
69. Id. at 49. 
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right to counsel "in any real sense."70 
In Geders v. United States,71 a court order prevented counsel 
from conferring with the defendant during an overnight recess. 
The Supreme Court examined the seventeen hour recess and 
held that the court order deprived the defendant of his right to 
counseU2 Central to the court's holding was the fact that it is 
common practice for an accused to confer with counsel during 
such extended recesses to discuss the events of the. day's trial. 
In Herring v. New York,73 a state statute granted the judge 
in a non-jury criminal trial the power to deny counsel the.oppor-
tunity to make a final summation. The Supreme Court found 
that "no aspect of [our adversary fact-finding process] could be 
more important than" the right of the defense to make a closing 
argument.74 Thus, the Court held that a total denial of the op-
portunity to make a closing argument, in a jury or non-jury 
criminal trial, contravenes the right to the assistance of counsel 
that the sixth amendment guarantees.75 
In Glasser v. United States78 and Holloway v. Arkansas,77 de-
fense counsel represented multiple defendants who allegedly had 
conflicting interests. In Glasser, the Supreme Court held that a 
defendant is entitled to the undivided assistance of counsel.78 
Since counsel's representation "was not as effective as it might 
have been if the appointment had not been made," the Court 
held that defendant was denied his sixth amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.78 In Holloway, the Supreme Court 
affirmed Glasser, holding that a court's failure to appoint sepa-
rate counsel upon timely motions by defense counsel, deprives a 
70. 1d. at 57. 
71. 425 U.S. 80 (1976). 
72. 1d .. at 91. 
73. 422 U.S. 853 (1975). 
74. 1d. at 862. 
75. 1d. at 857-59. 
76. 315 U.S. 60 (1942). 
77. 435 U.S. 475 (1978). 
78. 315 U.S. at 75. 
79. 1d. at 76. The Glasser Court held that "the 'assistance of counsel' guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and 
unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer should simultaneously represent 
conflicting interests." 1d. at 70. 
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defendant of the sixth amendment right to assistance of 
counse1.80 
In all of the above cases, reversal was automatic because the 
harm resulted from what the attorney was prevented from doing. 
Such harm could not be determined from the record since it ei-
ther occurred before there was a record or because it was not 
reflected in the record.81 The Cooper court, quoting Holloway, 
stated: "[T]hus an inquiry into a claim of harmless error would 
require ... unguided speculation."82 However, the harmless er-
ror rule should apply when specific acts and omissions occur at 
trial and their scope is readily identifiable from the record.83 
Since the reviewing court can determine with some confidence, 
and without mere speculation, if the error prejudiced the out-
come of the trial. 8. 
The Cooper court asserted another reason for granting relief 
only upon a showing of prejudice. The type of trial errors as-
serted by Cooper i.e., counsel's failure to object to the admission 
of evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, were of the 
type that could have been reviewed on direct appeal, as plain 
error,85 or in the alternative, could have justified collateral at-
tack.88 Both situations would have required a showing of 
prejudice.87 Therefore, the court reasoned that if these errors 
could escape a showing of prejudice by attacking them solely 
SO. 435 U.S. at 484-85. For a general discussion of the Holloway decision, see Note, 
The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Separate Counsel, 16 Houe. L. REv. 209 (1978); 
Comment, Multiple Criminal Representation Examined: Holloway v. Arkansas, 40 OHIO 
ST. L. REv. 251 (1979). 
81. 586 F.2d at 1332. 
82.Id. 
83. Id. In Cooper, the court examined the defendant's specifie allegations and found 
that 1) all of the alleged errors were readily identifiiable from the record, and 2) the 
allegation of counsel's failure to stipulate to a prior conviction was Cooper's only merito-
rious allegation and was not prejudicial enough to warrant reversal. See text accompany-
ing notes 90 to 93. 
84.Id. 
85. Id. at 1333. For general background material on the plain error doctrine, see 10 
J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.41 (2d ed. 1976). See text accompanying notes 126-128 
infra. 
86. 586 F.2d at 1333. For general background material on the collateral attack doc-
trine, see 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 65, at § 593. See also Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? 
Collateral Attack in Criminol Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142 (1970). 
87. 586 F.2d at 1333. For a discussion of the prejudice requirement under the plain 
doctrine, see 10 J. MOORE, supra note 85. For a discussion of the prejudice requirement 
under the collateral attack doctrine, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 423 U.S. 72 (1977). 
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under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the doctrines 
of plain error or collateral attack would be undermined. 
Finally, the court added two cautionary comments: 1) 
prejudice may result from the cumulative effect of multiple defi-
ciencies; and 2) the requirement of prejudice does not mean that . 
relief is only available if defendants would have been acquitted 
but for counsel's mistakes.8s 
Having defined the new Ninth Circuit standard and the re-
quirement of prejudice where ineffective assistance claims are 
based on specific act and omissions, the court applied the stan-
dard to the Cooper facts. sa Cooper alleged counsel's failure 
to object to the admission of the fruits of the warrantless 
searches of his home and person. The court found no merit 
to Cooper's allegation claiming counsel's failure to suppress 
the fruits of a warantless arrest, since the court found probable 
cause for the arrest and consent to the search.90 Cooper further 
alleged counsel's failure to move to supress his statements made 
to the police and failure to object to testimony regarding defen-
dant's identification at the pre-indictment lineup. Because the 
confession and line-up occurred prior to the Escobedo and Wade 
decisions, the court again found no merit to Cooper's claims: the 
interrogation was proper under pre-Escobedo standards, which 
existed at the time of trial; the pre-indictment lineup was proper 
under pre-United States v. Wade standards. 
Cooper also claimed counsel's failure to inform him of his 
right to appeal. The court determined however, that Cooper 
knew of his right to appeal independent of counsel. 91 Lastly, 
Cooper criticized his attorney's failure to stipulate to his prior 
burglary conviction. The court found that the only additional 
fact to come before the jury because of counsel's failure to stipu-
late was that probation on the earlier conviction had been re-
voked and that the prejudice from this additional information 
was slight.92 Therefore, the court held that even if counsel was 
negligent in this respect, the error was not prejudicial. 93 The 
88. 586 F.2d at 1333. 
89.1d. 
9O.1d. 
91. 1d. 
92.1d. 
93.1d. 
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court concluded that none of the Cooper allegations were preju-
dicial and therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing Cooper's 
habeas petition. 
The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Hufstedler, writing for the dissent,94 concurred with 
the majority's new standard requiring "reasonably competent 
and effective representation," but vigorously dissented on the re-
quirement of prejudice. The dissent argued that the right to as-
sistance of counsel is so fundamental that failure to provide con-
stitutionally adequate counsel at trial demands automatic 
reversal.95 The dissent launched three major attacks against the 
majority opinion: (1) circuit courts have not denied relief based 
on failure to show prejudice; (2) there is no viable distinction 
between situations where counsel is denied, or prevented from 
carrying out a vital function and where counsel's alleged ineffec-
tiveness is based on specific acts and omissions; and (3) the 
requirement of prejudice underlying the plain error and collat-
eral attack doctrines would not be undermined by requiring au-
tomatic reversal. 
The dissent's theory, underlying its automatic reversal rule, 
proposed that the sixth amendment not only embraces the right 
to counsel,98 but also the right to effective assistance of counsel. 97 
The dissent stated: "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
proscribes with equal force denials of reasonably competent and 
effective counsel, for '[i]t has long been recognized that the right 
to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.' "98 
The overriding concern in the right to counsel cases99 was enunci-
ated in Chapman u. California,loo where the Supreme Court 
stated that the right to counsel was among the "constitutional 
rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be 
treated as harmless error .... "101 Therefore, the dissent rea-
94. Judges Ely and Hug joined Judge Hufstedler's dissenting opinion. 
95. [d. at 1334. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 1335. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Marzullo v. Mary-
land, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977); Beasley v. United States, 491, F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 
1974). 
98. 586 F.2d at 1338, quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14. 
99. E.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
100. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
101. [d. at 23. 
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soned, a sixth amendment violation, such as a violation of the 
right to effective assistance of counsel, always requires automatic 
reversal. 102 
The dissent cited recent Supreme Court casesl03 which reaf-
firmed the Chapman automatic reversal rule. 104 However, these 
are the same cases the majority opinion in Cooper used to sup-
port its analysis. Where the majority characterized Herring, 
Geders and Holloway as warranting automatic rev.ersal,105 since 
counsel was prevented from carrying out a vital function, the 
dissent characterized these same cases as holding that automatic 
reversal applies regardless of any absence or presence of 
prejudice. loe The dissent found further support in Holloway, 
which reaffirmed the "general rule" of automatic reversal for vio-
lations of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, 
the dissent argued: "The right to effective assistance of counsel 
is more than a right to be free from prejudicial trial errors. The 
right to competent counsel is also based on considerations of pro-
cedural fairness that apply regardless of the strength of the case 
against the accused."107 
The dissent recognized that refusal to grant automatic re-
versal would impair defendants' right to the very presence of 
counsel because defendants, faced with overwhelming evidence 
of guilt, might never be able to demonstrate prejudice from the 
absence of counsel. Since this type of situation goes to the very 
heart of fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings, courts 
should not look to whether prejudice resulted or was shown. 108 
The dissent contended that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Chambers v. Maroneyl09 does not undermine the automatic re-
versal rule. According to the dissent, Chambers dealt only with 
the issue of what constitutes constitutionally ineffective counsel; 
102. 586 F.2d at 1335. 
103. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 
80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1976). 
104. The Chapman automatic reversal rule holds that certain constitutional rights, 
such as the right to counsel, are so basic to a fair trial, that a denial of those rights can 
never be treated as harmless error. Chapman v. California, 380 U.S. 18, 23 n.8 (1967). 
105. See text accompanying notes 71 to 84 supra. 
106. 586 F.2d at 1335. 
107. [d. 
108. [d. 
109. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
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it did not determine whether or not a defendant need show 
prejudice. Furthermore, the dissent finds misleading the major-
ity's analysis of appellate decisions in line with Chambers, as not 
requiring reversal where prejudice is not shown. l1° The dissent 
states that neither Chambers nor the circuit court decisions re-
quire a separate showing of prejudicelll apart from the overall 
demonstration that trial counsel did not conform to the constitu-
tional standard of competency. The dissent states that, "[o]nce 
trial counsel has been held to have been constitutionally ineffec-
tive, no circuit has denied relief because the error was 
harmless." 112 
The dissent rejected the majority's application of the auto-
matic reversal rule to only those situations where there is no 
counselor where counsel is prevented from carrying out vital 
functions. The dissent found no reason to distinguish between 
situations where there is no counselor counsel is prevented from 
carrying out vital functions, from situations where counsel is in-
competent. 1I3 Despite the fact that automatic reversal is pre-
mised, in part, on the difficulty of assessing the prejudicial im-
pact, this should not justify restricting the rule to situations 
where counsel is prevented from performing. In all situations, as-
sessing the prejudicial impact of the situations is difficult and 
results in speculation. The dissent argued that there will always 
be cases of specific acts or omissions where the cold record will 
not truly reflect counsel's performance or the effect of counsel's 
errors. 
The dissent also found no merit in the majority's argument 
110. The dissent argued that since the circuit court cases did not expressly require a 
separate showing of prejudice, these cases did not support the majority's holding. 586 
F.2d at 1336·37. 
111. [d. at 1336 & 1337 n.6. 
112. [d. at 1338. 
113. The dissent stated: 
Defendants represented by incompetent attorneys surely are at 
least as bad off as defendants with competent counsel who are 
barred from presenting closing argument at a bench trial. A 
holding that pro forma appointment of counsel is sufficient to 
remove Sixth Amendment violations from the automatic rever· 
sal rule would undermine the purpose of Gideon. 
[d. at 1338. The dissent further quotes from the original Cooper panel that "the purpose 
of Gideon was not merely to supply criminal defendants with warm bodies, but rather to 
guarantee reasonable competent representation." [d. at n.11, quoting Cooper v. Fitzhar-
ris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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that automatic reversal would undermine the requirement of 
prejudice, included in the plain error and collateral attack doc-
trines. The dissent's interpretation is that the requirement of 
prejudice included in both doctrines is permissible when counsel 
is competent, since then the defendant could have knowingly 
waived his rights and thus a requirement of prejudice may be 
justifiable. However, when counsel is incompetent, the underly-
ing "waiver" may not have been knowing,, 14 To protect the de-
fendant from unknowingly waiving his right to appeal because of 
incompetent counsel, automatic reversal should be adopted. 
Lastly, the dissent notes that the majority did not deter-
mine who should bear the burden of proving prejudice. If a 
harmless error approach is taken, the dissent advocates that, 
under Chapman v. California,1I5 someone other than the preson 
prejudiced must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
was harmless. 
E. CRITIQUE 
Portions of each opmIOn in Cooper make important and 
meritorious legal arguments. 1I8 Both opinions, however, also have 
significant gaps within their reasonings and thus create analyti-
cal problems. The remainder of the Note will examine the major 
areas of conflict and the weaknesses of each opinion. These areas 
include: (1) the distinction between vital function and claims and 
specific act and omission claims; (2) the effect of automatic rever-
salon the plain error and collateral attack doctrines; (3) the inter-
pretation of precedent; and (4) the procedural fairness theory. 
Vital Functions as Distinguished From Specific Acts and 
Omissions 
The essence of the majority's argument is that automatic re-
114. 586 F.2d at 1339. 
115. 386 U.S. 18 (1967). In Chapman, the Supreme Court stated: "[c]onstitutional 
error. . . casts on someone other than the person prejudiced by it a burden to show that 
it was harmless." [d. at 24. The Court further stated that the prosecution bears the bur· 
den of proving that the constitutional error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 
[d. See also United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1968). 
116. The majority opinion discusses the vital function/specific acts and omissions 
distinction, 586 F.2d at 1332; and the possibility of circumventing the prejudice require-
ment included within the plain error/collateral attack doctrines, id. at 1333. The dissent 
argues against the majority's plain error/collateral attack position, id. at 1339; then in· 
terpretes precedent, id. at 1335·38 and discusses procedural fairness, id. at 1335. 
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versal is required only when no counsel appears or where counsel 
is prevented from performing vital functions. While the majority 
does not expressly define the distinction, it cites cases it consid-
ers are properly within the automatic reversal rule.1I7 The major-
ity seems to view specific acts and omissions as errors that occur 
in the course of the trial that will appear in the record. liS The 
rationale for the vital functions/specific acts distinction is that 
"when no counsel is provided, or counsel is prevented from dis-
charging his normal functions, the evil lies in what the attorney 
does not do, and is either not readily apparent in the record, or 
occurs at a time when no record is made."lIg Where there is a 
claim relating to a specific act and omission "the error occurs at 
trial and its scope is readily identifiable."'20 
The majority's distinction makes sense especially where 
claims of ineffectiveness of counsel are based on facts similar to 
those in Cooper.121 Practically speaking, there is an obvious dif-
ference in magnitude between counsel being prevented from 
making a closing argument or conferring with the client, and 
counsel making a tactical error, such as failing to stipulate to a 
prior conviction. 
The dissent, however, raises the issue that the line between 
failure to perform vital functions and failure to perform specific 
acts and omissions is not clear.'22 There are situations that could 
conceivably fall into both categories. For instance, a court might 
prevent the attorney from making a clear objection, thereby pre-
serving the defendant's right to appeal. Likewise, a court might 
deny a request to make an offer of proof. A judge might deny a 
continuance so that pre-trial investigation or additional client 
conference could not be conducted. 'These situations could be 
viewed as either specific errors by the attorney or as a court 
117. For a discussion of the cases cited by' the majority, see text accompanying notes 
66 to 80 supra. 
118. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Geders v. United States, 425 
U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932). 
119. 586 F.2d at 1332, quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U .. S. at 490. 
120. [d. 
121. See text accompanying notes 4 & 5 supra. 
122. 586 F.2d at 1338. The dissent states: "It makes little sense to distinguish be-
tween cases where counsel is denied and cases where counsel is incompetent because rep-
resentation by incompetent counsel may be little or no better than no representation at 
all." 1d. 
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preventing an attorney from performing vital functions. Since 
under Cooper this distinction makes the difference between hav-
ing to show prejudice or being automatically reversed without 
such a showing, clarity is needed for uniform application in the 
trial courts. While the extreme cases may clearly fall in one cate-
gory or the other, the closer cases will undoubtedly create 
problems of interpretation. To this extent, the automatic rever-
sal rule is preferable since it would ensure consistency in trial 
court treatment of the basic procedural right to a fair trial. I23 
Plain Error and Collateral Attack 
The majority is concerned that if prejudice is not required 
the criminal defendant will be encouraged to make claims of in-
effective assistance in order to skirt traditional review processes 
where prejudice is required. 124 The majority asserts that if 
prejudice is not required the doctrines of plain error and collat-
eral attack would be undermined.m 
Plain errors are errors or defects affecting substantial rights 
that were not brought to the attention of the court by objection 
at trial. I28 Where no objection is made, an appellate court will 
reverse a trial judgment only where the errors are obvious,l27 or if 
they affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judi-
cifil proceeding.128 The error must be shown to prejudice the de-
fendant's case. Thus, if the error was "harmless," even if it is 
obvious, the result will not be reversed. 
Collateral attack,l29 which the Cooper dissent refers to as the 
Wainwright v. Sykes doctrine,130 originates with a habeas corpus 
petition. A state prisoner claims that state remedies have been 
exhausted without a decision on the merits of a federal constitu-
tional claim because of his failure to comply with the state pro-
123. See text accompanying notes 96 to 102 supra, and notes 157 to 166 infra. 
124. 586 F.2d at 1333. 
125. Id. 
126. 10 J. MOORE, supra note 85, at § 103.41. 
127. Id.; see also United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157. 160 (1936). 
128. 10 J. MOORE, supra note 85, at 0 103.41. 
129. See generally Goodman & Sollett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal 
Courts Respond. 30 HAsTINGS L.J. 1683 (1979); Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Inef· 
fective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Has Work to Do. 31 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(1978); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus: Further Erosion of Its Efficacy as a Remedy for 
State Incarceration. 24 Loy. L. REv. 251 (1978). 
130. 586 F.2d at 1339. 
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cedural rules on how the claim must be raised, i.e., where state 
law requires a trial objection and counsel failed to make one. 131 
In order to assert this type of collateral attack, the defendant 
must show cause for the failure to object at the time and actual 
prejudice .132 
The majority basically argues that if prejudice is not re-
quired for specific act and omission claims, defendants will over-
whelmingly choose to assert ineffective assistance claims to 
avoid the extra showing of prejudice required on directl33 appeal 
or collateral attack on the underlying constitutional violation. 
Thus, the court will be faced with large numbers of ineffective 
assistance petitions which would have been subject to a 
prejudice test on appeal. The court will have to rule on those 
cases where errors below could have been held harmless on the 
merits of the underlying claim. 
The dissent disagrees, contending that both these theories 
are based on defendant knowingly waiving his or her rights and 
then later raising a claim for relief. ls4 However, if counsel was 
inadequate, defendant may not have been aware of his rights 
and therefore could not be said to have knowingly waived 
them. 135 Waiver depends on personal participation and proceeds 
on the premise that the law should strive to guard against the 
individual's inadvertent or uninformed loss of a valuable right. 13B 
To protect the defendant from unknowingly waiving such impor-
tant rights because of incompetent counsel, automatic reversal 
should be applied upon prima facie showing of ineffectiveness. 137 
Furthermore, the dissent points out that trial courts will be 
able to distinguish between true ineffective assistance cases and 
claims that are in reality underlying substantive assertions that 
should go up on direct appeal or collateral attack. 13s The dissent 
131. See note 129 supra. 
132. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
133. 586 F.2d at 1333. 
134. [d. at 1339. See generally Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and 
the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1978). 
135. United States v. Marshall, 488 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1973). 
136. See Spritzer, supra note 134, at 513, 514. 
137. 586 F.2d at 1337. 
138. [d. at 1340 n.16. The dissent stated: 
The majority's fear that collateral attack rules will be under-
mined must rest on a distrust of the ability of courts to distin-
guish genuine claims of inadequate counsel and disguised col-
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points out that for ineffective assistance claims, the defendant 
must show why the attorney was incompetent,139 Such a showing 
is not required on appeal of the underlying claim. Thus trial 
courts will be able to identify those claims which are brought 
merely to circumvent the prejudice requirement because a prima 
facie showing of ineffectiveness will not be made out. 
With rulings on this prejudice issue being so recent, it is dif-
ficult to assess whether the majority's concerns will manifest 
themselves in practice. Additionally, there is no way to assess 
the dissent's conclusion that even if defendants do increasingly 
rely on habeas ineffective assistance claims, trial courts will be 
able to separate the real from the contrived claims. Perhaps the 
experience of the circuit courts who have ruled on this issue 
could be utilized to resolve this conflict. 
Interpretation of Precedent 
Throughout the opinion the majority and the dissent rely on 
the same casesl40 for differing propositions. UI It is this difference 
in interpretation that determines the ultimate result in the ma-
jority's and dissent's positions on the requirement of prejudice. 
Generally speaking, the majority reads the sixth amendment 
precedent narrowly, while the dissenting judges read the same 
cases much more broadly. 
The majority claims that courts of appeals have regularly 
held that "reversal is not required where the defendant suffered· 
prejudice as a result of the asserted trial errors. . . . "142 The 
dissent responded that "once trial counsel has been held to have 
been constitutionally ineffective, no circuit has denied relief be-
[d. 
139. [d. 
lateral attack. Since the majority presumes courts to be 
capable of determining the more subjective issue of prejudice, 
it is curious that they would distrust the ability of judges to 
apply the objective standard of attorney competence. 
140. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 
(1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932). 
141. Compare the majority's use of the cases cited in note 141 supra, 586 F.2d at 
1331-32 with the dissent's use of the same cases, id. at 1336-38. 
142. [d. at 1331. 
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cause the error was harmless."u3 Both of these positions are 
overstated. 
The majority failed to recognize or refute the analysis of the 
Third and Sixth Circuits which have adopted the automatic re-
versal doctrine. The Third Circuit in Moore v. United States, 144 
indicates that prejudice is one relevant factor, but is not a pre-
requisite to prevail on ineffective assistance claims. The Sixth 
Circuit in Beasley v. United States l45 stated that "[h]armless er-
ror tests do not apply in regard to the deprivation of a procedu-
ral right so fundamental as the effective assistance of counsel." 
The dissent is incorrect to state that no circuit has denied 
relief because the error was harmless. First, the dissent failed to 
address the Third Circuit's holding in United States ex rel. 
Chambers v. Maroneyl48 which denied defendant's habeas corpus 
petition on the ground that "the sum and substance of the case 
is that [defendant] was not prejudiced by the late appointment 
of counsel." Chambers was subsequently affirmed by the United 
States Supreme Court.147 Second, the dissent ignored the cases 
from the Eighth Circuit which has had a requirement of preju-
dice since 1975.148 
The dissent also states that "neither Chambers nor the cir-
cuit court decisions require any showing of prejudice apart from 
the demonstration that trial counsel did not conform to the con-
stitutional standard of competency."I" This blanket statement is 
143. [d. at 1338. 
144. 432 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1970). 
145. 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974). 
146. 408 F.2d 1186, 1196 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The Third Circuit 
in Chambers interpreted its previous decision, United States ex reI. Mathis V. Rundle, 
394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968) which held that denial of effective assistance of counsel could 
be presumed from a showing of belated appointment unless the prosecution proved that 
the defense had not been prejudiced by the tardy appointment. 408 F.2d at 1186. The 
Third Circuit, in Chambers construed this to mean the inherent prejudice due to late 
appointment of counsel may be properly overcome either 1) by evidence produced by the 
state in an evidentiary hearing showing that there was no prejudice, or 2) by adequate 
affirmative proof otherwise appearing in the record demonstrating that the appellant was 
not prejudiced. [d. at 1190. Mathis has since been overruled by Moore V. United States, 
432 F.2d 730, 73 (3d Cir. 1970). See note 152 infra. 
147. Chambers V. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
148. 510 F.2d 356, 358 (8th Cir. 1975). See also McQueen V. Swenson, 560 F.2d 959, 
960 (8th Cir. 1977), rev'g 425 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Mo. 1976); t.Jnited States V. Easter, 539 
F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976); Thomas V. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir. 1976). 
149. 586 F.2d at 1336-37. The majority and dissent clearly use the Supreme Court's 
23
Roper et al.: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
98 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:75 
not supported by the cases cited. 150 The dissent correctly notes 
that the whole issue of prejudice may be a factor to be consid-
ered in weighing whether the defendant has sufficiently shown 
ineffectiveness. 151 
The first series of cases that the dissent relies on for this 
proposition are from the Third and Sixth Circuit, both of which 
have adopted the automatic reversal rule.152 Further, all of these 
cases involve absence of any counselor failure of counsel to per-
form a vital function, situations which the majority agrees would 
warrant automatic reversal. 153 
The dissent does cite two Fourth Circuit cases that are con-
cerned with the first, bad advice concerning entering of a guilty 
plea and second, an attorney's errors during jury selection.154 
decision in Chamber's for differing propositions. The majority interprets the Chamber's 
rejection of a per se automatic reversal rule as holding that where counsel's performance 
has not prejudiced the defense, counsel's alleged errors will be harmless. See text accom-
panying note 60-65 supra. The dissent, on the other hand, finds the sole issue in Cham-
bers not whether a separate showing is required, but rather what constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel. [d. at 1336; see text accompanying notes 109-112 supra. Judge Huf-
stedler's view is strengthened by the fact that Chambers is not cited in any of the circuit 
court decisions that the majority interprets as requiring a separate showing of prejudice. 
[d. at 1337. 
150. See note 148 supra. 
151. 586 F.2d at 1337-38. 
152. E.g., Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) and text accompa-
nying note 145 supra; Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730,737 (3d Cir. 1970). Moore 
expressly overruled United States ex rei. Mathis v. Rundle, 394 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1968). 
The dissent states that the Third Circuit in Moore expressly adopts the automatic rever-
sal rule. 586 F.2d at 1336 n.5. However, the relevant language in Moore states the follow-
ing: "[T]he ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's act 
or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of normal competency. 
That the client was prejudiced by a failure in performance is of course evidentiary on the 
issue." 432 F.2d at 737. Although the language impliedly adopts the automatic reversal 
rule, there is nothing in the opinion that expressly adopts the rule. Because it overruled 
Mathis, Moore stands for the proposition that prejudice is no longer presumed, but rather 
may be one of the factors in determining if counsel was ineffective. 432 F.2d at 735. 
For other cases in the Third and Sixth Circuits, see, e.g .. United States v. Sumlin, 
567 F.2d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 1977) (ineffective assistance of counsel during FBI interroga-
tion was "of a different type altogether than those that deal with errors at trial or in trial 
preparation."); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1976) (limits application 
of harmless error on denial of counsel at a hearing on a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea); United States ex rei. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1970) (failure to 
investigate an alibi-ineffectiveness presumed and reversal required). 
153. See text accompanying note 57 supra. 
154. Tolliver v. United States, 563 F.2d 1117, 1121 (4th Cir. 1977) (flagrant misad-
vice resulting from "neglect or ignorance rather than from informed, professional deliber-
ation" deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 
F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 1977) (representation during jury selection was "outside the range 
24
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Both of these cases do deal with specific acts and omissions and 
there was no inquiry into prejudice. The dissent, however, ne-
glects to point out the other circuits that do have prejudice re-
quirements. 155 Thus, in their respective zeal, neither majority nor 
dissent honestly portrays the present state of the law. In reality, 
the circuit courts are split not two, but three ways on this very 
difficult issue, with cogent arguments being made on all sides. 156 
Ultimately, the resolution of the question depends on social pol-
icy considerations and on an analysis of the sixth amendment. 
Procedural Fairness 
The sixth amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense."157 The right to the assistance of 
counsel has been described as "necessary to insure fundamental 
human rights to life and liberty."158 There can be no question 
that the right to counsel is at the very core of the right to a fair 
trial. In Chapman, the high court acknowledged that a violation 
of this fundamental right could never be harmless; therefore, a 
showing of prejudice is not required. 159 
The Cooper dissent's strongest argument, that procedural 
fairness requires automatic reversal, is entirely ignored by the 
Cooper majority.160 This policy argument relies heavily on Chap-
man for the proposition that sixth amendment right to counsel 
violations cannot be harmless. When Chapman's holding is com-
bined with the rule of McMann which equates the right to coun-
sel with the right to effective counsel,161 the resultant constitu-
of competence expected of attorneys in criminal cases" and therefore deprived defen· 
dant of effective representation). 
155. See note 148 supra. 
156. See note 54 supra. 
157. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
158. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 
U.S. 444 (1940). 
159. 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
160. The majority deals with procedural fairness as an afterthought in one line near 
the end of their opinion. They acknowledge, .. [tlhe guilty as well as the innocent are 
entitled to a fair trial, and' [tlhe assistance of trial counsel is often a requisite to the 
very existence of a fair trial.'" 586 F.2d at 1333, quoting Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 31 (1972). 
161. In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), the Supreme Court held that 
the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. [d. at 771. In McMann, 
the defendants entered guilty pleas which they claimed were the result of coerced 
confessions. 
25
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tional imperative points strongly towards automatic reversal for 
all ineffective assistance cases.162 
Additionally, since the sixth amendment protects procedu-
ral fairness, its provisions apply equally to innocent and guilty 
defendants. 183 If, as McMann suggests, effective assistance is a 
foundational element of a fair trial, then effective assistance 
should be available to innocent and guilty alike. The Cooper dis-
sent correctly notes that a showing of prejudice will be an insur-
mountable barrier to remedying a constitutional violation of this 
right for defendants whose guilt is clear.'84 It will also be a diffi-
cult burden for defendants whose innocence is unclear. The 
prejudice showing required by the majority in Cooper thus 
makes obtaining a remedy for ineffective counsel more difficult 
for those whose guilt is clear or whose innocence is unclear, when 
procedural fairness should be equally available to all who are ac-
cused of crime. The standard of review of ineffectiveness claims 
should enable all defendants on an equal basis to remedy their 
constitutional deprivation of competent counsel. 
In Gideon, Justice Black eloquently wrote: 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel 
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to 
fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From 
the very beginning, our state and national consti· 
tutions and laws have laid great emphasis on pro· 
cedural and substantive safeguards designed to 
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in 
which every defendant stands equal before the 
law.'15 
Since McMann held that criminal defendants are constitu-
tionally entitled to the "effective assistance of competent coun-
sel," 188 perhaps the procedural safeguards Justice Black dis-
cussed necessitate automatic reversal for ineffective assistance 
violations despite the precedent to the contrary. 
162. The majority agrees that automatic reversal is constitutionally required where 
no counsel appears or where counsel is prevented from performing a vital funtion. 586 
F.2d at 1332. Thus, the dissent is only arguing for extension of this rule to specific acts 
and omissions cases. 
163. See note 160 supra. See also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963). 
164. 586 F.2d at 1335. 
165. 372 U.S. at 344. 
166. 397 U.S. at 771. 
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F. CONCLUSION 
The significance of Cooper lies in its rejection of the "farce 
and mockery of justice" standard and its endorsement of the 
"reasonably competent and effective assistance of counsel" stan-
dard. Adoption of the standard should lead to a more objective 
view of what constitutes effective assistance of counsel. The 
court, however, by combining both the "reasonably effective as-
sistance of counsel" standard and the "reasonably competent as-
sistance" standard has left room for confusion among the lower 
courts since no guidelines were established as to what the level of 
attorney ineffectiveness should be. 
The more controversial portion of the Cooper opinion is its 
adoption of the prejudice requirement. Using a two-step analy-
sis, a defendant must first prove ineffective assistance of counsel 
and second, must prove that the outcome of his or her trial was 
prejudiced by the ineffectiveness of counsel. The dissent makes a 
persuasive policy argument for automatic reversal based on the 
need to assure all criminal defendants a fair trial. Since the cir-
cuit courts are split in several directions, the ultimate resolution 
of this conflict awaits Supreme Court review. 
Catherine A. Yanni 
II. "RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT 
ORGANIZATIONS": THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
ENDORSEMENT OF POPULAR DECISION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1970, Congress passed the Organized Crime Control Act 
(OCCA-70), aimed at "the eradication of organized crime in the 
United States."· Title IX of this Act, "Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations" [RICO], 2 provides stiff penalties for 
1. Statement of Findings and Purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act, 84 Stat. 
923 (1970). See also McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S. 30) or its Critics: Which 
Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 141 (1970) (Written by Senator 
McClellan who, in conjunction with Senator Hruska, introduced legislation later incorpo-
rated into RICO). 
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). OCCA-70 also includes Title I, Special Grand Jury, 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3331-3334; Title II, General Immunity, id. at §§ 6001-6005; Title III, Recalci-
trant Witnesses, 28 U.S.C. § 1826; Title IV, False Declarations, 18 U.S.C. § 1623; Title 
V, Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses, id. at § 3481; Title VI, Deposi-
27
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those who participate in the affairs of an "enterprise"3 through a 
"pattern of racketeering activity"· or collection of unlawful debt.5 
tions. 18 U.S.C. § 3503; Title VII, Litigation Concerning Sources of Evidence, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3504; Title vm, Syndicated Gambling, 18 U.S.C. § 1511; Title X, Dangerous Special 
Offender Sentencing, id. at §§ 3575-78; Title XI, Regulation of Explosives, id. at §§ 841-
848; Title XII, National Commission on Individual Rights, id. at § 3331 note, 84 Stat. 960. 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976) defines "enterprise" as: "any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals 
associated in fact although not a legal entity." 
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as: "at least 
two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this 
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison-
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) 
(1976) defines "racketeering activity" as follows: 
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, 
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or 
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and 
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any 
act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of 
Title 18, United States Code: section 201 (relating to bribery), 
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 
473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft 
from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 
659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from 
pension and welfare funds), section 891-894 (relating to extor-
tionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the trans-
mission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail 
fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relat-
ing to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruc-
tion of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the 
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), 
section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to 
interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 
1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 
(relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sec-
tions 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of 
stolen property), sections 2341-46 (relating to trafficking in con-
traband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave 
traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United 
States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments 
and loans to labor organizations), or section 501(c) (relating to 
embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving 
bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felon-
ious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buy-
ing, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous 
drugs, punishable under any law of the United States. 
5. "Unlawful debt" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1976) as: 
[Aj debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity 
which was in violation of the law of the United States. . . and 
(B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gam-
bling . . . or the business of lending money or a thing of value 
at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usu-
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Sanctions for RICO violations are often much harsher than the 
sanctions provided by state and federal law for the numerous 
predicate offenses defining "racketeering activity."e Because the 
definitional language in section 1961 of the Act is subject to vary-
ing interpretations, questions have arisen as to the proper appli-
cation of the statute, and in fact, the constitutionality of RICO 
has been challenged on a number of grounds.7 
In United States v. Rone,8 a Ninth Circuit panel dealt with 
the issue of whether two criminal conspirators, acting in concert 
to commit various offenses, could be termed a RICO "enterprise" 
and thus fall within the am bit of the statute. Defendant Rone and 
co-defendant Little associated together for purposes of commit-
ting several acts of murder and extortion, and ultimately were 
convicted of the substantive RICO offense and the concomitant 
rious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate. 
These definitions are utilized in the substantive offense section of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 
(1976): 
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any 
income derived . . . from a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt. . . to use. . . any part 
of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any 
enterprise which is engaged in or the activities of which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce . . . . (b) It shall be unlawful 
for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or 
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, 
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise 
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate 
or foreign commerce. (c) It shall be unlawful for any person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or 
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, 
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct 
of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or collection of unlawful debt. 
6. For instance, two acts of mail fraud are punishable by a $2,000 fine and ten years 
imprisonment, with no forfeiture. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976). For comparable punishment 
under RICO, see note 41 infra and accompanying text. 
7. RICO has been subject to five constitutional challenges: vagueness, lack of author-
ity under the commerce clause, violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws, 
violation of the protection against double jeopardy, and violation of the eighth amend-
ment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. None have been upheld. See 
Atkinson, "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," 18 U.S. C. §§ 1961-68: 
Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes, 69 J. OF CRIM. L. AND CRIM. I, 4-9 (1978). 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to hear a RICO case, the court, in a footnote to 
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975), commented on RICO and the rationale 
behind the statute. 420 U.S. at 787 n.19. 
8. 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. June 1979) (per Foley, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Ely and Wallace, JJ.). 
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conspiracy.s On appeal, defendants urged that their convictions 
should be reversed, arguing that only legitimate businesses con-
ducted through a pattern of racketeering activity fall within the 
meaning of "enterprise," and here the prosecution failed to show 
that defendants associated with such a business. lo The majority 
of the panel disagreed, holding that a RICO "enterprise" could 
indeed include purely illicit organizations. It 
B. "ENTERPRISE" UNDER RICO 
Four sister circuits have agreed that the broad sword of RICO 
is aimed at those who participate in the affairs of unlawful organi-
zations through a pattern of racketeering activity.12 Central to 
this position is the idea that if Congress intended to limit 
"enterprise" to lawful business, it could have "inserted a single 
word of restriction,"13 and that the use of "any" in modifying 
"enterprise" mandates a broad reading of the statutory require-
ment. U Additionally, unlike the typical penal statute which is 
strictly construed,15 RICO explicitly provides that "provisions of 
this title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purpose."la "Enterprise" has been held to include a state govern-
mental unit,17 a foreign business,18 a police departm~nt, IS and the 
9. Both defendants were also convicted of two counts of extortion (18 U.S.C. § 894); 
defendant Hone alone was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm (18 U .S.C. § 
5861(d)) and possession of a firearm which was not identified by a serial number (18 
U.S.C. § 5861(i)). 
10. 598 F.2d at 568. 
11. [d. 
12. United States v. Aleman, No. 78-1782, slip op. at 8-10 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 1979); 
United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246,1248-49 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
933 (1979); United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 891-98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
1021 (1978); United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); United States v. 
Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); 
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). 
Contra, United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 58-59 (D. Conn. 1975). Moeller was subsequently overruled by 
United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 n.6. 
13. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106. 
14. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 898. But see United States v. Hone, 598 F.2d 
564, 574 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting). 
15. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973); see also Rewis v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971). 
16. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (1970). 
17. United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
18. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 1105 
(1975). 
19. United States v. Brown. 555 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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narcotics bureau of a police department;20 the majority rationale 
sees no reason to exclude criminal associations from this category. 
All the cases cited by the Rone court assert that this broad read-
ing of "enterprise" comports with the legislative intent underly-
ing Title IX.21 Thus the de facto association of the defendants in 
Rone constituted a RICO "enterprise," the affairs of which were 
conducted through racketeering activity; indeed, the primary 
purpose of the "enterprise" was to commit such unlawful acts. 
The requisite nexus of the "enterprise" to interstate commerce 
would exist if the jury found any of three assertions to be true. 22 
The dissenting opinion in Rone, written by Judge Ely, relies 
heavily on the reasoning of Judge Van Graafeiland in his dissent-
ing opinion to United States v. Altese. 23 That is, absent clear 
Congressional intent, federal criminal jurisdiction should not ex-
tend to every illicit venture which, in some minimal fashion, 
affects interstate commerce.24 While such action may be constitu-
tionally permissible, the intent of the lawmakers in drafting 
RICO was quite the opposite, as an examination of relevant legis-
lative history demonstrates. 25 RICO was intended to operate as a 
business regulatory statute, but this function is not served if the 
"enterprise" being "protected" is an illegitimate organization, 
possibly even an individual bandit. 28 
20. United States v. Ohlson, 552 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977). 
21. See, e.g., 84 Stat. 923 (1970) (stating the desire to "seek the eradication of organ-
ized crime"). See note 12 supra. 
22. To constitute a violation of § 1962, the enterprise in question must affect inter-
state or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976). The jury in Rone could have found 
this nexus by concluding either: (1) the company operated by a murder victim bought 
steel manufactured outside Caifornia; or (2) defendants received and cashed another 
murder victim's Social Security checks issued in Alabama; or (3) defendants engaged in 
extortionate collection of debts. 598 F.2d at 573. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 
(1971); United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 364 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). 
23. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). 
24. 542 F.2d at 107. C{. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 
(1935) (if the commerce clause reached all enterprises having merely an "indirect" effect 
upon interstate commerce, the "authority of the state over its domesitc concerns would 
exist only by sufferance of the federal government"). See also United States v. Sutton, 
605 F.2d 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979) .. 
25. See S. REp. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. REp. No. 91-1549, 
reprinted in (1970) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4007, 4032-36; United States v. Moeller, 
402 F. Supp. 49, 59 (D. Conn. 1975). See generally Comment, Organized Crime and the 
Infiltration of Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "Criminal Activity", 124 U. PA. 
L. REV. 124, 204-206 (1975). 
26. See United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 612-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 
F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); Comment, Title IX of the 
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This line of reasoning has not impressed the majority view, 
which has admitted that, although the infiltration of legitimate 
business was a major concern, "Congress also intended to pro-
hibit any pattern of racketeering activity in or affecting com-
merce."27 This sweeping rationale ignores the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis, a rule of statutory interpretation which "warns against 
expansively interpreting broad language which immediately fol-
lows narrow and specific terms."28 Applied to RICO, the broad 
language "any ... group of individuals associated in fact al-
though not a legal entity"29 interpreted in light of the preceding 
specific terms yields the result that all RICO "enterprises" must 
be, by definition, legitimate. And it is true that the specific terms 
"partnership, corporation, [and] association"30 connote legiti-
mate organizations. 
There is also a doctrine of statutory interpretation which 
resolves ambiguities in penal statutes to the benefit of the defen-
dant,31 although this canon of lenity should not be used to violate 
the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the statute.32 The 
minority view argues for the application of the canon of lenity in 
RICO: the doctrine would not run counter to legislative intent,33 
thus given the ambiguity of "enterprise" all doubts should be 
resolved in favor of a potential defendant, and the narrow con-
struction of the word should be favored. However, the weight of 
authority protests that such a reading of the statute "leaves a 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in its Interpretation, 
27 DEPAUL L. REV. 89, 98-99 (1977). Since by definition an individual can be an 
"enterprise", it follows that if "enterprise" includes criminal ventures as well as legitimate 
businesses, RICO can conceivably be stretched to punish lone criminals having no connec-
tion with any organization. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). 
27. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 1974). The Cappetto 
court also asserts that, while § 1962(a) deals with infiltration of legitimate businesses, 
subsections (b) and (c) are aimed at illegal organizations. But there seems to be no 
rational basis for the distinction, since the same definition of "enterprise" applies in all 
three subsections. See 542 F.2d at 110 n.5; see also note 5 supra. 
28. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Insco, 496 F.2d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1974). See also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 103 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1973). 
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976). See note 3 supra. 
30.Id. 
3!. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. Campos-
Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); United 
States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1973). 
32. United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26 (1948); United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 
527,530 (1944). See also 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 28, § 47.22 at 118. 
33. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
1980] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 107 
loophole for illegitimate business to escape its coverage."34 
C. "PATI'ERN OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITY" UNDER RICO 
To establish a RICO violation the prosecution must show 
participation in an enterprise through a "pattern of racketeering 
activity," which is defined as "two acts of racketeering activity, 
one of which occurred after the effective date of [the statute (i.e., 
1970)], and the last of which occurred within ten years ... after 
the commission of a prior act."35 The question is raised whether 
there must be a relationship between the two acts of racketeering 
activity. Since the "target of Title IX is. . . not sporadic activ-
itY,"38 and that it is "this factor of continuity, plus relationship, 
which combine to produce a pattern,"37 the requirement of a rela-
tionship between the predicate acts seems plausible enough. One 
line of cases holds that the "acts must have been connected with 
each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to 
constitute a pattern, "38 but more recent authority only requires 
that both predicate crimes be related to the affairs of the enter-
prise.3u In Rone, the three murders and two acts of extortion form-
ing the pattern of racketeering activity flowed naturally from the 
existence of the RICO "enterprise," i.e., the defendants them-
selves, thus the prosecution had no problem in establishing such 
an obvious nexus.4° 
34. United States v. Altese, 542 F.2d at 106·07. 
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976). See note 4 supra. 
36. S. REP. No. 91·617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. at 158 (1969). 
37. [d. 
38. United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 527 F.2d 
237 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. White, 386 F. Supp. 
882, 883·84 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See also United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 860-61 (7th 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
39. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1375 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 889 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978); United States v. 
Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 
783 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
Nerone involved a casino gambling operation conducted upon the premises of a mo-
bile horne park (the corrupted "enterprise" as alleged by the government), but conviction 
under § 1962 (c) were reversed because the government failed to prove that the proceeds 
of the casino operation were invested in the mobile horne park corporation. However, the 
court indicated that the prosecution could have chosen the gambling association itself as 
the "enterprise." 563 F.2d at 851-52. Compare with United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 
264 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979). 
40. 598 F.2d at 566-67. 
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D. CRIMINAL FORFEITURE PENALTIES UNDER RICO 
Violations of RICO are punishable by a fine of not more than 
$25,000, imprisonment for not more than twenty years and forfei-
ture of any interest acquired or maintained in violation of the 
statute.4I The latter sanction is unique in modern federal criminal 
law, because forfeiture is imposed directly on an individual defen-
dant rather than through a separate in rem proceeding.42 To pro-
vide procedural mechanisms for implementing the forfeiture pro-
vision of RICO, three additions to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure were made in 1972}3 The statute also allows district 
courts to enter restraining orders and prohibitions to prevent the 
transfer of property or other interest subject to forfeiture. 44 In one 
recent case, the Second Circuit affirmed an order imposing condi-
tional forfeiture upon the defendant's property; the defendant 
was offered the option of redeeming his seized corporation within 
six months of judgment, by payment of cash or other property 
satisfactory to the Attorney General having a value of $100,000.45 
The language in section 1963 is subject to varied interpreta-
tions, causing one court to remark that "[t]he scope of the stat-
ute is indeed without precise boundaries."4ft Several courts, how-
ever, have upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture provi-
sion,47 even though it is not clear what interests or property rights 
are subject to forfeiture. The Fifth Circuit has held that a union 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1976). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) (1976) (providing for the 
forfeiture of interests acquired through participation in a narcotics enterprise). RICO also 
provides for discovery and civil remedies, including private treble damage actions by 
persons injured by racketeering activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976). 
42. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979). 
43. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2) provides that "the indictment or the information shall 
allege the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture"; Rule 31(e) provides for 
a special verdict to be returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to 
forfeiture; Rule 32(b)(2) authorizes the "Attorney General to seize the interest or property 
subject to forfeiture, fixing such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper." 
See also United States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975)(indictment quashed because 
of government's failure to allege the extent of the interest subject to forfeiture pursuant 
to Rule 7(c)(2)). 
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (1976). In United States V. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (W.O. 
Pa. 1975), the court ruled that an injunction prohibiting the defendant from transferring 
his business assets did not deprive him of his presumption of innocence, but only served 
to maintain the "status quo." [d. at 1015. 
45. United States V. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979). 
46. United States V. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975, 992 (5th Cir. 1977). 
47. United States V. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 
(1975); United States v. Scalzitti, 408 F. Supp. 1014 (w.n. Pa. 1975); United States V. 
Amato, 367_ F. Supp. 547, 549 (S.n.N.Y. 1973). 
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officer's position is an "interest" subject to forfeiture, although 
the defendant was not barred from holding future positions in the 
management of the union. 48 Similarly, if funds derived from rack-
eteeringactivity are mixed with "clean" money and both bank-
rolls are used to operate a legi~imate business, what part, if any, 
of the business is subject to forfeiture? In recognizing this prob-
lem the Second Circuit rejected the appellant's claim that the 
forfeiture provision violated the eighth amendment's ban on cruel 
and unusual punishment, holding that section 1963 permitted the 
trial court sufficient flexibility in avoiding "draconian (and per-
haps potentially unconstitutional) applications of the forfeiture 
provision," and that "where the provision for forfeiture is keyed. 
to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise, as it is in 
RICO, the punishment is at least in some rough way proportional 
to the crime."49 
E. THE ANALYSIS IN United States v. Rone 
In Rone, the government proved that the defendants com-
mitted three brutal murders and two acts of extortion; from this 
standpoint, the long prison terms were a just result. It is doubtful, 
however, that the defendants should have been prosecuted under 
the RICO statute, because to prosecute this case under that stat-
ute, the government had to stretch the term "enterprise" to en-
compass virtually all patterns of racketeering activity; if this be 
the meaning of the key word, "enterprise" becomes a redun-
dancy, and one wonders why Congress did not simply prohibit 
"patterns of racketeering activity."50 The fact that "enterprise" 
is separately defined and separately integrated into the statute 
indicates that the word was meant to have meaning independent 
of "pattern of racketeering activity," hence its definition is most 
likely to include only legitimate organizations. 
Aside from considerations of common-sense statutory con-
struction, the Rone majority exhibits poor analysis and faulty 
. application of precedent. Three examples will suffice to illustrate 
this point. 
Rone cites United States v. Cappetto51 to bolster its conten-
48. United States v. Rubin; 559 F .2d at 990-92. 
49. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979). 
50. United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 265-66 (6th Cir. 1979). 
51. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). 
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tion that "enterprise" includes purely illegal associations. In 
Cappetto, the Seventh Circuit rejected the argument advanced 
by appellants that their illegal gambling association was not an 
"enterprise" under RICO, citing United States v. Parness 52 for the 
proposition that the key word was to be interpreted broadly. Yet 
in Parness the question before the court was whether the infiltra-
tion of a legitimate foreign business by Americans through acts 
committed in the United States fell within the ambit of RICO; 
the fact that the court answered this question in the affirmative 
does not stretch the meaning of "enterprise" to include illegal 
associations. Thus in Cappetto the court's reliance upon the hold-
ing in Parness is misplaced; in Rone, a fortiori, the court's reli-
ance upon Cappetto is misplaced. 
This reliance upon Cappetto is faulty for another reason. In 
support of its holding that an illegal gambling operation was a 
RICO "enterprise," the court in Cappetto cited a Senate Com-
mittee Report which noted that "the Federal Government must 
... prohibit directly substantial business enterprises of gam-
bling."53 Thus, the court reasoned, Congress must view illegal 
gambling as "enterprises" within the meaning of RICO.54 Yet the 
cited Committee Report actually referred to Title VIII of OCCA-
70, not Title IX. Title VIII was meant to deal specifically with 
illegal gambling operations; the fact that it is part of the same 
omnibus act as Title IX does not necessarily mean that the two 
titles were enacted with the same congressional intent.55 
The majority in Rone also cites United States v. Altese58 to 
support the view that a RICO "enterprise" can be an illegitimate 
business. The court in Altese held that the large scale gambling 
operation conducted by defendants was a RICO "enterprise" cit-
ing a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Campanale, 57 as 
authority for this proposition. But in Campanale the court held 
only that section 1962 applied to small businesses as well as to 
larger concerns; thus the legitimate business involved, Pronto 
Loading and Unloading Company, could not escape RICO'S net 
merely because it was not a large corporation.58 Nowhere in the 
52. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). 
53. 502 F.2d at 1358, quoting S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 72·73 (1969). 
54. 502 F.2d at 1358. 
55. See United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 60 (D. Conn. 1975). 
56. 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977). 
57. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). 
58. 518 F.2d at 364. 
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opinion is it suggested that the result would have been the same 
if an illegal organization had been the "enterprise" at issue. 
The third leg in the Rone court's tripod of authority, United 
States v. Elliott, 59 similarly fails to bear the weight of close scru-
tiny. In Elliott, the RICO "enterprise" consisted of five criminals 
associated together for purposes of committing various acts of 
murder, arson, and theft; the court took great pains to compare 
this gang of ruffians to a large business conglomerate.8o The 
Elliott court cites United States v. Hawes" as stating that 
"Congress gave the term 'enterprise' a very broad meaning,"82 yet 
the court in Hawes supported this assertion by citing United 
States u. Parness,83 United States v. Cappetto,84 and United 
States u. Campanale. 85 Furthermore, the "enterprise" at issue in 
Hawes, Peach State Distributing Company, was a legitimate 
business dealing in jukeboxes arid penny arcade amusements; 
this business acted as a front for illegal gambling operations. 
Arguably, then, Hawes falls within the ambit of the very activi-
ties Congress was attempting to deal with in enacting Title IX, 
namely, the infiltration of legitimate business through racketeer-
ing activity. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Certainly the panel in Rone was faced with two very danger-
ous defendants. Yet in blindly following erroneous application of 
precedent, contrary to clear legislative intent, and against 
common-sense statutory interpretation, the Ninth Circuit cre-
ated authority for far-ranging future RICO prosecutions. Because 
the key word "enterprise" has such an expansive meaning in this 
circuit, the statute is capable of reaching even the smallest petty 
crook, provided the pattern of racketeering activity in some small 
way affects interstate or foreign commerce. Here the discretion of 
the prosecutor is all-important. Hopefully the prosecutors in the 
Ninth Circuit will heed the warning of a recent decision in the 
Second Circuit: "[T]he potentially broad reach of RICO poses 
59. 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978). 
SO. 571 F.2d at 898. See generally Note, Elliott v. United States: Conspiracy Law and 
the Judicial Pursuit of Organized Crime Through RICO, 65 VA. L. REV. 109 (1979). 
61. 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976). 
62. 571 F.2d at 897, quoting United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d at 479 (5th Cir. 1976). 
63. 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975). 
64. 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). 
65. 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 1050 (1976). 
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a danger of abuse where a prosecutor attempts to apply the stat-
ute to situations for which it was not primarily intended. There-
fore, we caution against undue prosecutorial zeal in invoking 
~ICO."88 
Lee R. Roper 
III. "PROFILE" STOPS AND THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT: REASONABLE SUSPICION OR INARTICU-
LATE HUNCHES? 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Cortez, I officers of the United States 
border patrol set up an observation post adjacent to a highway 
in the desert of southern Arizona, in the belief that a certain 
suspected alien smuggler would be operating in the area that 
night. The officers decided that in watching for the smuggler~s 
vehicle they would concentrate only on a certain class of vehicles, 
including vans, campers and pickup trucks; within that class only 
vehicles which passed the post travelling westward and returned 
approximately ninety minutes later travelling eastward would be 
targeted for investigation.2 During the period of observation the 
officers spotted two vehicles in the "profile" class, both campers, I 
one of which returned a short time later, heading east. T~is , 
camper was stopped and six illegal aliens were found inside; the 
owner/driver of the camper and the smuggler were convicted of 
knowingly transporting illegal aliens. A Ninth Circuit panel re-
versed, holding that the border patrol officers did not have rea-
sonable suspicion to stop defendants,. and that the intrusion vio- . 
lated the defendants' rights under the fourth amendment. 
Clearly law enforcement agencies are sifting through past 
experience and constructing criminal "profiles" to be used in 
detecting anti-social conduct. The central question is whether 
such a behavioral model can be utilized to make an investigative 
stop of a citizen absent other indicia of criminal activity. The 
seminal case of Terry v. Ohio3 and the "founded suspicion" doc-
66. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1979). 
1. 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were 
Chambers and Ferguson, JJ.). 
2. [d. at 506. 
3. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, a Cleveland plainclothes detective became suspicious 
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trine of the Ninth Circuit will be discussed, followed by an analy-
sis of particular "profiles" considered in light of case law and 
applicable fourth amendment standards. 
B. THE FRAMEWORK OF Terry v. Ohio 
All seizures of the person, including those involving only a 
brief detention short of arrest, fall within the protection of the 
fourth amendment: and plainly such seizures must at least meet 
the requirement of "reasonableness."5 What is reasonable in any 
particular case involves a balance between the public interest at 
stake and the individual's right to personal liberty free from gov-
ernmental intrusion.8 Although the Terry court disclaimed ruling 
on the constitutionality of a stop based on less than probable 
cause and instead focused upon the propriety of the subsequent 
frisk,7 the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan made the sensi-
ble observation that the right to frisk a suspect is dependent upon 
the reasonableness of the forcible stop,8 and that in this connec-
tion there was little difference for practical purposes between the 
holding and dictum.s 
of two men loitering on a street comer and peering into a store window at frequent 
intervals; eventually the pair were joined by a third man. Thinking that the suspects were 
planning a stickup and probably armed, the detective confronted the trio, identified 
himself and asked for their names. When the men only mumbled something the officer 
spun Terry around and patted his breast pocket. He felt a pistol, which he removed. A 
frisk of the second man also uncovered a pistol; the third man was unarmed. Terry was 
charged with carrying a concealed weapon, and he moved to suppress the gun as evidence. 
The trial judge denied the motion, and all the higher courts, including the United States 
Supreme Court, affirmed. 
'4. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
I, 16-19 (1968). Note that fourth amendment protection extends only to seizures executed 
pursuant to government authority. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 903-04 (9th 
Cir. 1973). ' 
5. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Subject to certain excep-
tions, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
357 (1967). Accord, Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970); Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). The California Supreme Court has stated that the issue in 
evaluating possible fourth amendment violations "is not simply whether the conduct of 
[the police] might have been 'reasonable' under all the circumstances, but whether [the 
intrusion] fal1s within one of the 'few specifically established and well delineated excep-
tions' to the warrant requirement." People v. Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 282, 286, 496 P.2d 1261, 
1263, 101 Cal. Rptr. 893, 895 (1972). 
6. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (per curiam); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. I, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). 
7. 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. 
8. 1d. at 32-33. 
9. Note, Reasonable Suspicion for Border Patrol Stops: United States v. Brignoni-
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Terry firmly rejects the monolithic model of the fourth 
amendment which recognizes two polarities: either the officer 
effectively restrains the liberty of a citizen, in which case a fourth 
amendment seizure has taken place and its validity depends 
upon the existence of probable cause to arrest, or else no restraint 
has taken place and therefore there is no seizure and the resultant 
conversation between officer and citizen is strictly voluntary. 10 
Instead Terry chooses a sliding-scale model of the fourth amend-
ment, providing police with an "escalating set of flexible respon-
ses,"11 in which "increasing degrees of intrusiveness require in-
creasing degrees of justification and increasingly stringent proce-
dures for the establishment of that justification."12 To justify a 
stop, the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts,"13 warrant the intrusion. The test is objective: could an 
officer reasonably conclude, in light of experience, "that criminal 
activity may be afoot"?U The initial stop must be justified, and 
the resultant inquiry must be "reasonably related in scope"15 to 
the justification for its initiation. 
C. THE "FOUNDED SUSPICION" DOCTRINE OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Prior to Terry, the Ninth Circuit addressed the propriety of 
an investigative stop based on less than probable cause to arrest 
in Wilson v. Porter. 1ft Although the defendant in Wilson had not 
violated any traffic laws at the time of the forcible stop, the police 
Ponce, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 277, 289 (1976). See also Weisgall, Stop, Search and 
Seize: The Emerging Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 219, 229 (1974). 
10. J. Caracappa, Criminall~aw & Procedure: Some Current Issues, 16 DUQ. L. REV. 
499, 502 (1978). 
11. 392 U.S. at 10. 
12. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390 
(1974). See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28 (1969). 
13. 392 U.S. at 21. A close scrutiny of facts and probabilities is mandated by Terry 
and its progeny: only conduct that "affirmatively suggests particular criminal activity, 
completed, current, or intended" can validate an investigative seizure. Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
14. 392 U.S. at 30. The nature of the suspected criminal activity is relevant in deter· 
mining the propriety of an investigative stop. Thus in Terry the suspected crime was 
robbery, and the detective reasonably believed the suspects were armed; the Court ap· 
proved the stop and frisk even though the period of observation was only several minutes. 
In contrast, the suspected crime in Sibron was possession of narcotics; the Court held the 
stop and frisk impermissible though the period of observation was several hours. La Fave, 
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. 
L. REV. 40, 65 (1968). See J. Caracappa, supra note 10, at 510. 
15. 392 U.S. at 20, 29. 
16. 361 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1966). 
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officers executing the stop apparently felt that a motorist cruising 
the streets at three a.m. presented suspicious circumstances re-
quiring further investigation. While looking into the car, one of 
the officers saw a gun barrel protruding from beneath the passen-
ger front seat and subsequently arrested defendant. The court 
upheld this intrusion, arguing that although probable cause to 
arrest did not exist at the time of the stop, only a "founded 
suspicion" was necessary to authorize a brief investigative stop; 
all that was required was "some bases from which the court can 
determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing."17 
The test is subjective and grants the officer wide latitude to act 
in light of experience; the court stated that it "need not look for 
a reconstructed, after-the-fact explanation of what may have 
been nothing more at the time ... than the instinctive reaction 
of one trained in the prevention of crime."18 
Yet instinctive reactions (hunches) are exactly what the 
Court in Terry warned should not be used to justify a seizure of 
the person, absent other reliable indicia of criminal activity. This 
conflict has led one commentator to conclude that Terry effec-
tively overrules Wilson. 19 However, recent Ninth Circuit 
"founded suspicion" cases have cited Wilson as controlling au-
thority,20 while other factually similar cases have ignored the 
subjective test of Wilson and have chosen to follow the principles 
of Terry.21 
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,22 the United States Su-
preme Court applied the criteria of Terry in affirming an en banc 
Ninth Circuit decision, holding that·" [e]xcept at the border and 
17. [d. at 415. 
18. [d. 
19. Weisgall, supra note 9, at 244. 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Diaz, 528 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam); United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 
U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Holland, 510 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1010 (1975); United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarado, 510 F.2d 1063 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane); 
United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 
(1975); United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Davis, 459 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1972). 
21. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), aff'g 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Carrizoza-Gaxiola, 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Torres-Urena, 513 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 
1973) (en bane); United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1973). See generally 
Note, Criminal Law & Procedure, The Doctrine of Founded Suspicion, 6 GOLDEN GATE 
U. L. REV. 509 (1976). 
22. 422 U.S. 873 (1975), aff'g 499 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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its functional equivalents, officers on roving patrol may stop vehi-
cles only if they are aware of specific articulable facts, together 
with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant 
suspicion that the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in 
the country."23 Though the governmental interest in guarding 
against the smuggling of illegal aliens is legitimate, the border 
patrol should not be allowed to stop motorists at random on less 
than reasonable suspicion, since such power tends to abrogate the 
fourth amendment rights of citizens mistaken for illegal aliens.24 
The Brignoni-Ponce decision should clarify Ninth Circuit case 
law regarding the proper standard of the doctrine of "founded 
suspicion. " 
Assuming that the objective test of Terry and Brignoni-
Ponce is proper in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion 
justifying an investigative stop, a nagging question remains: what 
are "specific, articulable facts," and which inferences derived 
therefrom are rational? Must the activity of the suspect affirma-
tively point to particular criminal conduct, as suggested by the 
concurring opinion of Justice Harlan in Sibron v. New York,25 or 
is it sufficient that the behavioral characteristics of the suspect 
in a particular environment tend to place that suspect in a class 
which in the past has demonstrated a high probability of criminal 
conduct? This is the problem posed by the use of criminal pro-
files, exacerbated by the fact that under Terry the officer is al-
lowed to draw upon experience in determining whether reasona-
ble suspicion exists. In this connection, is the officer limited to 
personal experience, or is the utilization of the collective experi-
ences of others similarly situated permissible?28 In any event one 
23. 1d. at 884. C{. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979) (police made random stop 
of car to check licensing and registration without a reasonable suspicion that either vehicle 
or driver were subject to seizure for violation of law; the stop was unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment). Random stops should be distinguished from roadblock or checkpoint 
stops, since in these situations all cars are halted; motorists can see others in similar 
circumstances, and thus are "less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion." 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 643, 658 (1976), quoting United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-96 (1975). These concerns are relevant because a seizure may not 
be reasonable under the fourth amendment if the methods of police investigation used are 
harassing or offensive. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 16-17; note 82 infra. 
24. 422 U.S. at 884. 
25. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
26. Clearly a policeman can rely upon an uncorroborated tip furnished by a reliable 
informant to jUstify a stop and frisk. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-48 (1972). But 
see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 890 (1976) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
• 
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
1980] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 117 
point is clear: as the public interest at stake in a particular situa-
tion diminishes, and as the behavioral characteristics of a suspect 
fall away from the ideal profile model, the seizure of the suspect 
approaches conduct that could be termed "arbitrary or harass-
ing."27 
D. UTILIZATION OF PARTICULAR CRIMINAL PROFILES 
Criminal profiles are specialized behavioral models based 
upon empirical data gathered by law enforcement agencies and 
applied to specific factual situations. The usefulness of a profile 
is therefore limited by the nature of the data used in the initial 
formuJation, and here the officers may be tempted to substitute 
personal hunches for objective scientific data. Cortez is an excel-
lent example of this process at work: the border patrol officers 
knew from investigation that the smuggler usually operated on 
weekends, yet they had no rational basis for believing he would 
operate that night, and further, they admitted "that they had no 
reason to know that the vehicle assisting [the smuggler] would 
approach from, and return to, the east rather than the west."28 
Moreover, the officers deliberately excluded commercial looking 
trucks, station wagons and sedans from the profile class, though 
they were aware such vehicles had in the past been used to trans-
port illegal aliens. 29 
The Court in Brignoni-Ponce listed several factors to be con-
sidered in assessing the existence of reasonable suspicion to stop 
a vehicle in the border area; together these factors form the basis 
of the alien smuggling profile.3u The apparent Mexican ancestry 
of the driver and occupants is relevant, but an investigatory stop 
(arguing that in Adams the informant was not credible and that the information upon 
which the officer acted was not shown to be based upon first-hand knowledge). This raises 
the interesting question of whether a criminal profile and the uncorroborated tip of an 
informant are equally reliable for purposes of justifying a stop and frisk. 
27. Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d at 415. 
28. 595 F.2d at 507. 
29. [d. at 506. The dissent in Cortez emphasized the desolate terrain and the early 
morning hour in finding reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. [d. at 510 (Chambers, 
J., dissenting). See also United States v. Torres-Urena, 513 F.2d 540,545 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(Wright, J., dissenting); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1974). 
30. The profile elements are as follows: (1) travelling near the border; (2) on a lightly 
travelled road; (3) in a notorious smuggling area; (4) in a car that appears to be heavily 
loaded or has an extraordinary number of passengers, or has large compartments suitable 
for storing aliens; (5) driven by someone of Mexican' ancestry; (6) who takes evasive action 
or drives erratically; and (7) who is carrying passengers exhibiting characteristics of Mexi-
can residents who appear to be trying to hide. 422 U.S. at 884-85. 
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cannot be based solely upon this factor. 31 Proximity of the vehicle 
to the border, the typical traffic pattern of the road, and the 
reputation of the locale as a "high crime" area are all relevant 
factors,32 although such circumstantial evidence standing alone 
cannot justify a stop.33 The critical profile characteristic in these 
cases is usually a suspicious aspect of the vehicle itself or its 
movements,34 as well as aberrant behavior of the driver. 35 
These latter profile ingredients are critical because they more 
closely resemble the "specific, articulable facts" required for a 
valid stop in Terry; the ethnic and circumstantial factors take on 
significance only in conjunction with the more reliable indicia of 
criminal activity. This is in keeping with the statement in Terry 
that the officer must observe "unusual conduct" which "in light 
of his experience" reasonably leads him to conclude that criminal 
activity may be afoot.38 Thus a group of Mexicans driving in a 
3l. Id. at 885-86; United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476, 478 (9th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976). But see United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853, 
856 (9th Cir. 1973) (ethnic background of the driver a8 a "neutral fact"). 
32. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85; United States v. Avalos-
Ochoa, 557 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th 
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Jaime-Barrios, 494 F.2d 455 
(9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bugarin-Casas, 484 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1973). Ct. United 
States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 758·59 (2d Cir. 1976) (suspect stopped and frisked in 
narcotics-prone location in New York City). But see United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 
859, 861 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973). Giving the "high crime area" factor too much weight could 
easily lead to harassment of poor inner city residents. See Note, Inuestigatiue Stops in 
Urban Centers: Upholding the Constable's Whim, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 963, 973 (1978). 
33. See United States v. Martinez-Tapia, 499 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1974) (car proceed-
ing slowly on road one mile from border in sparsely populated area not sufficient basis 
for stop). However, the presence of a vehicle in a notorious smuggling area combined with 
suspicious movements or appearance of vehicle can be enough to support a finding of 
founded suspicion. See United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 977 (1976); United States v. Nunez-Villalobos, 500 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 
1974); United States v. Roberts, 470 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 
(1973). 
34. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885; United States v. Madueno-
Astorga, 503 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (car equipped with large trunk and 
heavy duty suspension system on the rear axle appeared to "drift" on a curve in the road); 
United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 
(1975) (two cars travelling in tandem, rear car appeared overloaded and riding low to the 
ground, observed as it skidded around a comer); United States v. Bugarin·Casas, 484 F.2d 
853 (9th Cir. 1973) (station wagon with large rear compartment riding low in the rear). 
35. United States v. Rocha-Lopez, 527 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
977 (1976) (car braking unnecessarily at intersection, as if uncertain of the area); United 
States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975) 
(car skidding around comer). But see United States v. Ogilvie, 527 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(fact that driver turned off highway and reversed direction before reaching checkpoint 
does not justify stop). 
36. 392 U.S. at 29-30. 
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notorious smuggling area should not be labeled "suspicious" and 
stopped for investigation absent some affirmative behavior sug-
gesting the possibility of criminal conduct. The officer, of course, 
has the option of maintaining surveillance and making appropri-
ate inquiries at a later time, after the occupants of the car have 
given objective reasons to believe illegal aliens are being trans-
ported. 
Though the experience of the officer in similar situations is 
not strictly speaking part of the profile, both Terry and Brignoni-
Ponce clearly indicate that this factor is relevant in determining 
the existence of reasonable suspicion.37 Certainly the record of 
past arrests on similar' charges has a bearing on the officer's utili-
zation of the profile vis-a-vis available facts. 38 Thus the "batting 
average" of the officer is relevant in assessing the strength of prior 
experience, but it may not be enough that a considerable number 
of prior arrests were made. Clearly in close cases the proven ex-
pertise of the officer in executing judicially valid stops will be 
crucial in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion. 
Closely related to the alien smuggling profile is the stolen car 
profile utilized by a team of federal and Arizona law enforcement 
officers in United States u. Carrizoza-Gaxiola. 38 There, officers 
stopped southbound cars matching a profile of vehicles com-
monly stolen in Phoenix and Tucson and driven into Mexico. The 
government claimed reasonable suspicion existed to stop 
defendant-driver because (1) he was Mexican; (2) he was driving 
toward Mexico in a car with Mexican license plates; and (3) he 
was driving a late model Ford L ro, a vehicle included in the 
profile. The defendant was violating no traffic laws, and there was 
nothing otherwise suspicious about his behavior; the forcible stop 
was grounded solely upon the profile match. 
The court disagreed with the government's position, finding 
37. [d. at 27-28; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885. 
38. Note, however, where an officer testified that he had made twenty to thirty arrests 
of illegal aliens in the Oceanside area during the two years preceding the stop in dispute, 
the court gave no weight to such testimony because of the officer's failure to testify as to 
the number of people he had detained who subsequently proved not to be illegal aliens. 
United States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1973); Accord, United States v. 
Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 759-60 (2d Cir. 1976) (Motley, J., dissenting). See also Weisgall, 
supra note 9, at 250-51; Bogomolny, Street Patrol: The Decision to Stop a Citizen, 12 
CRIM. L. BULL. 544, 573 (1976). 
39. 523 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1975). 
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that "[f]ounded suspicion requires some reasonable ground for 
singling out the person stopped as one who was involved or is 
about to be involved in criminal activity."40 Although a profile is 
constructed from specific, articulable facts, the "founded suspi-
cion" test requires "some additional fact or facts which focus 
suspicion on the individual or vehicle stopped."41 This view deci-
sively rejects the lenient, subjective approach of Wilson and, con-
sistent with Terry, stands for the principle that a profile match 
alone does not permit an investigatory stop. 
Because the public interest at stake in detecting stolen cars 
does not approach the widespread economic concern generated by 
the presence of hundreds of thousands of illegal aliens on Ameri-
can soil,42 the results of the Terry balancing test43 will reflect this 
difference when identical degrees of intrusiveness are considered. 
Both profiles, however, are vulnerable to use by over-zealous offi-
cers as scientific· excuses for "fishing expeditions" conducted 
mainly against members of the Mexican-American community 
who are unfortunate enough to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. 
The development of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) hijacker profile was predicated upon the strong govern-
mental interest in protecting airline passengers from hijackings.44 
This profile was developed in October, 1968, through the com-
bined efforts of the FAA, the Department of Justice and the De-
partment of Commerce.4s Based on a statistical study of previous 
hijackers who, as a group, tended to exhibit behavior different 
from the ordinary airline passenger,4ft the profile consisted of 
40. [d. at 24l. See United States v. Soto-Soto, 598 F.2d 545,547 (9th Cir. 1979) (stolen 
truck profile). 
4l. United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1979). But see State v. Ochos, 
112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 1097 (1976) (use of stolen truck profile adequate for lawful stop). 
42. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 900-14 (appendix to opinion of Burger, C.J., 
concurring) . 
43. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. 
44. One jurist has suggested that the danger to life and property posed by hijackings 
alone justifies searching all prospective passengers. United States v. Bell, 464 F .2d 667, 
675 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J., concurring). In the same case, however, another mem-
ber of the court rightly pointed out the "serious abuse of individual rights" that could flow 
from such a sweeping rationale. [d. at 675-76 (Mansfield, J., concurring). See also United 
States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1097-98 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
45. See Ingram, Are Airport Searches Still Reasonable?, 44 J. OF AIR L. & COM. 131, 
133 (1978); McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-a Reasonable 
Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 302 (1972). 
46. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1082 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Ingram, 
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twenty-five to thirty behavioral characteristics, only a small 
number of which were used at anyone time to screen passengers 
going through the boarding process}? Studies asserted that appli-
cation of the profile would clear 99.5% of air travellers, but would 
clear no potential hijackers,4s As of February 6, 1972, all passen-
gers on all reservation flights in the United States were subjected 
to the profile screening system. 49 
At the outset it should be recognized that, unlike the alien 
smuggling profile, the hijacker profile was meant to be used as 
part of a larger detection system. As originally conceived, a sus-
pect matching the hijacker profile (a "selectee") was required to 
submit to examination by a magnetometer and asked to present 
proper identification. If the selectee did not activate the magne-
tometer and produced adequate identification boarding was al-
lowed, otherwise a United States marshal was summoned and 
further investigation ensued. If necessary, a frisk or pat-down of 
the selectee's outer clothing was conducted,50 but this action was 
to be taken only as a last resort. According to statistics cited by 
one court only about one-tenth of 1 % of passengers screened were 
actually frisked, but within this group there was a 6% probability 
that someone had a weapon. 51 This probability was deemed high 
supra note 45, at 133; J. Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18 
VILL. L. REV. 1004, 1008 (1973). 
47. See United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180, 1182 (3d Cir. 1972); United States 
V. Bell, 335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 667,670 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). The profile characteristics are kept confidential to protect 
the effectiveness of the system. But see Note, Searching for Hijackers, Constitutionality, 
Costs, and Alternatives, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 396 n.106 (1973). 
48. United States V. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1084 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Note, 
The Antiskyjack System: A Matter of Search-or Seizure, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1261, 1265 
n.35 (1973). 
49. Ingram, supra note 45, at 136. 
50. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); McGinley and 
Downs, supra note 45, at 304. Note that by January, 1973, Federal Aviation Administra-
tion regulations required that all carry-on baggage must be searched and that all passen-
gers must be screened by the magnetometer. See 37 Fed. Reg. 25, 934 (1972); United 
States V. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973); Gora, The Fourth Amendment at the 
Airport: Arriving, Departing or Cancelled?, 18 VILL. L. REV. 1036, 1046 (1973). Thus the 
profile "should be relegated to a supplementary role," in part because this procedure does 
not effectively deter the hijacking of shuttle flights. United States V. Edwards, 498 F .2d 
496,497-98 (9th Cir. 1974). In fact, under modern screening procedure, it is doubtful that 
the profile is used at all. See note 72 infra and accompanying text. 
5!. United States V. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Lopez was the first 
case to consider the constitutionality of airport screening procedures. The court found that 
"[t)he profile is a highly effective procedure for isolating potential hijackers." Id. at 1086. 
The case was dismissed, however, because the airline had modified the profile by inserting 
an ethnic characteristic and other criteria calling for the personal judgment of an airline 
47
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enough to justify a Terry-type frisk of that small percentage of 
persons remaining after the vast majority of the passengers had 
been winnowed out by the screening process and permitted to 
board the aircraft.52 
Courts following the approach of United States v. Lopez53 
agree that the airport search is analogous to the Terry-type stop 
and frisk, but differ as to the weight the hijacker profile should 
be accorded in determining the existence of reasonable suspi-
cion.54 As a threshold consideration, the profile is reievant in de-
termining which passengers should be subjected to further scru-
tiny, but the profile without more should not be used to justify a 
stop and frisk. As one commentator stated, 
[m]ere statistical information that a person 
demonstrates certain normal and innocuous char-
acteristics, which may have been coincidentally 
exhibited by [other criminals], can scarcely be 
considered sufficiently suspicious to justify an in-
trusion into the right of privacy. Otherwise, it is 
employee. [d. at 1101. Though the decision makes use ofstatistical probabilities, the court 
refuses to use figures alone to justify a Terry.type frisk. [d. at 1097. 
52. [d. In one sample of 500,000 passengers only 20 were denied boarding for any 
reason. Note, Skyjacking: Constitutional Problems Raised by Anti·Hijacking Systems, 63 
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 356, 356 n.2 (1972). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26·30 (1968) 
(permitting warrantless search without probable cause or consent when the officer has a 
reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous). But ct. United States v. 
Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (defendant fit the profile and activated 
the magnetometer, marshal erred in searching suitcase before making initial pat·down of 
defendant's outer clothing). But see People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 164,524 P.2d 830, 
833, 115 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361 (1974) (questioning the validity of using the statistics quoted 
in Lopez to justify a Terry·type search). 
53. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz.Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973) (defendant 
met the profile and had marginally confusing identification but did not activate the 
magnetometer and did not otherwise act suspiciously; no reasonable suspicion existed to 
justify detention and search of shopping bag); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (defendant met profile and aroused suspicion by purchasing one·way ticket to 
New York with cash produced from a paper bag; reasonable suspicion existed to investi· 
gate defendant further and ultimately detain her when she attempted to board return 
flight for Detroit); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (defendant 
met profile, had ticket made out to another name, and had another person's identification; 
warrantless search of defendant's person and luggage not justified); United States v. Bell, 
335 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aft'd, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 
(1972) (defendant met profile, activated the magnetometer and could produce no identifi· 
cation; reasonable suspicion existed to stop and frisk defendant). Contra, United States 
v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973) (defendant met profile and displayed contradictory 
forms of identification; warrantless search of defendant's flight bag justified). But see 
United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272,1274·75 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum) (profile alone 
may be enough to justify stop and frisk). 
48
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only a short step to suggest that a profile . . . of 
the typical mugger or narcotics addict be pre-
pared for distribution to the police for use in high 
crime areas.55 
123 
This accords with the result reached in connection with the alien 
smuggling profile.56 
Courts, recognizing the marginal value of the profile concept, 
have tended to uphold airport seizures on other grounds. In one 
Third Circuit decision, the court acknowledged that the marshal 
and possibly the ticket agent had utilized the behavior pattern 
profile, and stated that "[s]ubstantial issues concerning such 
usage are posed," but that "we need not reach them because the 
justifiable bases for the search were largely independent of the 
Profile."57 In a Second Circuit case, a search was deemed lawful 
even though the defendant was erroneously designated a selectee, 
because the magnetometer had been activated and the defendant 
was using a ticket issued in another name and otherwise acting 
suspiciously.58 These decisions seem correct under Terry because 
of the presence of specific, articulable facts suggesting the possi-
bility of criminal activity, and, by implication, the profile be-
comes irrelevant. 
If the valid utilization of the hijacker profile is not required 
for a lawful stop and frisk, the inquiry narrows to a determination 
of exactly what affirmative conduct does provide reasonable sus-
picion in the context of an airport search. In one Fourth Circuit 
case, the defendant did not match the profile but did activate the 
magnetometer, and this provided the sole basis for the resultant 
search which turned up a loaded pistol on the defendant's per-
55. McGinley and Downs, supra note 45, at 314 (footnotes omitted). 
56. See notes 30 to 38 supra and accompanying text. 
57. United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701, 704 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
995 (1972). In Lindsey the prospective boarder exhibited extremely anxious behavior, and 
airline personnel indicated he should be watched. When approached by a U.S. marshal 
and asked to identify himself, the defendant produced contradictory forms of identifica· 
tion. The marshal then noticed two large bulges in defendant's coat pocket. Fearing the 
bulges were weapons, defendant was asked to come outside the boarding area and submit 
to a pat·down search. The bulges felt "very solid," so the marshal extracted aluminum 
wrapped packages containing heroin. [d. at 703. See also United States v. Moreno, 475 
F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1973). 
58. United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 1397 
(2d Cir. 1973). This result was obtained on the theory that airports are special areas, like 
borders, where people have a lesser expectation of privacy. See also United States v. 
Legato, 480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973). 
49
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son.59 The court held that the use of the magnetometer consti-
tuted a search, but that the search was reasonable under the 
fourth amendment because of the strong governmental interest 
involved and the minimal nature of the intrusion.60 Relying on 
Terry, the court reasoned that since the activation of the device 
gave the marshal reason to fear for the safety of the other passen-
gers, the personal frisk of the defendant was justified.61 This con-
clusion is questionable in light of the fact that because the mag-
netometer reacts to coins, keys and other innocent objects, 50% 
of all those who pass through the device register a positive read-
ing.82 Thus the search of the defendant was based solely upon the 
marshal's inarticulable hunch that the defendant posed a danger 
to other passengers, other indicia of criminal activity being ab-
sent. In this case, the Terry doctrine was stretched to its outer 
limits. 
Recognizing the problems associated with applying Terry to 
airport screening procedures, the Fifth Circuit has applied less 
protective fourth amendment standards by analogizing airport 
searches to border searches,83 while the Seventh Circuit reached 
a similar result by asserting that airports were "critical zones" 
where special fourth amendment standards applied.54 In this lat-
ter case, the defendant fit the profile and produced conflicting 
identification; though the magnetometer had not been activated 
the court accepted the government's argument that sufficient 
specific and articulable facts existed to justify the warrantless 
search of defendant's flight bag which was found to contain her-
oin.85 Through the juxtaposition of the traditional Terry analysis 
59. United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 
U.S. 947 (1972). 
60. [d. at 771. 
61. [d. at 772. See also Unied States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180,1181-83 (3d Cir. 1972). 
62. United States v. Bell, 335 F. Supp. at 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. 
Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1086 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See also Gora, supra note 50, at 1040; 
McGinley and Downs, supra note 45, at 303, 314. The latter commentator has criticized 
.the profile on grounds of inexactness, since the profile is merely a means of classifying a 
person, upon presentation for boarding, as "somebody who should be looked at further," 
and does not purport to identify potential hijackers. [d. at 305, 314. By extension, the 
combination of profile match and magnetometer activation is only a sum of hunches not 
rising to the level of specific, articulable facts needed for a Terry frisk. 
63. United States v. Cyzewski, 484 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Skip-
with, 482 F .2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F .2d 44 (5th Cir. 
1973). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
64. United States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 1973). See also note 58 supra. 
65. 484 F.2d at 668-69. 
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with the "critical zone" argument, the Seventh Circuit severely 
reduced the level of probability needed for a lawful stop and frisk, 
while extending the concept of frisk to include a full search of 
carry-on luggage regardless of whether the entire screening proce-
dure had been utilized.dd Thus the scales are tipped in favor of the 
government as fourth amendment rights at the airport are over-
shadowed by the interest in preventing air piracy. 
In United States v. Davis, d7 the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the Terry analysis is inapposite to airport searches because the 
search is directed "not against appellant or any other person as 
such, but rather against the general introduction of weapons or 
explosives into a restricted area."dS Thus the appropriate analogy 
is to the administrative search cases, where the search is con-
ducted "as part of a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of 
an administrative purpose, rather than as part of a criminal in-
vestigation to secure evidence of crime . . . . "89 This approach 
comports with the deterrence rationale of the airport screening 
system only ifthe search is reasonable. To meet the test ofreason-
ableness the administrative screening search "must be as limited 
in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the admin-
istrative need that justifies it. "70 Since the administrative pur-
pose of the search is to prevent air piracy, the need for such a 
search disappears if the prospective passenger elects not to board 
the aircraft; hence, airport searches are valid only if the right to 
avoid search by declining to board is recognized. 71 
The right to decline boarding and avoid search attains in-
creased significance when the nature of modern airport screening 
66.Id. 
67. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). 
68. Id. at 907. See United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 43 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), 
aff'd, 486 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973). Several commentators have agreed with the Davis court 
that the Terry doctrine could not be used to uphold the new screening process. See, e.g., 
Gora, supra note 50, at 1047-48; Wright, Hijacking Risks and Airport Frisks: Reconciling 
Airline Security with the Fourth Amendment, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 491, 502-06 (1973). 
69. 482 F.2d at 908. See also United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Camara 
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); United States v. Schafer, 461 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 
1972). But see Comment, Constitutionality of the 1973 Airport Searches: A Factual 
Analysis, 8 U.S.F. L. REV. 172, 188,193-94 (1973); Note, The Constitutionality of Airport 
Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128, 144 (1973). 
70. 482 F.2d at 910. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969); Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 19 (1968). 
71. 482 F.2d at 910-11; United States v. Meulener, 351 F. Supp. 1284, 1288-91 (C.D. 
Cal. 1972); United States v. Allen, 349 F. Supp. 749, 752 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Contra, United 
States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276-81 (5th Cir. 1973). 
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procedure is examined. The three~prong profile-magnetometer-
identification process has been abandoned in favor of a new sys-
tem in which electronic screening of all passengers and inspection 
of all carry-on luggage is mandatory.72 The potential for abuse is 
apparent when one considers that even before the advent of the 
new system over 33% of arrests stemming from the screening 
system have been for possession of illegal drugs.73 Contrary to the 
optimism expressed by the Davis court, it is clear that airport 
searches are being used as a subterfuge to conduct general 
searches of persons and property;74 such abuse can only worsen 
under the new wholesale screening system. Application of the 
exclusionary rule to non-weapon evidence seized during an air-
port search is a proper remedy if the dangers of official abuse are 
to be avoided.75 
The airport is also the locus of the drug courier profile. Devel-
oped and used by Detroit Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agents,7e this profile purports to list a number of deviant 
characteristics that persons not transporting narcotics would not 
be expected to exhibit.77 Although the number or combination of 
72. See note 50 supra. 
73. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 909 n.43 (9th Cir. 1973). See, e.g., United 
States v. Fern, 484 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d 
Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972); 
United States v. Lindsey, 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972). 
Cf. La Fave, supra note 14, at 65 n.126 (discussing temptation for officer to look for 
contraband rather than dangerous weapons). 
74. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d at 909. 
75. Gora, supra note 50, at 1050·55. Contrary to the fear expressed by the Lopez court, 
the marshal need not return the narcotics to the defendant; he could simply confiscate 
the contraband. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1098-99. The point is that official 
overreaching will be curtailed if the contraband cannot serve as the basis for a subsequent 
prosecution. For a progressive approach to this problem, see United States v. Kroll, 351 
F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1972). 
76. Although the drug courier profile has mainly been utilized in connection with 
Detroit International Airport, DEA agents in New Orleans and New York have also used 
the profile. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Westerbann·Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
77. Among the elements of the profile are the following: (1) nervousness in the ter· 
minal; (2) travel to and from drug "source" cities, usually for short periods of time; (3) 
little or no luggage, or the use of empty suitcases; (4) use of small denomination currency 
for ticket purchases; (5) use of an alias; (6) making of phone call immediately upon arrival; 
(7) use of one-way tickets; (8) furnishing false identification to airline personnel; (9) 
attempt to conceal presence of travelling companion; (10) an unusual or circuitous itiner-
ary. See United States v. Ballard, 673 F.2d 913 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Floyd, 
418 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. 
Mich. 1976), reu'd Bub nom., United States v. McCaleb, 662 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). This 
list is not exhaustive since new elements of the profile appear as the factual situation 
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characteristics needed for a profile match is uncertain, the gov-
ernment usually contends that the presence of these characteris-
tics in the behavior of a suspect furnishes the DEA agent probable 
cause to arrest, or at least a reasonable suspicion justifying a 
Terry stop.78 The DEA and some jurists79 view the drug courier 
profile as a valuable weapon in the fight against narcotics traf-
ficking; one federal district court cited statistics in support of the 
effectiveness of the profile.so 
The drug courier and air piracy situations are distinguishable 
in one important respect: in the drug cases there is no 
"fundamental public interest at stake in routine enforcement of 
the drug laws. "81 Hence, a seizure considered reasonable in the 
context of either a border stop or a hijacker screening stop may 
well be unreasonable where the object of the stop is to detect the 
transportation of illegal drugs. An average citizen stopped at the 
Mexican border or as part of the hijacker detection system will 
most likely tolerate the brief detention because of the strong pub-
lic policies involved, but the same traveller may become quite 
indignant when told that the purpose of the stop is to intercept 
narcotics. This subjective reaction stems from the nature of the 
stop: unlike the former situations, the traveller stopped by a DEA 
agent knows that the detention is "part of a criminal investiga-
tion to secure evidence of crime."82 The comfort in seeing others 
in similar circumstances likewise stopped is missing.83 The ad-
changes. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 609, 698 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). 
78. United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,720 (6th Cir. 1977). See also Kadish and 
Brofman, Drug Courier Characteristics-A Defense Profile, 15 TRIAL 47-50 (May 1979). 
79. See United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 708 n.1 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. 
granted, No. 78-1821 (September, 1979) (en banc) (per curiam) (Weick, J., dissenting). 
80. Since the profile went into effect, agents have searched 141 persons in 96 airport 
encounters. Agents found contraband in 77/96 encounters (80%), and arrested 122 persons 
for narcotics violations. 26 of the 77 "positive" searches were consent searches; illegal 
drugs were seized in all cases where consent was not given and a search was made. In 15-
25 consent searches no drugs were found. United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 
539 (E.D. Mich. 1976), rev'd sub nom., United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 
1977). 
81. 409 F. Supp. at 542. See also Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 390-92. 
82. 482 F.2d at 908. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
83. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975); United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 
1977); note 23 supra. See also Note, Criminal Procedure-Search and Seizure-Fourth 
Amendment Precludes Drivers' License Inspection Vehicle Stops Not Based on Reasona-
ble Suspicion or Made Pursuant to Random Selection Scheme, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1123, 
1134 (1978). Note that an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion may turn into 
an illegal arrest without probable cause if the manner and degree of force used in the stop 
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ministrative search rationale, therefore, is inapposite, and the 
propriety of the stop must be measured against the standards of 
Terry, keeping in mind that because the public interest at stake 
is relatively diminished, the fourth amendment rights of the indi-
vidual loom correspondingly larger. 
Courts have unanimously agreed that the use of the drug 
courier profile by itself is insufficient to establish probable cause 
to arrest a suspect.84 The question then becomes whether the 
profile alone furnishes the DEA agent with "specific and articula-
ble facts," pointing to the conclusion that in light of past experi-
ence "criminal activity may be afoot."M Because the profile is 
only as strong, for Terry purposes, as its component characteris-
tics, the elements of the profile must be examined in light of the 
objective standard of Terry. 88 
Arrival from a major drug source city is a crucial part of the 
profile, yet how a particular place becomes classified as a source 
city remains a mystery. 87 Assuming arguendo the viability of this 
profile component, its usefulness is reduced when the flight in 
question stops over in a non-source city prior to arrival at its 
ultimate destination, because the DEA agent cannot tell where 
the suspect boarded the plane without executing a stop.88 
Nervousness is also part of the profile, but it is difficult to 
understand how an agent can distinguish between a passenger 
would lead a reasonable, innocent person to conclude an arrest had been executed. United 
States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497,502 (9th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Scheiblauer, 
472 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1973). 
84. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, No. 
78-1821 (September, 1979) (en bane) (per curiam); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 
717,720 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 729 (E.n. Mich. 1976); 
United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 543 (E.n. Mich. 1976). See also Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). 
85. See notes 13 and 14 supra and accompanying text. 
86. Note that this examination was not possible where the hijacker profile was con-
cerned, because the characteristics of this profile were kept confidential. See note 47 
supra. This is another indication of the lesser governmental interest involved in the case 
of the drug courier profile. 
87. Chicago is a source city, but according to one case "no evidence was introduced 
in support of that classification," and notwithstanding this claim "lilt appears safe to 
assume that the overwhelming percentage of travelers from Chicago are not in any way 
connected with the heroin trade." United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 
690, 698 (E.n.N.Y. 1977). C{. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882 (1975) 
(most drivers near the border have nothing to do with illegal alien smuggling). 
88. 435 F. Supp. at 6'99. See also Kadish and Brofman, supra note 78, at 50. 
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glancing about nervously to escape detection, and one who is 
merely disoriented from air travel, the strangeness of the airport, 
fatigue and so forth.89 The use of this element of the profile in 
assessing a person's psychological attitude involves great poten-
tial for abuse and the concomitant erosion of the objective under-
pinnings of Terry. 
Nor is the failure to claim baggage necessarily indicative of 
criminal conduct. The fact that a suspect arrived on a morning 
flight carrying only an overnight bag suggests nothing more than 
a short stay in the arrival city.eo Similarly, even assuming that an 
agent reasonably believes that a pair of disembarking passengers 
are travelling together, there is nothing particularly suspicious 
about the fact that the pair decline to speak to one another while 
walking through the terminal.el Subjective hunches of the DEA 
agent do not amount to reasonable suspicion. 
Other elements of the profile such as the use of small denomi-
nation currency to buy tickets, the making of a phone call imme-
diately upon arrival, an unusual itinerary, and the use of one-way 
tickets are consistent with innocent conduct, and the airline pas-
senger behaving in such a manner should not be subjected to 
official interrogation absent reliable indicia of possible criminal 
conduct.82 Even when the more suspicious aspects of the profile 
are considered, such as the use of an alias and the furnishing of 
false identification to airline personnel, these acts cannot be said 
to affirmatively point to the actor as a drug courier. In short, as 
one court aptly put it, "nothing plus nothing equals nothing."·3 
89. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. 690, 699 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); 
United States v. Mico Rachelle Rogers, 436 F. Supp. I, 7 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States 
v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Where, however, the agent is aware of 
other facts pointing to criminal activity, nervousness can be used in connection with these 
more reliable indicia. See, e.g., United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,59-62 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(agent recognized defendant as major narcotics dealer, other profile characteristics pres-
ent); United States v. Allen, 421 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (defendant 
carrying suitcase embossed with name of known large scale heroin dealer, other profile 
characteristics present). 
90. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 700. 
91. 1d. 
92. See, e.g., United States v. Dewberry, 425 F. Supp. 1336 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (defen-
dant arrived direct from Los Angeles, met by persons agents believed to be known drug 
traffickers, agents observed and overheard the.group arranging for the pickUp of a suitcase 
in a suspicious and covert manner. Held reasonable suspicion to detain the group existed). 
93. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 700-01. 
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Although the drug courier profile may well be a "perfectly 
valid law enforcement device,"u the proper approach seems to be 
that its existence is not "a talisman that obviates the need for 
traditional analysis."95 This is sound advice in view of the fact 
that here the talisman is mutable: in one case an agent admitted 
that "the profile in a particular case consists of anything that 
arouses ... suspiciops."D6 This approach echoes the lenient sub-
jectivity of Wilson97 and is to be avoided if personal liberty is to 
retain any meaning, for if one DEA agent can testify that being 
Hispanic is part of the drug courier profile,Ds there is no reason to 
believe that the fourth amendment rights of any person will be 
adequately safeguarded in the pursuit of crime. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This survey of criminal profiles demonstrates that the line 
between objective fact and subjective hunch can be extremely 
thin; yet, the existence of the line is necessary ifrights guaranteed 
under the fourth amendment are to be preserved against arbi-
trary governmental intrusions. The use of criminal profiles tends 
to blur this line by replacing specific facts about particular sus-
pects with generalities about classes of people that are susceptible 
to abuse by law enforcement officers. The danger lies in the fact 
that profiles are generated from empirical data that relies on 
limited human experience; however, the variety of street encoun-
ters an average officer may face is endless, and when confronted 
94. United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, No. 
78-1821 (September, 1979). 
95. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. 1330, 1333 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Accord, 
United States v. Floyd, 418 F. Supp. 724, 728 (E.D. Mich. 1976). But see United States 
v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717,720 (6th Cir. 1977) (dictum) (in which the court states that "a 
set of facts may arise in which the existence of certain profile characteristics constitutes 
reasonable suspicion . . . . "). 
96. United States v. Chamblis, 425 F. Supp. at 1333. The court in Westerbann-
Martinez concluded that "either the 'Drug Courier Profile' is too amorphous and unrelia-
ble to be of any help, or. . . there is a tremendous lack of communication within the Drug 
Enforcement Administration as to the factors in the profile." 435 F. Supp. at 698. 
As of this writing, DEA agents stationed in San Francisco International Airport have 
been using the drug courier profile for the past four to five months. Although the profile 
is usually not used alone to make an investigative stop, one agent working the airport 
conceded that the elements of the profile varied with the situation at hand. Interestingly 
enough, two of the prime behavioral factors relied upon are in apparent conflict: calmness 
displayed in the baggage area and nervousness exhibited while walking through the ter-
minal. Telephone interview with Bill Gellerman, special agent with the DEA airport 
patrol, San Francisco International Airport (Nov. 26, 1979). 
97. See notes 16 to 21 supra and accompanying text. 
98. United States v. Westerbann-Martinez, 435 F. Supp. at 698. 
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by a borderline situation in which reasonable suspicion to execute 
a. Terry stop is uncertain, this average officer may well rely upon 
the talisman of the profile instead of looking to objective facts in 
light of personal experience. And in relying on the profile the 
officer will most likely "fill in the gaps" through dependence upon 
subjective hunches, justifying the resultant seizure as a product 
of "good police work." This scattershot approach to crime detec-
tion circumvents the clear mandate of Terry and is repugnant to 
American concepts of fairness and liberty. 
Lee R. Roper 
IV. PRIVATE AIR FREIGHT SEARCHES AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Gumerlock, I the Ninth Circuit, en banc, 
upheld convictions for heroin possession over the defendants' 
fourth amendment challenge to the search of air freight by United 
Airlines employees. In so doing, the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
opinion of one of its panels2 which had set aside the convictions 
on the ground that the search was unlawful. The Gumerlock 
court, after examining a federal statutory scheme designed to 
enlist the aid of private airlines to inspect packages to prevent 
skyjacking, found that there was insufficient government involve-
ment to require applying fourth amendment standards to air 
freight searches by private airlines.3 
1. 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (en bane) (per Browning, J.; Ely and Hufstedler, 
JJ. filed separate dissenting opinions). 
2. United States v. Fannon, 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977) (per Koelsch, J.; the other 
panel members were Chambers and Hufstedler, JJ.). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized. 
For background material on searches and seizures in the airport context, see generally 
Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and Seizures, 62 Kv. 
L.J. 623 (1974); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable 
Approach, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 293 (1972); Comment, Are Airport Searches Still 
Reasonable?, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 131 (1978); Comment, The Airport Search and the 
Fourth Amendment: Reconciling the Theories and Practices, 7 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 
307 (1978). 
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In Gumerlock, the defendants delivered packages to United 
Airlines for shipment.. As a result of the defendants' nervous 
behavior and other circumstances, the United Airlines freight 
agents suspected that the packages contained something other 
than what the defendants had declared.5 The agents sought per-
mission from their supervisor to open the package and inspect its 
contents pursuant to a tariff provision which they understood to 
authorize inspection under the circumstances.8 The agents found 
heroin in the packages and defendants Gumerlock and Fannon 
were subsequently convicted of possession of and conspiracy to 
possess heroin.7 No law enforcement personnel were involved at 
any time during the search of the packages. 
A Ninth Circuit panel in United States u. Fannon8 reversed 
the convictions and held that an air freight search by an airline 
employee was sufficient state action in light ofrecent federal anti-
skyjacking legislation to warrant application of fourth amend-
ment standards.' However, in Gumerlock, the Ninth Circuit 
reached the opposite result and held that the fourth amendment 
does not apply since there was no government involvement. 'o The 
court construed the identical legislation that the panel had con-
sidered in Fannon but concluded: (1) the provisions of the Air 
Transportation Safety Act of 1974 (ATSA)" and subsequent Fed-
4. 590 F.2d at 795. 
5. The court did not specify what these "circumstances" were, nor what the defen-
dants declared. [d. at 799. 
6. [d. Air freight searches conducted pursuant to tariff regulations have been consis-
tently held "non-governmental" for purposes of the fourth amendment. [d. at 799 n.17 
citing United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308,1311 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Issod, 
508 F.2d 990, 994 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399-401 & n.S1 
(D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 450 (2d Cir. 1973); United States 
v. Ogden, 485 F.2d 536, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 
324-25 (2d Cir. 1972); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967). 
7. 590 F.2d at 795. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1979). 
8. 556 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1977). 
9. [d. at 964. The Fannon court found that 49 U.S.C. § 1511(b) authorizes air carriers 
to condition transportation on the consent of the passenger or shipper to a search and 
confers on the carrier a governmental function sufficient to subject its conduct to constitu-
tional limitations. For the text of § 1511(b), see note 11 infra. The Fannon court set forth 
the facts of the case far more fully than the Gumerlock court and reveals that the purpose 
of the United Airlines search was to look for narcotics. 556 F.2d at 962. 
10. 590 F.2d at 795. 
11. The defendants relied on § 204 of the Air Transportation Safety Act of 1974 
(ATSA) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (Supp. v 1975» which provides: 
(a) The Administrator shall, by regulation, require any air 
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier to refuse to 
transport 
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era I Aeronautics Administration (FAA) regulations12 do not man-
date the search of air freight; (2) the defendants failed to carry 
their burden of proof that the agents acted pursuant to ATSA or 
FAA regulations; and (3) a search in which the government is not 
involved directly as a participant or indirectly as an encourager 
is not protected by the fourth amendment. 13 
B. ISSUES PRESENTED 
The issues presented in Gumerlock, although not expressly 
stated, were: (1) whether the provisions of the ATSA or subse-
quent FAA regulations mandating air freight searches constitute 
state action warranting the application of fourth amendment 
standards; (2) if the ATSA and FAA provisions are not manda-
tory, does an airline's voluntary compliance with these provisions 
imply state action and therefore bring the search within the pro-
tections of the fourth amendment; and (3) whether an airline 
employee search of air freight must meet fourth amendment stan-
dards when performed without government involvement but 
solely to aid law enforcement. 
(1) any person who does not consent to a search of his 
person, as prescribed in section 1356(a) of this title, to deter-
mine whether he is unlawfully carrying a dangerous weapon, 
explosive, or other destructive substance, or 
(2) any property of any person who does not consent to a 
search or inspection of such property to determine whether it 
unlawfully contains a dangerous weapon, explosive, or other 
destructive substance. 
Subject to reasonable rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Administrator, any such carrier may also refuse transportation 
of a passenger or property when, in the opinion of the carrier, 
such transportation would or might be inimical to safety of 
flight. 
(b) Any agreement for the carriage of persons or property 
in air transportation or intrastate air transportation by an air 
carrier, intrastate air carrier, or foreign air carrier for compen-
sation or hire shall be deemed to include an agreement that 
such carriage shall be refused when consent to search such 
persons or inspect such property for the purposes enumerated 
in subsection (a) of this section is not given. 
12. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c) (1976). For the text of § 121.538, see note 19 infra. 
13. 590 F.2d at 800. 
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C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT OPINION 
Does the Anti-Skyjacking Legislation Mandate Air Freight 
Searches? 
In 1974, Congress passed the ATSA with the intent to 
"provide security against acts of criminal violence against air 
transportation through the imposition at airports in the United 
States of such measures as the screening of passengers."u In 
Gumerlock, the defendants relied on a prior Ninth Circuit case, 
United States v. Davis, IG which stated that any search conducted 
pursuant to the ATSA scheme to strengthen the security of air 
transportation is subject to the fourth amendment. Ie Davis in-
volved a search of carry-on baggage rather than air freight and, 
although the court examined many anti-skyjacking provisions, its 
inquiry was directed to whether the defendant had waived fourth 
amendment protections by consenting to the search. In 
Gumerlock, however, the court found Davis to support their hold-
ing that the regulations were concerned only with airline passen-
gers and their carry-on baggage, and not air freight. n The defen-
dants submitted the ATSA legislation and FAA regulation in 
their attempt to show that air freight searches by airline employ-
ees are required by law. The ATSA sectionl8 provides that any 
carriage of persons or property for compensation shall be refused 
by the carrier, if the shipper refuses to consent to the search of 
such person or property. The court concluded that "[s]ection 204 
does not in terms authorize or require searches by air carriers" 
but rather provides the remedy of exclusion from the aircraft if 
the passenger refuses the search of his person or carry-on baggage 
in compliance with FAA regulations}e 
14. Both the Senate and House bills require "all passengers and property in air 
tran8portation ... be screened by weapon detecting devices." See S. REp. No. 13, 93d 
Cong., 1st Se8s. 1·2, 8, 10 (1973) and H.R. REP. No. 885, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974), 
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS, 3996, 4003·04. 
15. 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973). In Dauis, the appellant had been convicted of 
attempting to board an aircraft while carrying a concealed weapon. The Dauis court 
examined the anti·hijacking provisions under federal law, as well as their legislative 
history, at great length and found that "the government's participation in the develop· 
ment and implementation of the aircraft search program [had] been of such significance 
as to bring any search conducted pursuant to that program within the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment." [d. at 904. The court ruled that the defendant should have been afforded 
an opportunity not to board the plane and thereby eliminate the need for an inspection 
of his belongings. [d. at 911. 
16. Id. at 904. 
17. 590 F.2d at 796·97. 
18. For the text of § 204 of the ATSA, see note 19 infra. 
19. 590 F.2d at 797·98. The FAA regulations state in part: 
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, 
. The court found that there was no need for Congress to grant 
air carriers the right to refuse to transport freight without consent 
because that right had long been established through carrier tar-
iffs and by common law. 20 The Gumerlock court reasoned that 
this section of the ATSA, for purposes of applying the fourth 
amendment, did not supplant a carrier's common law or tariff 
right to search shipped goods. It concluded that Congress would 
not have worked such a fundamental change in the law without 
expressly saying SO.21 
The FAA regulation22 submitted by the defendants requires 
airlines to submit a written program for a security system for 
screening cargo to the FAA Administrator for approval. Defen-
dants argued that this section amounted to a federal mandate for 
air freight searches. The Gumerlock court found that this section 
does not require "carriers to adopt any particular security proce-
dures with respect to cargo, [and] specifically it does not require 
inspection of cargo."23 In so finding that Congress did not intend 
to include air freight shipment within the administrative scheme, 
the court further decided that the search involved in this case was 
(b) Each certificate holder shall . . . adopt and put into 
use a screening system, acceptable to the ~dministrator, that 
is designed to prevent or deter the carriage aboard its aircraft 
of any explosive or incendiary device or weapon in carryon bag· 
gage or on or about the person of passengers .... 
(c) Each certificate holder shall prepare in writing and 
submit for approval by the Administrator its security program 
including the screening system prescribed in paragraph (b) of 
this section, and showing the procedures, facilities, or a combi· 
nation thereof, that it uses to support that program and that 
are designed to -
(3) Prevent cargo and checked baggage from being loaded 
aboard its aircraft unless handled in accordance with the certif· 
icate holder's security procedures . . .. 
14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1976). The court acknowledged the mention of cargo in § 
121.538(c)(3) but noted that the inclusion of checked baggage within the section which 
did not require screening implied that cargo also need not be mandatorily screened. 590 
F.2d at 799 n.15, citing 41 Fed. Reg. 10911 (1976). Legislation subsequent to Fannon had, 
however, extended screening procedures to checked baggage. 1d. at 798. 
20. See 590 F .2d 799 n.17. Tariffs refer to the carrier's responsibility to charge a 
particular fee in transporting goods depending on what they were, and the carrier's need 
to know what is being shipped. The common law rights arise from the carrier's duty not 
to transport dangerous cargo. See United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 398·99 (4th Cir. 
1974). 
21. 590 F.2d at 798 n.9. 
22. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c) (1976). For the text of this section, see note 19 supra. 
23. 590 F.2d at 799. 
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without government involvement.24 The search of these packages 
by the airline was private and not subject to fourth amendment 
requirements.25 
State Action Through Voluntary Compliance With Legislation 
After finding that the legislative provisions submitted by the 
defendants did not require carriers to search air freight, the 
Gumerlock court merely touched upon the issue of whether fourth 
amendment protections would apply if carriers voluntarily com-
plied with the FAA regulation on air freight. After noting that 
defendants had failed at trial to carry their burden by proving 
that United Airlines had submitted the mandatory screening pro-
gram for air freight to the FAA, the court assumed that the airline 
had not adopted such a system.u Had United Airlines adopted a 
security screening program under the FAA regulations and con-
ducted the Gumerlock search pursuant to that screening pro-
gram, the implication is that the court might have found that 
fourth amendment protection would apply. Judge Ely, in his dis-
sent, makes this issue explicit: "[I]f the challenged inspection 
in this case were conducted pursuant to such a security program, 
then I believe that the inspection fell within 'the government's 
administrative scheme to strengthen the security of air transpor-
tation.' As such, it would be subject to the Fourth Amendment."27 ° 
The inference from the majority opinion is that the fourth amend-
ment would apply to a search conducted under the voluntary 
provisions of the FAA regulation. 
24.1d. 
25. 1d. The Gumerlock court noted that "the two packages involved in this case were 
not examined as part of a government mandated security program. On the contrary, the 
search of these packages was a private one, conducted by the air carrier's employers 
without government intervention, and is therefore not subject to the fourth amendment." 
1d. at 796. 
26. 1d. at 799. The court stated: 
There is nothing in the record to indicate whether United Air-
lines in fact adopted any security procedures with respect to 
cargo, or, if it did, whether the procedures include inspection 
approved by the administrator. Since the burden of establish-
ing government involvement in the search rests upon appel-
lants, we must assume that United Airlines has not adopted 
such a system in response to section 121.538(c)(3) which sub-
jects air freight to security searches. 
1d. (footnote omitted). 
27. 1d. at 801. 
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Search To Aid Law Enforcement 
Finally, the defendants contended that fourth amendment 
protection should apply to the United Airlines search because the 
agents searched the packages for contraband in aid of law en-
forcement28 rather than to vindicate any private interest of the 
airline. 29 The court found that United Airlines employees acted 
"officiously and not at the behest of the government, "30 and that 
the search was not subject to the fourth amendment "because the 
[agents were motivated] ... by a unilateral desire to aid in the 
enforcement of the law. "31 
D. CRITIQUE 
As Judge, later Justice, Cardozo once remarked about the 
fourth amendment exclusionary rule, "the criminal is to go free 
because the constable has blundered. "32 The threshold question 
in Gumerlock is whether the United Airlines agents acted as con-
stables or private persons. Searches by private persons without 
government involvement are not protected by the fourth amend-
ment. 33 However, where the government is even remotely in-
volved, the court will hold the fruits of such a search inadmissible 
on fourth amendment grounds.34 
The Ninth Circuit articulated this position in United States 
v. Davis,35 stating that the fourth amendment should not be un-
dercut by the government actively encouraging conduct by pri-
vate persons which is prohibited to the goverpment. Thus, the 
28. Id. at 800. 
29.Id. 
30.Id. 
31. Id. 
32. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21; 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). See generally, Kami-
sar, Is The Exclusionary Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment, 62 JUDICATURE 66 (1978); Sunderland, The Exclusionary Rule: A Require-
ment of Constitutional Principle, 69 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 141 (1978); Comment, Fourth 
Am.endment in the Balance-the Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell, 28 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 611 (1976). 
33. Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 
(1921). 
34. See, e.g., Corn gold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976) (private search 
conducted because of a police request found in violation of the fourth amendment); United 
States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374, 1378 (9th Cir. 1975) (private search conducted in the 
presence of police officers found in violation of fourth amendment); United States v. 
Davis, 482 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1973) (private search conducted solely in the aid of enforcing 
a federal statute found in violation of the fourth amendment). 
35. 482 F.2d at 904. 
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Ninth Circuit in Davis has joined other courts who have implic-
itly stated that the fourth amendment applies when the govern-
ment encourages a search or is a participant in a search.30 While 
the Davis court had little trouble finding that a search of carry-
on baggage was made in aid of the enforcement of a federal stat-
ute, the Gumerlock court simply found that air freight did not 
come under the same federal ambit. 
The fault of the Gumerlock opinion is that while the court 
undertakes a scholarly discussion of the history of anti-skyjacking 
legislation, the conclusion that the legislation does not encourage 
the security search of air freight is questionable. The wording of 
the FAA regulation37 requires airlines to submit cargo screening 
programs to the FAA for approval and requires that such a 
screening program be designed to prevent an explosive or incendi-
ary device from being brought aboard the plane. The majority, 
however, does not read the regulation as requiring inspection of 
air freight.3s As Judge Hufstedler notes in her dissent, the federal 
legislation is designed to prevent explosive devices or firearms 
from being loaded on aircraft, regardless of the manner by which 
the prohibited devices are boarded.3u 
Gumerlock, in overruling Fannon found that air freight ship-
ments were "not within the reach of an administrative scheme to 
enhance the security of air transportation from acts of criminal 
violence," and that the scheme certainly "did not involve 
searches of air freight."40 The inference is that air freight does not 
pose a sufficient threat in skyjack attempts to warrant legislation 
mandating its search. The court interprets the legislation as not 
considering the use of air freight in skyjacking, even though air 
freight is mentioned, because carriers have a common law right 
to search air freight packages}· 
36. E.g., the Ninth Circuit has stated: "[l]n light of all the circumstances of the 
case, [the "private party"] must be regarded as having acted as 'instrument' or agent of 
the state." United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 6 (9th Cir. 1976), quoting Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971). While the Sherwin court was looking at a more 
direct governmental participation than the "encouragement" referred to in Davis, the 
Gumerlock court found neither direct or indirect participation by government. 590 F.2d 
at 800. 
37. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(c)(3) (1976). For text of the FAA regulation, see note 19 supra. 
38. 590 F.2d at 799. 
39. [d. at 802 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
40. [d. at 799. 
41. ld. at 798 n.9. 
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Narrowing the Fourth Amendment 
Judge Chambers' concurrence in the vacated Fannon opinion 
expresses a fear of judicial expansion of the fourth amendment 
and advocates restraint.42 The Gumerlock opinion, by initially 
limiting situations when the fourth amendment applies at all, 
accomplishes this goal in two ways. First, the court finds no gov-
ernment involvement through legislation even though the statu-
tory language strongly suggests that air freight should be screened 
and searched. Second, it affirms that an airline employee may act 
unilaterially to aid law enforcement without complying with con-
stitutional safeguards. 
Airlines, through FAA and legislative licensing and restric-
tions are inextricably linked with the government. 43 The United 
Airlines employees in Gumerlock, if acting solely to find narcot-
ics, were performing a government function. 44 Since Gumerlock 
affirms this conduct, it appears that the government may 
"undercut" the fourth amendment through encouraging airline 
employees to search. 
Future Implications 
The Gumerlock court left the door open for future attempts 
by defendants to assert that the FAA regulation constitutes gov-
ernment involvement for fourth amendment purposes. The court 
stated that the defendants failed to meet their burden of estab-
lishing government involvement and that there was nothing in 
the record to show that United Airlines had voluntarily complied 
with the FAA regulation.45 The implication is that if a defendant 
can prove that an air carrier voluntarily complies with the FAA 
regulation, such a search would be protected by the fourth 
amendment. We will have to wait for such a case.48 
42. 556 F.2d at 964·65. See also a brief opinion by Judge Chambers in which he states 
his reasons for changing his concurrence to a dissent and for opposing an en banc review. 
United States v. Fannon, 569 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1978). 
43. 14 C.F.R. §§ 1·399 (1979). 
44. See United States v. Krell, 338 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Alaska 1977), where the 
court, on facts similar to those reported in Fannon stated: "Since the only purpose of the 
search was to turn drugs over to the police it is within the fourth amendment." C{. United 
States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399·401 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding contra); Gold v. United 
States, 378 F.2d 588 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding contra); United States v. Corngold. 367 F.2d 
1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding contra). 
45. 590 F.2d at 799. 
46. Two cases support the Gumerlock decision: United States v. Edwards, 443 F. 
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The extent to which courts will allow private parties to aid 
law enforcement without fourth amendment standards needs to 
be clarified by the Supreme Court. In his memorandum to the 
vacated Fannon opinion, Judge Chambers reached this conclu-
sion as well, stating that cases with facts such as those found in 
Gumerlock are of extraordinary importance and must inevitably 
be resolved by the High Court.47 The outcome will be of critical 
importance in determining how far the government may go in 
relying on private persons to effect law enforcement. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit in Gumerlock held that the ATSA and 
subsequent FAA regulations do not require carriers to search air 
freight and consequently that state involvement is not present to 
invoke the fourth amendment in a search of air freight. With the 
constitutional stakes so high, one would hope that more insight 
and explanation had been given in the court's opinion. 
John Douglas Moore 
V. TUCKER MOTIONS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
PROCEDURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Farrow v. United States 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, I deline-
Supp. 192, 199 (D. Mass. 1977) (disagreeing with Fannon); State v. Pohle, 166 N.J. Super. 
504; 400 A.2d 111, 113-14 (1979) ("Gumerlock is directly apposite and it constitutes per-
suasive authority for the fourth amendment immunity of the inspection and search proce-
dures undertaken in the instant case."). 
47. 569 F.2d at 1108, citing Judge Kaufman in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaquelin, 479 F.2d 
1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973): 
I vote against en banc; not because I believe this case is unim-
portant, but because this case is of such extraordinary conse-
Quence that I am confident the Supreme Court will take this 
matter under its certiorari jurisdiction . . . [e Jn bane consid-
eration by this court hqwever would merely serve as an instru-
ment of delay . . . . 
1. The en bane procedure may be obtained at the initial hearing or on petition for 
rehearing. The determination to hear the case en bane is made if a majority of the judges 
feel that the case presents important Questions or that full-court consideration is necessary 
to establish uniformity of that circuit's decisions. Note, Practitioner's Guide for Appeals 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ninth Circuit Survey, 7 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 465-466 (1976). 
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ated the proper procedures to be followed when a prisoner files a 
section 2255 motion2 challenging a sentence on the ground that 
the sentence was based on invalid prior convictions.3 In Farrow 
v. United States,4 the defendant moved to vacate his sentence." 
He argued that the district court had improperly considered four 
prior convictions6 at his sentencing which he alleged were ob-
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides that a prisoner in custody may move the court to vacate, 
set aside, or correct a sentence that is in violation of the Constitution or otherwise subject 
to collateral attack. The section further provides that the prisoner is entitled to a hearing 
to determine the issues in dispute unless the motion and case records "conclusively show 
the prisoner is entitled to no relief." Section 2255 provides, in pertinent part: 
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by 
Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the 
ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sen-
tence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court 
which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence. 
A motion for such relief may be made at any time. 
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the 
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United 
States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the 
issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with 
respect thereto. If the court finds that the judgment was ren-
dered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was 
not authorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or 
that there has been such a denial or infringement of the consti-
tutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulner-
able to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the 
judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or resentence 
him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as may appear 
appropriate . . . . 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). 
3. The invalid prior convictions addressed in this opinion are those rendered invalid 
because they were obtained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
Gideon established the right of an indigent defendant to have the benefit of court-
appointed counsel at his trial. Gideon was made retroactive in Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 
375 U.S. 2 (1963). Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) established that such invalid 
convictions could not be used "against a person either to support guilt or enhance punish-
ment for another offense." 
4. 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. Aug., 1978) (per Choy, J.) (en banc). 
5. Farrow was sentenced to five years for failing to pay a special tax on marijuana in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4755(a)(1), 7202, and three years for jumping bail in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 3150. Id. 
6. The four prior convictions claimed to be improperly considered were a 1949 Wash-
ington state conviction for first degree forgery; a 1950 California conviction for forgery, 
grand theft auto, and escape; a 1952 California conviction for two counts of burglary and 
forgery; and a 1956 California conviction for burglary. It is not indicated how many years 
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tained in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright. 7 The district court 
denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing.s The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in an opinion that 
establishes the proper procedure to be followed by this circuit in 
all future cases. 
United States v. Tucker 
In 1972, the Supreme Court applied the statute in the sem-
inal case of United States v. Tucker. 9 The Court established that 
a petitioner is entitled to relief when he shows that his sentence 
was based on invalid prior convictions. Of Tucker's three previous 
convictions,lo two were constitutionally invalid. The invalidity 
was established in collateral proceedings II prior to the section 
2255 motion. The record of the sentencing proceeding showed 
that the judge had given explicit consideration to defendant's 
previous convictions. 12 
in prison Farrow served for these convictions. The sentences ranged from 30 days to 15 
years in prison. Farrow did not contest the validity of two additional convictions, one in 
California in 1959 for burglary and one in 1964, also in California, for second degree 
robbery. Sentences for these convictions ranged from six months to life. All six prior 
convictions were included in the Probation Department presentence report. [d. at 1357 n. 
31. That the sentencing judge was aware of the challenged convictions at sentencing was 
not disputed. 
7. 372 U.S. 335. In his brief, Farrow asserted that these convictions had been found 
unconstitutional in a California superior court. This assertion was never dealt with by the 
court and throughout the opinion Farrow was treated as though he were merely alleging 
invalidity. 
8. In a three-judge panel decision, Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 24, 1976), Judge Koelsch, writing for the majority, reversed the district court's ruling 
and remanded the case for application of procedures laid out in its lengthy decision. See 
note 74 infra. Judge Choy dissented from the panel opinion. Upon petition by the govern-
ment, the court granted a rehearing en bane. The panel decision was withdrawn and 
explicitly overruled in the later opinion by Judge Choy, now writing for the majority. 580 
F.2d at 1344 n. 1. 
9. 404 U.S. 443 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Section 2255 motions filed when 
the prisoner is challenging his sentence on the basis of proven or allegedly invalid convic-
tions have since become known as "Tucker motions" and will be referred to as such in 
this note. 
10. Tucker was convicted for a felony in 1938 in Florida, while he was a juvenile, and 
served seven and a half years. In 1946, he was convicted in Louisiana on a felony charge 
and was sentenced to four years. He was convicted for burglary in Florida in 1951 and 
served one year before escaping. In the challenged sentencing proceeding, Tucker received 
the maximum sentence of 25 years for bank robbery. 
11. Some years after the challenged sentence was imposed the constitutional invalid-
ity of the 1938 and 1946 convictions was established in the California Superior Court of 
Alameda County. 404 U.S. at 444. 
12. The record showed that the sentencing proceeding began by an FBI agent, present 
at the hearing, enumerating Tucker's prior convictions in response to the judge's request. 
[d. 
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But the Court's ambiguous ruling in Tucker has led to much 
confusion in the lower courts. 13 Many questions remain unan-
swered regarding the applicability and extent of Tucker's hold-
ing. Exactly what relief does Tucker afford? That is, must the 
defendant's sentence be vacated or simply reconsidered? Does 
Tucker apply when invalidity is only alleged? The Fifth Circuit 
addressed this last question in 1972 in Lipscomb v. Clark.14 
Lipscomb v. Clark 
The defendant in Lipscomb was given the maximum sent-
ence for his conviction. IS He alleged that three of his four previous 
convictions were invalid. The court held that the fact that the 
defendant merely alleged the invalidity of his previous convic-
tions did not place the case beyond the scope of Tucker. 16 
The court remanded the case to the district court for further 
proceedings w.hich it assumed were in compliance with Tucker. 
First, the district court should determine if the allegedly invalid 
priors actually enhanced the sentence. Enhancement is to be de-
termined by removing the challenged convictions from defen-
dant's conviction record and deciding if the sentence is still 
"appropriate"17 in light of remaining prior convictions. If the 
court finds that the sentence is still appropriate this finding ends 
the process. If the court finds that the sentence is not appropriate, 
it must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
challenged priors are in fact invalid. If the court finds that the 
prior convictions are invalid, the petitioner must be resent-
enced. ls 
B. THE Farrow PROCEDURE 
According to the Farrow court, a movant in a Tucker chal-
lenge must show three elements to establish a prima facie case: 
(1) a prior conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. 
Wainwright; (2) the sentencing judge's mistaken belief that the 
13. 580 F.2d at 1345. See also Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d 130, 135 (9th Cir. 
1976) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
14. 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972). 
15. Lipscomb was sentenced to five years for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, 2311·2313 
(1970). 
16. 468 F.2d at 1323. 
17. See notes 62 to 71 infra and accompanying text. 
18. 468 F.2d at 1323. 
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prior conviction was valid; and (3) enhancement of the chal-
lenged sentence based on the invalid prior convictions. 1u If all of 
these elements are shown, the remedy is a resentencing without 
consideration of the invalid prior convictions.2u 
In Tucker, the first element had been established in collat-
eral proceedings.21 The second element was clear from the record, 
as is ordinarily the case, and thus not in issue. The only element 
to be determined was whether Tucker's sentence had been im-
properly enhanced by the prior invalid convictions.22 
In Farrow, the court was faced with a different situation. 
Unlike Tucker, Farrow had not determined the invalidity of the. 
challenged convictions prior to the Tucker motion. Farrow's posi-
tion was thus identical to that of the movant in Lipscomb v. 
Clark. The court in Farrow held that in situations like this, where 
the movant is 'only alleging invalid prior convictions, the proce-
dure outlined in Lipscomb is to be followed. 23 This means that 
instead of determining enhancement last, as in Tucker, enhance-
ment is determined first. And unless the movant can show im-
proper enhancement, he will never have an opportunity to show 
that the prior convictions were in fact invalid. 
Judge Recollection 
The court in Farrow endorses Lipscomb's procedure for de-
termining enhancement. In this procedure, the sentencing judge 
reviews the movant's conviction record, after excising the chal-
19. 580 F.2d at 1345, 1354. 
20. [d. at 1348, 1353. 
21. See note 11 supra. 
22. The defendant's prior convictions are normally brought to the judge's attention 
in the presentence report.In federal proceedings, FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2) mandates the 
presence of prior convictions in the presentence report. 
23. 580 F.2d at 1354. It is not entirely clear whether the court intends to limit the 
use of Lipscomb procedures to cases where the invalidity of the prior convictions is only 
alleged. The movants in both Farrow and Lipscomb had not previously established inval-
idity. The court begins its analysis by identifying the issue to be addressed as the proper 
"procedure to be followed in disposing of the motion . . . where the invalidity of the 
defendant's prior convictions is only alleged," id. at 1345, and focuses on that problem 
throughout the opinion. Yet the court at the same time states that "[w]e have taken this 
case en banc to delineate the procedure for district courts to follow when a convict files a 
§ 2255 motion claiming a Tucker violation," id. at 1344, without specifying that the 
procedure only applies when the movant is alleging invalidity. There seems nothing in the 
court's opinion to prevent applying these procedures to a movant who has established 
invalidity. 
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lenged convictions, to determine if the sentence is still appropri-
ate. But Farrow adds an alternate procedure. The judge may 
make a finding of no enhancement simply by recollecting that he 
did not rely on the challenged convictions at sentencing. This 
finding is sufficient to dismiss the Tucker motion without a hear-
ing.24 
The court's authority for this procedure is not Lipscomb, 
since Lipscomb never mentions the judge's informal disclaimer of 
reliance as a way to determine enhancement. The court relies 
primarily on its own previous decisions25 in United States v. 
Eidum,28 Dukes v. United States,27 and Wilson v. United States. 2M 
In Eidum the trial judge based his denial of the Tucker motion 
on his own disclaimer of reliance. On appeal, the court held that 
it would "not refute the judge's own estimation of the deleterious 
impact of the prior convictions' on his determination of sen-
tence"29 and therefore affirmed. Dukes presented an identical 
situation. Relying on Eidum, the court affirmed the lower court's 
dismissal of the motion. In Wilson the court approved both 
Eidum and Dukes but added a caveat: 
In affirming [the lower court's denial of the mo-
tion] we do not hereby adopt a rule that the trial 
court's statement that it did not rely on the in-
valid prior conviction always constitutes suffi-
cient reconsideration to satisfy Tucker . . . . 
Rather, we hold that where, as here, there is a 
substantial basis in the record on its face to sup-
port the court's statement of non-reliance, then 
the reconsideration mandated by Tucker has been 
performed.30 
The court in Farrow adopts and extends the Wilson rule,3' 
holding that a dismissal of the motion based on the judge's dis-
claimer of reliance will not be overturned on appeal unless the 
disclaimer is contradicted by the record.32 There are three major 
24. 580 F.2d at 1353. 
25. Id. at 1346-1348. 
26. 474 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1973). 
27. 492 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1974). 
28. 534 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1976). 
29. United States v. Eidum, 474 F.2d at 582. 
30. Wilson v. United States, 534 F.2d at 133. (emphasis in original). 
31. See notes 50 and 53 infra and accompanying text. 
32. 580 F.2d at 1348. 
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problems with this procedure: (1) the chain of authority on which 
it is based is weak; (2) it gives the appearance of injustice; and 
(3) it is difficult to review effectively. 
1. Inadequate Authority. The court is correct in suggest-
ing that the official adoption of the judge-disclaimer procedure in 
Farrow simply affirms earlier Ninth Circuit cases. This procedure 
was approved in Eidum, Dukes and Wilson. But, as Judge Huf-
stedler notes in her dissent to Wilson,33 neither Eidum nor Dukes 
give any real authority for the procedure. "The decisions of our 
circuit in Eidum . . . and Dukes . . . are opaque, very brief 
opinions. The language of Eidum, repeated in Dukes and quoted 
by the majority in this case, is conclusory, unsupported by any 
authority, or any reasoning. No effort whatever is made to square 
the conclusion with Tucker. "34 
The court in Farrow attempts to meet Hufstedler's criticism; 
it is only partially successful. The Farrow court quotes the Su-
preme Court in Blackledge v. Allison35 for the proposition that a 
judge's own recollection may suffice to summarily dismiss a sec-
tion 2255 motion "even though he could not similarly dispose of 
a habeas corpus petition challenging a state conviction."36 How-
ever, the authority the court relied upon is dicta. The petitioner 
in Blackledge was a state prisoner and was not attacking his 
sentence under 2255. Moreover, the dispositive issue in 
Blackledge was not improper enhancement of sentence but the 
voluntariness of the petitioner's guilty plea.37 
The Farrow court continues by reasoning that the rationale 
33. 534 F.2d at 134-39 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). Wilson was a panel decision in 
which the majority affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion without a hearing. A 
petition for rehearing en banc was denied. Judge Hufstedler dissented from both decisions 
and was joined by Circuit Judges Koelsch, Browning, Duniway, and Ely from the denial 
of the rehearing en bane. 
34. [d. at 137. 
35. 431 U.S. 63 (1977). 
36. 580 F.2d at 1352. 
37. The defendant in Blackledge was a prisoner in a North Carolina state peniten-
tiary who petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. He was attacking his sentence of 17-21 
years for attempted safe robbery. He alleged that his plea of guilty to this offense was not 
voluntary because it was based on a promise by his attorney, presumably after consul-
tation with the judge, that he would receive a sentence of only 10 years. At the sentencing 
proceeding, the petitioner stated on the record that his plea was voluntary. The Court held 
that the record of the proceeding for taking the petitioner's guilty plea did not on its face 
defeat his allegations. 431 U.S. at 78. 
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supporting the rules38 governing section 2255 compels the conclu-
sion that a judge may dismiss the motion based on his own recol-
lection. Rule 4 provides that whenever feasible the motion should 
be presented to the same judge who imposed the sentence.3U The 
court reasons that the rule encourages the judge to use his own 
familiarity with the case and with the sentencing proceeding to 
decide the motion. 40 
This reasoning is persuasive-but inadequate. It does not 
explain how the procedure complies with Tucker. 41 In her dissent 
to Wilson, Judge Hufstedler noted that the Court in Tucker re-
manded the case even though the judge in the lower court had 
disclaimed reliance. 42 In her dissent to Farrow, Hufstedler denies 
outright43 the validity of the judge's disclaimer of reliance because 
it does not comply with section 2255. The judge simply makes a 
finding, rather than testifying about his state of mind at sentenc-
ing. Thus the disclaimer is not a part of the record. Section 2255 
mandates that a hearing must be had "[u]nless the motion and 
the files and records of the case conclusively show that the pris-
oner is entitled to no relief. "44 
38. Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts (1977), 
reprinted in BB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, at § 14.30 app. (2d rev. ed. 1979). 
39. Id. Rule 4 (a) provides: 
(a) Reference to Judge; Dismissal or Order To Answer. 
The original motion shall be presented promptly to the judge 
of the district court who presided at the movant's trial and 
sentenced him, or, if the judge who imposed sentence was not 
the trial judge, then it shall go to the judge who was in charge 
of that part of the proceedings being attacked by the movant. 
If the appropriate judge is unavailable to consider the motion, 
it shall be presented to another judge of the district in accord-
ance with the procedure of the court for the assignment of its 
business. 
40. 580 F.2d at 1352. 
41. See, e.g., Note, Sentencing. Due Process, and Invalid Prior Convictions: The 
Aftermath of United States v. Tucker, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1099, 1108 (1977), arguing 
against reading the rules' in such a way as to sanction denying hearings: 
[T]he rules are plainly intended to implement section 2255, 
not thwart it. The statutory language is the ultimate source of 
authority and must guide the interpretation of the new rules. 
The statute states that the "court shall . . . grant a prompt 
hearing" unless the papers "conclusively show that the prisoner 
is entitled to no relief." This language argues against a reading 
of the rules as encouraging summary dismissal. 
(footnote omitted)(emphasis in original). 
42. 534 F.2d at 134 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
43. 580 F.2d at 1364. Judge Ely joined Judge Hufstedler in the dissent. 
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976) (emphasis added). See Halliday v. United States, 380 
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The majority in Farrow answer this criticism by declaring 
that "such an interpretation is both too literal and misapprehen-
sive of the Lipscomb procedure."4o The majority may be correct, 
but they nonetheless do not show how the judge's finding is based 
on "the motion and the files and records of the case" as required 
by the language of section 2255. 
2. Appearance of Injustice. A second problem with this 
procedure is that it simply looks unfair. The judge merely makes 
a finding of no reliance based on his own recollection; there is no 
formal hearing; the movant has no opportunity to argue his case 
or to question the accuracy of the judge's recollection. Moreover, 
as Judge Hufstedler points out in her Wilson dissent, the judge 
is called upon to recollect his state of mind at a sentencing pro-
ceeding that in many cases took place years before the current 
Tucker motion. 48 "Even if we could assume that judges, unlike 
other mortals, are capable of such feats of total recall and edited 
ex post facto judgment, the process is unfair and will be perceived 
as unfair. "47 
The Farrow disclaimer procedure gives the appearance of 
injustice because it gives the judge wide discretion and denies the 
movant a hearing on this issue. The Farrow dissent recognizes 
that this procedure reflects the court's desire to avoid hearings on 
any issue. 48 
It is not difficult to imagine that a judge will be influenced 
by a desire to avoid the "time and expense that a hearing would 
entail"4' when he recollects his previous state of mind. Suppose, 
for example, that a movant challenges three of six prior convic-
F.2d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1967) ("In spite of some remarks in certain cases about the judge's 
personal recollections we cannot believe that, unless acquiesced in, they are part of the 
record in a § 2255 proceeding."). 
45. 580 F.2d at 1352. 
46. 534 F.2d at 138. In Wilson, for example, the judge was recollecting a sentencing 
proceeding that occuned eight years earlier. 1d. at 132-33, 138. 
47. 1d. at 138. 
48. 580 F.2d at 1364 (Hufstedler and Ely, JJ., dissenting). The fact that the issue of 
enhancement is decided before that of the invalidity of the challenged convictions in-
creases the likelihood that no hearing on invalidity will be necessary. Furthermore, by 
holding that the question of enhancement will be determined through the judge's own 
recollection or review of the records, the court attempts to avoid a hearing on this element 
as well. 
49. 1d. at 1353. 
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tions. Under the Farrow disclaimer procedure, it is relatively easy 
for a judge to dismiss the motion simply by finding that it was 
not the three challenged convictions that he relied upon. The 
majority feel that apprehension of such "psychological barriers to 
[the judge] deciding objectively"50 is mistaken. They feel confi-
dent that "judges will rise above such influences-just as . . . 
they do in cases of racial or personal bias, or public or private 
pressure-subject, of course, to review by this court under ap-
propriate standards."51 Quite aside from one's doubts about the 
ability of judges to rise above such biases, the review process 
advocated by the court is wholly inadequate to the task. 
3. Inadequate Standards of Review. The Farrow court 
subtly alters the rule in Wilson. The effect is to deny relief on 
review in all but the most extreme cases. Wilson held that a 
judge's disclaimer would be upheld when there was a "substantial 
basis in the record to support"52 it. In a display of tortuous logic, 
the Farrow court asserts that this "substantial basis" need not be 
independent of the disclaimer nor "clear on the face of the record, 
since ... the judge's finding based on his own recollection may 
itself provide this 'substantial basis."'53 In circular fashion, the 
disclaimer supports itself. Having in effect destroyed Wilson's 
substantial basis test, the court also destroys the possibility of 
adequate review on this issue, for there remains nothing against 
which to measure the judge's disclaimer of reliance. 54 
The court holds that the judge's dismissal of the motion 
based on his own recollection will be reversed on appeal only 
when his disclaimer is clearly contradicted by the record. 55 This 
situation is exemplified for the court by a recent Ninth Circuit 
case, Leano v. United States. 58 The defendant in Leano was given 
50. [d. at 1350. 
51. [d. 
52. 534 F.2d at 133. See notes 29 to 31 supra and accompanying text. 
53. 580 F.2d at 1355-56 n.27. 
54. The only other possible way to review the judge's disclaimer is to hold a hearing 
on this determination. The judge would be the chief witness at such a hearing. As Judge 
Hufstedler notes in the dissent, it is understandable that courts have sought to avoid 
hearings in which the mental processes of judges are the subject of factual inquiry. [d. at 
1364 (Hufstedler and Ely, JJ., dissenting). But the answer to this dilemma is not to 
declare such a disclaimer non-reviewable but to avoid a procedure whereby a judge's 
disclaimer of reliance is sufficient in and of itself to dismiss a Tucker motion. 
55. 580 F.2d at 1355. 
56. 494 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974) (Leana I) (reversing district cQurt's dismissal of 
Tucker motion on the basis of disclaimer); 592 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) 
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the minimum sentence for a second offender on the mistaken 
assumption that a prior conviction for a related offense was 
validY When Leano brought a Tucker motion attacking the sent-
ence and alleging that the prior conviction was invalid, the judge 
disclaimed reliance on the prior and dismissed the motion with-
out a hearing. The Ninth Circuit reversed because the record 
clearly contradicted the disclaimer: the record showed that the 
judge considered the minimum sentence to be that of a second 
offender, which could not have been the case unless the judge had 
relied on the prior conviction. On remand the judge reiterated his 
disclaimer and again dismissed the motion. Leano appealed, and 
the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to a different 
judge for resentencing. 
Thus, it is clear that a judge's disclaimer of reliance on chal-
lenged prior convictions will be overturned on appeal only in the 
rare case where the record shows that he must have relied on 
those convictions to impose the sentence he did. 58 Such cases will 
normally occur only where the judge imposes a sentence based on 
the mistaken notion that the defendant is a second offender, as 
in Leano, or where the judge states his reliance on the challenged 
conviction at the sentencing proceeding and later disclaims reli-
ance on that conviction. But where the judge bases the sentence 
in part on the challenged conviction, does not so state at the 
sentencing proceeding, and later disclaims reliance-either be-
cause his memory is faulty or because he considers the sentence 
still appropriate for other reasons-no review is possible. Yet 
this non-reviewable disclaimer is sufficient to dismiss a Tucker 
motion without a hearing. Given the importance of this proce-
dure, and the fact that what is at issue is "misinformation of 
constitutional magnitude,"5u it is difficult to share the court's 
confidence that "judges will rise above bias ... subject, of 
course, to review by this court."80 
(Leana II) (reversing judge's second dismissal and remanding to a different judge for 
resentencing). 
57. Leano pleaded guilty to two counts of concealing and transporting imported 
marijuana in violation of 21 U .S.C. § 176a (since repealed). He was sentenced to 10 years 
for each count, to be served consecutively. Ten years was the mandatory minimum sen· 
tence for a second drug offender. 592 F.2d at 558. 
58. According to the Farrow court, a case will be assigned to a different judge on 
remand only where the judge reiterates his disclaimer after the contradiction between his 
disclaimer and the record are brought to the judge's attention. 580 F.2d at 1351·52 n. 
20. 
59. [d. at 1345, quoting from United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443. 
SO. [d. at 1350. 
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The Endorsement of Lipscomb's Appropriateness Standard 
According to the Farrow court, enhancement may be deter-. 
mined using two procedures. The first and easiest to apply is the 
judge's recollection of reliance.81 The second procedure is taken 
from Lipscomb. 82 In the Lipscomb procedure the judge reconsi-
ders the movant's sentence in light of the allegations of invalidity. 
The judge then excises the challenged convictions from the mov-
ant's conviction record to determine whether the sentence is still 
appropriate. If it is, the challenged convictions are deemed not 
to have enhanced the movant's sentence, and the motion may be 
dismissed without a hearing.83 
All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have en-
dorsed some form of the Lipscomb procedure.84 But the unanim-
ity dissipates over the issue of what is the proper standard to be 
employed.85 The biggest problem with the Lipscomb procedure is 
61. See text accompanying notes 24 to 32 supra. The court appears to make the 
enhancement determination a two-step process. If the judge does not affirmatively rec()l-
lect that he relied on the challenged convictions at sentencing, he moves on to the 
Lipscomb procedure: "Where the judge does not have an affirmative recollection of his 
previous mental state, he must reconsider the appropriateness of the original sentence 
from reconstruction of the record, assuming the invalidity of the challenged priors." [d. 
at 1354. 
62. 468 F.2d at 1323. 
63. See notes 17 and 18 supra and accompanying text. 
64. See Reynolds v. United States, 528 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1976) (explicitly approving 
Lipscomb); Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1975) (explicitly approving 
Lipscomb); Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1974) (using similar procedure 
without citing Lipscomb); United States v. Radowitz, 507 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1974) (explic-
itly endorsing Lipscomb); United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973) (explicitly 
endorsing Lipscomb); Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973) (explicitly 
approving Lipscomb); United States v. Green, 483 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 1071 (1973) (using similar procedure without citing Lipscomb); McAnulty v. United 
States, 469 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1972) (using similar procedure without citing Lipscomb). 
For Ninth Circuit cases, see notes 25 to 28 supra. But see Mitchell v. United States, 482 
F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973) (rejecting Lipscomb procedure without citing Lipscomb). 
65. Not every circuit adopting Lipscomb or Lipscomb-like procedures has had occa-
sion to enunciate whether it also adopts the Lipscomb "appropriateness" standard. The 
First Circuit in United States v. Sawaya, 486 F.2d 890 (1st Cir. 1973), the Third Circuit 
in Del Piano v. United States, 575 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1978), the Fifth Circuit in Smith v. 
United States, 565 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1978), the Sixth Circuit in Reynolds v. United States, 
528 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1976), the Seventh Circuit in Crovedi v. United States, 517 F.2d 
541 (7th Cir. 1975), and the Eighth Circuit in McAnulty v. United States, 469 F.2d 254 
(8th Cir. 1972), have all adopted the "appropriateness standard. The Second Circuit in 
Wilsey v. United States, 496 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1974) uses the "same sentence" standard 
employed in Tucker. The Fourth Circuit used the "appropriateness" standard in Brown 
v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973), but rejected it in Stepheney v. United 
States, 516 F.2d 7 (1975) (en banc) (remanding to the district court to determine if the 
sentence would have been the same) and in Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263 (1978) (follow-
ing Stepheney). 
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that it appears to depart from Tucker in the standard to be em-
ployed in reconsidering the sentence. The enhancement test in 
Tucker" is whether the judge, in reconsidering the sentence, can 
assert that he would have given the same sentence if he had 
known that the prior convictions were invalidY The Lipscomb· 
test, which the court in Farrow endorses, is whether the judge, 
after removing the challenged convictions from the record (and 
his consideration), now considers the sentence to be appropriate. 6K 
The Tucker "same sentence" standard is very precise, nar-
row, and difficult to meet: the movant must be resentenced un-
less the judge finds that he would have given precisely the same 
sentence had he based the sentence on correct information. The 
"appropriate sentence" standard is broader and, accordingly, 
easier to meet. A judge's finding that the sentence is still appro-
priate may mean simply that the original sentence is not unrea-
sonable or that it falls within the wide range of permissible pun-
ishments. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the "appropriate sent-
ence" standard in Stepheny v. United States69 and correctly 
found that it did not comply with Tucker. The court held that a 
judge's finding that the sentence was appropriate 
does not clearly say that the District Court found 
that the length of sentence was unaffected by the 
invalid prior convictions, that the sentence would 
have been the same with or without them . . . . 
[Under Tucker] [t]he fact of seeming general 
66. It is not universally agreed that Tucker requires a finding of enhancement to 
make a prima facie case. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 482 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1973), 
decided a year after Lipscomb, in which the Fifth Circuit found no enhancement require-
ment in Tucker: "To prevail below (the movant) was not required to secure an affirma-
tive finding that reliance on prior invalid convictions enhanced his sentence. He needed 
only to show that the sentencing judge considered constitutionally invalid convictions." 
ld. at 291. 
67. Although the Farrow court does not follow the Tucker test, it states the test 
accurately: "[t]he 'real question' in Tucker cases [is] whether the original sentence 
might have been different if [the judge] had known that the prior convictions were 
invalid under Gideon." 580 F.2d at 1353. 
68. 580 F.2d at 1354. The Tucker procedure does not ask the judge to perform the 
difficult (perhaps impossible) task of reconsidering the movant's sentence as if the judge 
had never looked at the challenged priors. Instead, the Court in Tucker asked the judge 
specifically to consider the unconstitutionality of the prior convictions, and found the 
earlier unconstitutional imprisonment of the movant a compelling reason to resentence. 
404 U.S. at 447 n. 8. See also, Note, supra note 41, at 1101 n. 16 (1977). Under the Farrow 
procedure the judge need never consider the fact of previous unconstitutional imprison-
ment at all and certainly need not balance it against the unchallenged priors in reconsider-
ing the sentence. 
69. 516 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1975). 
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appropriateness now is not enough if the sentenc-
ing judge cannot say he would not have imposed 
a lesser sentence had he been unaware of the prior 
conviction or had assumed its invalidity at the 
time of sentencing.70 
153 
The dissent in Farrow makes a similar objection to the use of the 
Lipscomb "appropriateness" standard. The dissent correctly as-
serts that this procedure does not comply with Tucker or with 
section 2255 because "[t]he question is not whether the sentence 
would have been 'appropriate' .... [but] whether, at the time 
of the sentencing, the judge would have given the same sen-
tence."71 
Since under the Farrow formula a finding of enhancement is 
a prerequisite to resentencing, the effect of the court's endorse-
ment of the broader Lipscomb standard is to make it more diffi-
cult for a movant to prevail in a Tucker proceeding. This effect 
can be seen by reiterating an earlier example: if a movant chal-
lenges three of six prior convictions, it is easier for a judge to find 
that the sentence, originally based on six convictions, is still ap-
propriate in light of three valid convictions than to find that he 
could have given the same sentence if he had known of the inval-
idity of the three challenged convictions. 
The Hearing on Invalidity 
If the sentencing judge finds that the sentence was enhanced 
by the allegedly invalid prior convictions, the movant will be 
granted a hearing on the validity of those convictions. Three ele-
ments must be established to successfully demonstrate the 
Gideon violation: (1) that the movant was indigent at the time 
of the challenged proceeding; (2) that he was not represented by 
counsel in that proceeding; and (3) that there was no effective 
waiver of the right to counsel in that proceeding.72 If the movant 
70. [d. at 9. 
71. 580 F.2d at 1363. Regarding the requirements of Tucker, the dissent notes that 
"[ilf a Tucker error could be cured simply by the district judge's reviewing the initial 
sentencing record, deleting the invalid priors, and deciding whether the sentence was still 
'appropriate,' the Supreme Court's rejection of the Government's argument would be 
incomprehensible." Id. See also Comment, Due Process at Sentencing: Implementing the 
Rule of United States v. Tucker, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1126 (1977). 
72. 580 F.2d at 1354. The movant has the burden to show indigency; it is met where 
he alleges indigency and the government does not deny it, or if the government does deny 
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establishes all three elements at the hearing, he will be resent-
enced without consideration of the invalid prior convictions. 
C. THE DISSENT: AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE 
It is ironic that in attempting to preserve judicial efficiency 
the court creates procedures that in many cases will prove more 
time-consuming than if the issue of invalidity were determined 
in the first instance. The need for a full-scale hearing to deter-
mine invalidity may not arise as often as the court seems to fear 
nor will the hearings themselves necessarily consume as much 
time as the court seems to think. In her dissent, Judge Hufstedler 
explains that the issue of invalidity can be resolved easily and 
efficiently: 
Ordinarily, the face of the record of the prior con-
viction will reveal either the presence or the ab-
sence of counsel. If the record clearly shows that 
counsel was present, an evidentiary hearing will 
not be required unless the petitioner claims that 
the record does not truly reflect the proceedings. 
If the record is silent concerning the presence of 
counsel, or if the record is equivocal, the absence 
of counsel is presumed . . . . In absence of proof 
from the record that the petitioner knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel, the prior 
conviction is constitutionally infirm. Waiver of 
counsel cannot be presumed from a silent record 
. . . . In almost all cases, the Gideon issue will be 
resolved by the combination of the record of the 
prior proceedings together with the allocations of 
the respective burdens of proof. Because the bur-
dens are very difficult to overcome, there will be 
few occasions in which any kind of evidentiary 
hearing will be necessary. 73 
To avoid the somewhat labyrinthic procedures advocated by 
the majority, Hufstedler suggests a simpler procedure. She would 
it, where the movant so testifies and the government offers no evidence to rebut. The 
burden is on the government to show representation where the record is silent or shows 
that the movant was not represented; the burden is on the movant to impeach the record 
where it shows he was represented. The burden is on the government to prove waiver when 
lack of representation is determined and the record is silent or shows no waiver; the burden 
is on the movant to show waiver not knowingly and intelligently made where the record 
shows he was offered counsel and declined. Proof of each factor must meet the 
preponderance·of·the·evidence standard. Id. at 1355. 
73. Id. at 1364·1365 (Hufstedler and Ely, JJ., dissenting). 
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require a Tucker movant to make a prima facie case by showing 
four elements: (1) that the movant neither had counsel nor made 
an effective waiver in the challenged proceedings, shown from the 
records of those proceedings; (2) that the judge considered the 
challenged convictions at sentencing; (3) that the judge did not 
place a disclaimer of reliance on the challenged priors on the 
record at the time of sentencing, and (4) that the challenged 
sentence exceeded the minimum for the offense for which the 
movant was convicted. If the movant makes this showing, he 
must be resentenced. 
This procedure has the advantages of saving the court's time, 
weeding out frivolous motions by requiring a substantial showing 
of invalidity at the time of the motion, and giving the appearance 
of justice by weighting the procedure in favor of the movant, 
rather than against him. 
D. CONCLUSION 
By rejecting Judge Hufstedler's proposal, and a similar pro-
posal made by the majority in the withdrawn panel opinion,74 the 
Ninth Circuit joins the other circuits in a near-unanimous en-
dorsement of the Lipscomb procedure. In so doing, and in estab-
lishing the validity of its own judge disclaimer procedure, the 
74. The panel opinion sets out a six-point procedure: (1) where practical, the Tucker 
motion should be assigned to a judge other than the sentencing judge; (2) if it is clear from 
the motions, files, and records of the case that the sentencing judge did not consider the 
challenged convictions, the original sentence stands; (3) if non-consideration of the chal-
lenged convictions does not appear from the motions, files, and records, the sentencing 
judge's consideration of these convictions is presumed; (4) where improper consideration 
is presumed, a hearing must be conducted to determine the validity of the challenged 
convictions, unless this issue can be determined from the motions, files, and records of 
the challenged proceedings; (5) if the challenged convictions are found to be valid, the 
original sentence stands; (6) if the challenged convictions are found to be' invalid, the 
sentence is vacated and the movant is resentenced by the Tucker proceeding judge with-
out consideration of the invalid prior convictions. Farrow v. United States, No. 74-2429, 
slip op. at 18 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 1976). The panel majority considered the third step in 
the procedure to be a "prophylactic rule." This rule was designed both to avoid a hearing 
"in which the sentencing judge, pitted against the petitioner, is placed on the witness 
stand" and to ensure the appearance of fairness. [d. The panel majority also suggested 
the possibility that the judge in resentencing might consider the prior unconstitutional 
imprisonment of the movant as a mitigating factor. [d., n. 11. The panel's suggestion that 
a different judge should hear the Tucker motion has since been overruled by the Rules 
Governing § 2255 Proceedings, note 38 and 39 supra; see Rule 4 (a). For an extensive 
criticism of the panel opinion before it was withdrawn, see Elliot v. United States, 434 F. 
Supp. 774 (N.D. Cal. 1977). For a discussion and endorsement of the panel opinion 
approach, see Note, supra note 41, at 1106-11 (1977). 
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Ninth Circuit may have closed the door on movants who seek a 
fair hearing on challenges of constitutional magnitude. 
Paige L. Wickland 
VI. YOU CAN TELL A CRIMINAL BY HIS LIBRARY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an age of relative enlightenment with respect to the proce-
dural rights of criminal defendants, it is somewhat surprising that 
an accused can be subjected to criminal liability based, at least 
in part, on his admission of having read a particular book. Yet, 
in United States v. Giese' the Government was not only allowed 
to require the defendant to read aloud inflammatory passages 
from a revolutionary anthology, in the guise of character and 
veracity impeachment, but was allowed to argue to the jury in 
closing argument that the defendant acted in conformity with the 
radical ideas expressed therein. The defendant asserted six 
grounds for reversal of his conspiracy conviction,2 and while the 
majority of the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized the first 
amendment implications, they found an implied waiver of the 
rights involved. Thus the constitutional issues were shrouded in 
mundane evidentiary concerns as the first amendment faded in 
importance. 
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Frank Stearns Giese, a professor of French at Portland State 
University, became associated with his co-conspirators through 
the Radical Education Project (REP) bookstore which he founded 
in 1971. As an adjunct to the enterprise, he sent books to inmates 
1. 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir. May, 1979) (per Trask, J.; Sweigert, D.J., sitting by desig-
nation concurred in a separate opinion, Hufstedler, J., dissented in a separate opinion), 
cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 480 (1979). 
2. The grounds asserted were as follows: 
(1) Count X of the indictment was legally insufficient. 
(2) The district court erred in denying Giese's motions for 
bills of particulars. 
(3) The voir dire examination was inadequate. 
(4) The district court erred in admitting certain evidence. 
(5) The court's instructions to the jury were erroneous. 
(6) The Government committed reversible acts of prosecu-
torial misconduct. 
1d. at 1177. This casenote will primarily address the fourth contention due to its constitu-
tional significance. 
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at the Oregon State Correctional Institution and led group discus-
sion sessions at the prison. According to two of the co-conspirators 
who became witnesses for the prosecution, several participants 
eventually coalesced into a group for the purpose of discussing 
their vehement opposition to the Vietnam War. Eventually, the 
group succumbed to the futility of their passive efforts to end the 
war, and vowed to take direct action in order to stop, or at least 
disru pt the war. 
Two acts of violence, attributed to this coalition and alleg-
edly including Giese, formed the basis for the Government's pros-
ecution: the January 2, 1973 bombing of a Portland Navy recruit-
ing center; and the January 4, 1973 bombing of a Portland Army 
recruiting center. Giese allegedly agreed to take part in the latter 
bombing, helped plan the details of the operation, and drove the 
getaway car during its commission. 
A federal grand jury for the District of Oregon returned a 
joint ten-count indictment charging Giese and four other persons 
with a variety of offenses. Giese was named in six of the counts 
charged,3 including a general conspiracy count. The jury acquit-
ted Giese of all of the substantive crimes, but found him guilty 
of criminal conspiracy. 
At trial, the prosecution introduced in its case-in-chief nu-
merous revolutionary books and pamphlets seized pursuant to a 
search of an apartment belonging to one of the co-conspirators" 
3. Giese was charged in Count "IV with misprison of a felony (the January 2, 1973 
Navy recruiting center bombing), in Counts V through vm with committing various 
offenses in connection with the January 4, 1973 Army recruiting center bombing, and in 
Count X with criminal conspiracy to commit the substantive offenses charged.ld. at 1176. 
4. A total of 27 seized literary items were introduced into evidence, including: " 'The 
Underground Bombing Manual,' 'Firearms and Self-Defense,' 'Department of Army Man-
ual, Electronic Blasting Equipment,' 'Technical Training and Tips: Mine Warfare,' 
'[From the Movement Toward] Revolution,' 'Communist Guerilla Warfare in the 
U.S.A.,' 'The Paper Trip,' 'The Anarchist's Cookbook,' and 'Protect Yourselffrom Investi-
gation.''' ld. at 1204 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
In his opening statement, the prosecutor described "The Blaster's Handbook" as "one 
of the 'more significant pieces of evidence in this case. It is the ABC's of bombing, the 
how-to-do-it, how to use explosive devices, .. .''' ld. at 1202 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
According to Judge Hufstedler, while several of the pamphlets were identified only 
by name, the Government's lead-off witness, co-conspirator McSherry, was asked to iden-
tify several pamphlets and to describe their subject matter. For example, "McSherry 
identified 'Special Forces Handbook,' which he said dealt with 'explosive devices, mines, 
and different kinds of explosives and how to detonate them.''' ld. at 1203 (Hufstedler, J., 
dissenting.) 
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Meyer, another co-conspirator, testified for the prosecution that 
during discussions with prisoners, Giese offered to send them free 
"Communist or Socialist literature." Meyer further testified that 
Giese engaged in discourse on such varied topics as "revolution, 
radicalism, black liberation, Hitler, and the war in Vietnam," 
and that Giese at one point advocated George Jackson's Blood In 
My Eye-a book dealing with "urban warfare in American ci-
ties."5 The Government's theory was that certain materials con-
tained fingerprints of the co-defendants which tended to corro-
borate witness' testimony that the conspirators associated with 
one another. 
Giese's fingerprints were found on only one of the books, 
From the Movement Toward Revolution (Revolution}.6 His law-
yer objected to the introduction of the fingerprints into evidence 
on, at least, the grounds that the Government had laid an inade-
quate foundation.7 Nonetheless, Revolution was admitted into 
evidence as a physical object containing the fingerprints of Giese 
and several of his alleged co-conspirators. 
Giese took the stand in his defense and was questioned by his 
counsel regarding each and every Government exhibit. He testi-
fied that he did not sell, nor did he carry, in his bookstore any of 
the books and pamphlets in evidence.s Thereafter, Giese's lawyer 
had him produce eighteen books which he termed a "representa-
5. rd. at 1194. 
6. Three of Giese's fingerprints were found on page 146, three were found on page 166, 
one was found on page 167, and two were found on page 168. The testimony of the 
Government's expert witness did not definitely establish when the fingerprints were 
placed upon the book. He stated that, in general, fingerprints can remain identifiable for 
a period of up to seven years. Consequently, it appeared that the fingerprints on 
REvOLUTION were made sometime between the book's publication in mid-1971 and its 
seizure by Government officials in mid-1973. rd. at 1186 n.17. 
7. The precise nature of the objection made by defense counsel is controverted. The 
book apparently came into evidence as a part of a stipulation concerning all 27 items, and 
the majority claimed that Giese's lawyer made only one objection during the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief which "did not challenge the book's probative value as circumstantial 
evidence of association, but merely alleged that the government had laid an inadequate 
foundation." rd., n.18. Judge Hufstedler contended, on the other hand, that upon his 
discovery regarding the age of the fingerprints, defense counsel promptly interposed an 
objection "on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid and on the further 
ground that the evidence was irrelevant to any issue in the case . .. [d. at 1203 (Hufstedler, 
J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The factual schism is not insignificant in that the 
majority rested its application of only the plain error standard of review on counsel's 
alleged failure to object on relevance grounds. 
8. [d. at 1188. 
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tive sample" of the type of books Giese did sell in his REP book-
store, and he proceeded to identify, and briefly describe some of 
them for the jury.s According to the majority, Giese had "pre-
faced" his testimony regarding the sample with an account of his 
involvement in various social and political causes, apd described 
how he participated in sit-ins and marches to manifest his con-
cern until 1969, when he received a "sizeable inheritance," and 
decided that "the best way to propagate his political views was 
to establish" the REP bookstore. to 
On cross-examination, Giese testified that he had read por-
tions of Revolution and that he owned his own copy of the book, 
but he denied ever having sold it or having otherwise provided it 
to his co-conspirators. The prosecutor then requested that Giese 
read aloud certain pre-selected and inflammatory passages of 
Revolution. 11 Giese was required by the court to comply with the 
9. The majority portrayed Giese's production of the representative sample as follows: 
(H]e offered a rather detailed exegesis of Frederick Engel's 
Dialectics of Nature; he discussed Camus's background; and he 
explained the theses of Pierre Jalle's Pillage of the Third World 
and Andre Gorz's Strategy for Labor. A Radical Proposal. He 
gave brief descriptions of the contents of Soul On Ice by Eld-
ridge Cleaver, Away With All Pests: An English Surgeon in 
People's China. 1954-1969 by Joshua Hom. Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America by Andre Gunder Frank. 
and Soledad Brother by George Jackson. Black Elk Speaks by 
John G. Niehardt. Viet Nom in Photographs and Text by Felix 
Greene. Limits to Growth (a report for the Club of Rome). and 
American Radicals: Some Problems and Personalities. Giese 
also mentioned Sisterhood Is Powerful. An Anthology of Writ-
ings From the Women's Liberation Movement by Robin Mor-
gan. Readings in U.S. Imperialism by K.T. Fann and Donald 
C. Hodges. and Monopoly Capital. An Essay On the American 
Economic and Social Order by Paul A. Baran and Paul M. 
Sweezy. The three works Giese had written were Artus Desire. 
Priest and Pamphleteer of the Sixteenth Century. French Lyric 
Poetry. and an article on Camus and Algeria which was pub-
lished in the Colorado Quarterly. 
Id. at 1188-89. 
10. Id. at 1189. 
11. Id. at 1192-93 n.26. The following exchange between the prosecutor and Mr. Giese 
occurred: 
Q. Mr. Giese. would you look at Page 166. the last paragraph 
on the lower right-hand side. I have got a little check mark 
there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you see that. sir? 
A. Yes. I do. 
Q. Could you read that particular paragraph for us and con-
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request over the objection of defense counsel on grounds of relev-
ance and first amendment concerns.'2 In his closing argument, 
the prosecutor himself read out loud to the jury some additional 
violent passages from Revolution, and argued that "throughout 
the book are references to the very thing that these people did."13 
tinue on? 
A. 'We are sorry to'-
Mr. Paulson: May I have an objection? 
The Court: You may have a continuing objection. Please pro-
ceed. 
A. You want to read it aloud? 'We are sorry to hear that the 
townhouse forever destroyed your belief that army [sic] strug-
gle is the only real struggle. That places us in a unique position 
because, as Che stated, "armed struggle is the only solution for 
people who fight to free themselves" and we have lost dearly-
loved comtades.' Do you want me to go on? 
Q. Yes sir. 
A. 'Also probably every experienced revolutionary has, but we 
realize that risks must be taken, some will die, others will re-
place them or us.' 
Q. Will you continue to the end of the paragraph. 
A. I am trying to make sense out of the sentence. All right. 
'Others will replace them or us like people rapping about end-
ing racism, colonialism, sexism and all of the other pigisms, 
exploitation and all that but these things can only be ended by 
revolution and revolution is in the final analysis armed strug-
gle, revolution is violence, revolution is war, revolution is blood-
shed. How long have different successful national liberation 
fronts fought before they have won large popular support.' 
The passage came from pages 166 and 167 which bore Giese's fingerprints. [d. 
12. The objection interposed was as follows: 
Mr. Paulson [Giese's lawyer]: Objection. It's hearsay and to 
my knowledge, he has not been charged with having read books 
but with acts in this case of-
The Court: Overruled. 
Thereafter, the court gave Giese's counsel a "continuing objection," see note 11, supra. 
597 F.2d at 1192 n.26. 
13. The closing argument was, in pertinent part, as follows: 
In California as regards to Mr. Giese, we have From the Moue-
ment Toward Reuolution, Mr. Giese has fingerprints on this 
particular book. He told you that he had one of these books 
himself, possibly, at home. He could not recall how or if at all 
his fingerprints got on this particular book which came out of 
the Debra Sue Apartments in California. This is an architec-
tural manual, basically, of urban warfare. Between this book 
and this book, you have the makings for any sort of urban 
warfare that you would like to participate in. 
This is basically a conspiracy action, and I would like to just 
very briefly take excerpts from pages which contain Mr. Giese's 
fingerprints. 'A revolutionist sees death as a national phenome-
non, must be ready to kill to change conditions. Revolution is 
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On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Giese claimed that the trial 
court violated a number of the rules of evidence with respect to 
Revolution: (1) it was error to admit Revolution in the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief as its prejudicial effect outweighed its proba-
tive value as evidence of association; (2) it was error to admit the 
book's contents on cross-examination because they were hearsay 
and irrelevant to the offense charged; and (3) in any case, it was 
improper for the trial court to permit the prosecutor to make 
Giese read the inflammatory passage in front of the jury .14 Giese 
also claimed that admission of Revolution infringed upon his first 
amendment liberties, specifically, freedom of expression and the 
right to receive information. 15 
In rejecting Giese's arguments, the Ninth Circuit empha-
sized that they were not establishing a "general rule" that the 
Government may use a person's reading habits or literary tastes 
against him in a criminal prosecution. Their decision rested 
firmly upon the "peculiar circumstances" of the case; "reflecting 
[their] concern for the sensitive nature of first amendment val-
ues, it rest[ed] on very narrow grounds."II The court held that 
the admission of Revolution in the Government's case-in-chief 
armed struggle, violence, war, bloodshed and the duty of a 
revolutionary is to make revolution. 
Let's all try to pick targets with more care and planning. The 
object is to destroy the economy like bombing sites which will 
affect the economy the most, rip off weapons and money, snip-
ing attacks. Remember, in a revolution, one wins or dies. The 
stakes are very high. 
Do you recall the old words, "Ask what you can do for your 
country," destroy it, mentally, morally, psychologically and 
physically destroy it. And whatever you do do it good. 
Now those are just two pages from this book but these are two 
pages which contain the fingerprints of Frank Giese. If you have 
an opportunity, you may want to-leaf through the rest of the 
book, because, as I indicated, this tells you-this is another 
how to do it for urban warfare. 
Did we make up Frank Giese's fingerprints on the book From 
the Movement Toward Revolution? ... You read those pages 
where Frank Giese's fingerprints were. You read those pages. It 
talks about bombing, sniper attacks. You read that book. You 
read other pages throughout there. Look at Page 51, for in-
stance, look at the preface. Throughout that book are references 
to the very thing that these people did. 
[d. at 1206 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
14. [d. at 1184. 
15. [d. at 1184-85. 
16. [d. at 1185. 
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was proper because the book, as a physical object, bore Giese's 
fingerprints and those of other co-conspirators and therefore 
tended to corroborate the witness' testimony that they were asso-
ciated with one another. 17 Further, the court held that it was 
proper for the prosecutor to request Giese to read out loud ex-
tracts from the book on cross-examination because Giese had 
"opened the door to that line of inquiry" by introducing the eight-
een books sold in his bookstore as evidence of his peaceable char-
acter.18 In more simple terms, the majority held that Revolution 
was admissible to prove association, to rebut character evidence, 
and to impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness. IS 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The majority reasoned that Giese's counsel failed to object 
to Revolution as fingerprint evidence on grounds of relevance and 
therefore the trial judge would only be reversed for plain error. 20 
The court recognized that book titles alone can "sometimes have 
a tendency to prejudice a defendant," relying on United States 
v. McCrea;21 however, in the instant case, the court concluded, 
the exhibit's probative value "clearly outweighed" the title's 
"slightly prejudicial effect."22 The majority "readily" distin-
guished McCrea on the basis that the books introduced by the 
prosecution in that case totally lacked probative value, either as 
works of literature or as physical embodiments of evidence link-
ing co-conspirators.23 
17.Id. 
18.Id. 
19. Id., n.15. 
20. Id. at 1186-87. 
21. 583 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1978). McCrea was convicted of possession of an unregis-
tered firearm (destructive device) in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The prosecution 
introduced two books seized from McCrea's possession into evidence: "Improvised Muni-
tions Handbook" and "OSS Sabotage & Demolition Manual." The Ninth Circuit held 
that admission of the books was error, but held the error to be harmless in light of the 
otherwise overwhelming evidence of McCrea's guilt, coupled with the fact that the Gov-
ernment made no mention of the books during its opening statement, nor attempted to 
capitalize on them during trial. 
Judge Trask, writing for the majority in Giese, distinguished McCrea on the basis that 
knowing possession was all the government had to prove and thus the defendant's intent 
was immaterial. Since one cannot logically infer possession of firearms from mere posses-
sion of books concerning them, the books contributed "nothing to the truth finding pro-
cess." Judge Trask further noted that although the McCrea opinion gave no indication as 
to whether the books bore the fingerprints of the defendant, or anyone else, even if they 
had, the books still would have been immaterial since McCrea was not charged with 
criminal conspiracy. 597 F.2d at 1187. 
22.Id. 
23. Id. at 1188. See note 21 supra. 
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Next, the majority concluded, the prosecution gained the 
right to cross-examine Giese on Revolution's contents when he 
took the stand and produced the eighteen samples, testifying to 
the contents of many of them, and "suggesting" that they were 
indicative of his peaceable character.24 "Giese implied," claimed 
the majority, "that the 18 books exemplified the kind ofliterature 
he sold, owned, or read,25 and that the literature, in turn, reflected 
his left-wing but nonrevolutionary political views. "26 By 
"juxtaposing" an account of his political activities with an ex-
planation of his motivation for founding REP bookstore, and a 
description of the kinds of books he "sold, owned or read,"27 
Giese, the majority concluded, sought to portray himself as a 
"scholarly, humane, peace-loving political activist who possessed 
a decidedly non-violent character."28 
The Supreme Court set forth the basic principles governing 
use of character evidence by a defendant-witness in Michelson v. 
United States,29 concluding that "the price a defendant must pay 
for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open the entire 
subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make 
himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him." The 
majority applied this principle and concluded that "Giese threw 
open the subject of his literary tastes and reading habits when he 
testified about the specific acts of selling, reading, and owning the 
eighteen books."30 At that point, the trial judge was vested with 
" 'broad discretion to admit extrinsic evidence tending to contra-
dict the specific statement, even if such statement concern[ed1 
a collateral matter in the case.' "31 The majority noted that a trial 
judge had broad discretion in determining what lines of question-
ing are reasonably related to the subject matter of direct exami-
24. 597 F.2d at 1188. 
25. [d. at 1188-89 (emphasis added). See note 9 supra. The majority noted that the 
books Giese had personally authored were his personal property and kept at home rather 
than in the bookstore. Hence, Giese "owned" some of them. The majority also noted that 
while Giese claimed that he had not necessarily read the 18 books he was introducing into 
evidence, "he left no doubt that he had read many of them," by virtue of his discussion. 
Hence, Giese "read" some of them. [d. 
26. [d. at 1189 (emphasis added). 
27. [d. 
28. [d. 
29. 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948). 
30. 597 F.2d at 1190. 
31. [d., quoting United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1250 (2d Cir. 1978). 
32. See United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17, 24 (9th Cir. 1976); United States 
v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1976); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE § 191, at 59 (2d ed. Supp. Cleary et al., eds. 1978). 
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nation,32 and, in the case of character evidence in particular, its 
admissibility "'depend[s] on numerous and subtle considera-
tions difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record, and there-
fore, rarely and only on a clear showing of prejudicial abuse of 
discretion will Courts of Appeals disturb rulings of trial courts 
.... '''33 In light of the foregoing principles, and given Giese's 
"fairly extensive contacts with the book" the court could not 
conclude that the trial judge had abused his discretion. The ma-
jority explained: 
Justice would not have been served had the jurors 
been left with ... the one-sided impressions 
created by Giese's 18 innocuous books. To show 
the opposite side of the coin, as it were, it was fair 
for the government to cross-examine Giese on 
other books had had sold, owned, or read. From 
the Movement Toward Revolution was such a 
book. It is true that Giese did not keep From the 
Movement Toward Revolution in stock at the 
book-store, but he did not sell all of the 18 books 
there either. However, there is no doubt that 
Giese read and owed From the Movement Toward 
Revolution.34 
The court reasoned that the trial judge correctly overruled 
defense counsel's objections on grounds of hearsay and irrele-
vance because Revolution was relevant for the "dual rebuttal" 
purposes of impeaching Giese's character and his veracity as a 
witness. The contents were not hearsay because they were not 
introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted therein.3li 
The court likewise rejected Giese's claim that he was 
"forced" by the prosecutor to read out loud from Revolution in 
front of the jury, noting that Giese himself did not wage a protest, 
33. 597 F.2d at 1191, citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 480 (1948). 
34. 597 F.2d at 1191. The majority added that because defendants are traditionally 
afforded "considerable latitude" when they testify regarding their personal histories, they 
"[sjometimes commit tactical blunders." The court explained: 
We are cognizant of the limitations inherent in the use of litera-
ture as proof of character, and we do not applaud the strategy 
employed by Giese and his attorney. Nor do we bestow our 
imprimatur on the concept of trial by books. Nevertheless, the 
question before this court is not whether we think books are a 
persuasive form of character evidence; the issue is whether the 
government had a right to respond once the defendant had, of 
his own volition, chosen that method of proving he was a peace-
able, law-abiding individual. 
[d. at 1190-91. 
35. [d. at 1191-92. 
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nor did his lawyer object to "the act of reading as such."38 "Giese 
was no more 'forced' to read from the book than is a witness who 
is asked to read a prior inconsistent statement to the jury," the 
court notedY Again, the trial judge is accorded considerable dis-
cretion, the majority reasoned, in deciding "how" evidence is to 
be presented because of his "superior position" to evaluate the 
proceedings, and his exercise of discretion will be upheld unless 
he has acted "arbitrarily or irrationally."38 
The majority adopted a "useful te~t" from the Sixth Circuit 
for determining whether a defendant is unjustly prejudiced by 
having to perform a particular act on the witness stand,39 and 
determined that Giese suffered no degradation such as to warrant 
reversal of his conviction.4° Whatever damage did occur, the ma-
jority determined, could easily have been mitigated by defense 
counsel "simply asking his client on redirect whether he agreed 
with what the book said. "41 Besides, the court concluded, even if 
Giese was slightly injured by his performance, "the probative 
value of enabling the jury to observe his demeanor while he was 
being impeached outweighed the prejudicial effect."42 In light of 
36. [d. at 1192. See note 12 supra. 
37. 597 F.2d at 1192. 
38. [d. at 1192-93. The majority relied on a recent Second Circuit opinion, United 
States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 
(1978) which held that" 'the preferable rule' in reviewing a district court's decision on 
the question of unfair prejudice 'is to uphold the trial judge's exercise of discretion unless 
he acts arbitrarily or irrationally.' " [d. 
39. United States v. Doremus, 414 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1969). In Doremus, the 
Sixth Circuit held that impermissible prejudice results when "the requested performance 
or demonstration would unjustly humiliate or degrade the defendant" or "such perform' 
ance would be damaging to the defendant's image and irrelevant to the issue on trial." 
40. 597 F.2d at 1193. 
41. [d. While no such rehabilitative effort was in fact made, it could have been made. 
Therefore, the situation differed from, for example, the "forced reenactment of an espe-
cially shocking crime" which is capable of degrading a defendant "beyond repair," accord-
ing to the majority. [d. 
42. [d. The court elaborated as follows: 
It is axiomatic that jurors are entitleg to see how the witness 
reacts when the cross-examiner catches him in a contradiction 
or exposes one of his falsehoods. "The demeanor of the witness 
on the stand may always be considered by the jury in their 
estimation of his credibility." lilA Wigmore on Evidence § 946, 
at 783 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (emphasis in original). Evidence 
is normally taken by means of viva voce testimony of witnesses 
rather than by written depositions because it is considered cru-
cial for the judge and jury "to obtain the elusive and incom-
municable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying." 
[d. quoting J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1395, at 153 (emphasis in original). 
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these factors, the court reasoned, the trial judge did not act irra-
tionally or arbitrarily in failing to rule sua sponte that the act of 
reading unfairly prejudiced Giese}3 
The majority concluded its analysis regarding the prosecu-
tion's use of Revolution by stating that Giese's first amendment 
argument "is without merit. "44 The majority noted that Giese did 
not assert his constitutional argument "by way of a timely objec-
tion or request for instructions at trial;" moreover, he impliedly 
waived it, according to the majority, by opening up the subject 
of his literary tastes.45 At that point, "Giese was not entitled to 
be selective in describing the contents of his books any more than 
the defendant in United States v. Hearstu . .. was entitled to be 
selective in describing what she did between the time she was 
kidnapped and her arrest."4? The court concluded that "one who 
raises the issue of the kind of books he sells, reads, or owns should 
not be able to invoke the First Amendment as a bar to cross-
examination [on matters reasonably related to the subject mat-
ter of direct examinationl."48 
43. [d. 
44. [d. 
45. [d. at 1193-94. 
46. 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). 
47. 597 F.2d at 1194. 
48. [d. at 1194. The court analogized Giese's waiver of his first amendment rights to 
a waiver of fifth amendment rights, quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 216 
(1971). See also Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 166 (1958); United States v. Lustig, 
666 F.2d 737, 760 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977). Giese's first amendment 
argument regarding Meyer's testimony in the Government's case-in-chief about his partic-
ipation in political discussions at the prison and recommendation of certain books to the 
inmates met a similar fate. The majority reasoned that: 
Evidence relating to Giese's statements about books and poli-
tics was relevant because it provided the jury with information 
about his relationship with many of the people who subse-
quently became his co-conspirators. Like the fingerprints on 
From the Movement Toward Revolution, Meyer's testimony 
shed light on the conspirators' association with each other. It 
also tended to show that Giese exercised a leadership role vis-
a-vis the other conspirators. By conducting discussions on a 
topic of mutual interest-radical politics-and by furnishing or 
recommending books on that Bubject, Giese attracted Meyer 
(and perhaps his fellow prisoners Severin and Wallace) to the 
group at the bookstore which eventually formed the conspiracy. 
Meyer's testimony was not unfairly prejudicial. In fact, the 
government took steps to ensure that the jury did not draw 
improper inferences from evidence relating to books and politi-
cal beliefs. In his summation, the assistant United States attor-
ney reminded the jurors that Giese and his co-defendants were 
92
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
1980] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 167 
In reviewing the several instances of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, the court admitted that the prosecution had used "some 
slightly overblown rhetoric in describing From the Movement 
Toward Revolution" in its summation to the jury. 49 Due to the 
lack of an appropriate objection, and request for a corrective in-
struction, the majority again applied only the plain error stan-
dard of review. 50 The court concluded that there was no plain 
not on trial for reading or possessing certain types of literature 
or for subscribing to a particular political philosophy. Our scru-
tiny of the record convinces us that the government used 
Meyer's testimony solely for permissible purposes and not to 
prove that Giese had a violent character or to induce the jury 
to punish him for reading and recommending radical literature. 
Accordingly, we hold that Giese's First Amendment rights were 
not violated. 
597 F.2d at 1194-95. 
49. 1d. at 1199. See note 13 supra. The majority stated that although they 
"wish[ed)" the prosecutors had exercised greater restraint in their characterization of 
REvOLUTION in closing argument, in light of the circumstances, their remarks did not 
compel reversal of the conviction: 
Since the book was in evidence, the government attorneys were 
entitled to comment on it to a certain extent. However, they 
should have confined their remarks to stressing the sharp con-
trast between the kinds of books Giese said he read and the 
kinds he actually read, thereby reminding the jurors that From 
the Movement Toward Revolution had been used to contradict 
Giese's character evidence and to impeach his credibility as a 
witness. Having considered all of the circumstances, we con-
clude that the prosecutors' failure to so limit their remarks was 
not so improper and damaging as to compel reversal. We note 
that although Giese's attorney had registered his "continuing 
objection" to the admissibility of the book's contents ... he 
• did not voice an objection or request a curative instruction in 
response to the government's comments in closing argument. 
We further note that the defense attorneys made extensive use 
of the book in their own summations. Co-defendant Cronin's 
counsel sarcastically characterized From the Movement To-
ward Revolution as a "song book" .... Co-defendant Wal-
lace's lawyer told the jury that the book was one ofthe weakest 
links in the government's case. . .. The defense attorneys re-
peatedly urged the jurors to peruse various parts of the book 
. . ., and the lawyers for Giese and Cronin even went so far as 
to read extracts from pages of From the Movement Toward 
Revolution on which no conspirator's fingerprints were found 
.... The defense attorneys' behavior at trial belies Giese's 
appellate argument that the prosecutors' references to From 
the Movement Toward Revolution in summation so inflamed 
the jury as to deprive him of a fair adjudication of guilt or 
innocence. (emphasis added). 
597 F.2d at 1200 n.30. 
50. 1d. at 1199. See note 49 supra; United States v. Perez, 491 F.2d 167, 173 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 858 (1974). 
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error committed because the case against Giese was "strong" and 
therefore, absent the Government's improper remarks the jury 
still would have found him guilty of criminal conspiracy.51 Fur-
ther, the court noted, the defense attorneys' "extensive use" of 
Revolution in their own summations and urgings that the jurors 
peruse portions of the book belied Giese's argument that the pros-
ecutors' conduct in summation so inflamed the jury as to deprive 
him of a fair tria1.52 
D. CRITICISM 
There is little one can add to the criticisms set forth convinc-
ingly by Judge Hufstedler in her dissenting opinion. However, 
since the Supreme Court has recently denied petition for certior-
ari in this case, this Note will briefly review some of the major 
pitfalls in the majority's analysis, and then summarize the major 
implications of this very important case. 
The prosecution clearly utilized the contents of Revolution to 
convince the jury that the revolutionary ideas expressed therein 
were held by Giese himself, and that, moreover, Giese acted upon 
those concepts to form a conspiracy to bomb military recruiting 
centers in order to halt the Vietnam War.53 Based upon her read-
ing of the record, Judge Hufstedler concluded that "Giese was 
. . . convicted of conspiracy by book association in egregious vio-
lation of the guarantees of the First Amendment."54 She further 
concluded that the "record flatly contradict[ed] the majority's 
waiver and invited error theories."55 
From a purely evidentiary standpoint, Revolution probably 
should have been excluded by the trial judge on a number of 
distinct .grounds. Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
51. 597 F.2d at 1199-1200. See United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184, 188-89 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 931 (1974); Corley v. United States, 365 F.2d 884,885 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966). 
52. 597 F.2d at 1200 n.30. See note 49 supra. 
As Judge Hufstedler noted in her dissent, the critical inquiry is whether the remarks 
were so prejudicial in light of the circumstances as a whole as to make it likely that they 
adversely influenced the jury so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. See, e.g., Lawn 
v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n.15 (1957); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil 
Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150,237-43 (1940); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 84-89 (1935); 
United States v. Greenback, 491 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1974). 597 F.2d at 1210 n.7 (Hufstedler, 
J., dissenting). 
53. [d. at 1201 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
54. [d. 
55. [d. at 1202 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
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dence, the book was particularly excludable as evidence of asso-
ciation in view of its highly cumulative nature.56 While the erro-
neous admission of the book as a tangible embodiment of other 
evidence was most likely harmless error given the abundant evi-
dence of the co-conspirators' association with one another, the 
difficulty is that proper exclusion at that point might have ob-
viated the subsequent sequence of rather odd events which pro-
vided for its further misuse. 
Judge Hufstedler determined that Judge Trask's "novel" 
impeachment theory of admissibility was not only forbidden by 
the first amendment, it was contradicted by the record. She la-
mented the majority's "escape" from the reality of the book's use 
by the prosecution to convince the jury that it should attribute 
the ideas expressed therein to Giese, who thereafter acted upon 
them to form the conspiracy to commit the underlying substan-
tive offenses.57 Moreover, she surmised, the contents were not 
properly admissible to impeach Giese, "even if the Government 
had made that attempt."58 For one thing, the contents of books 
one reads are not probative as to the reader's peaceable or non-
peaceable character because "[n]o inference of any kind can be 
drawn about a person's character from the kinds of books that he 
reads. "59 
56. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that although relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by, inter alia, 
the "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." As the Advisory Committee Notes 
explain, certain circumstances "call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned 
relevance" when unfairly prejudicial, i.e., having "an undue tendency to suggest a deci-
sion on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one .... " 
Moreover, as is noted by Judge Hufstedler, whether the fingerprints were probative 
at all is subject to question-all they really proved was that "the persons who handled 
the book had been associated with the book." As she reasoned: "[n)o inference a[rose) 
that the persons who handled the book were even casually acquainted in absence of proof 
that the fingerprints were made at or about the same time." The Government expert could 
not pinpoint the temporal proximity of the prints on REVOLUTION, so that it was immi-
nently possible that they were made in succession, as the book changed hands between 
1971 and 1973. 597 F.2d at 1206-07. (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). See note 6 supra. 
57. 597 F.2d at 1209 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
58. [d. at 1207 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
59. [d. Even if Giese had misguidedly attempted to imply that the 18 pieces of 
literature somehow reflected his left-wing but non-revolutionary political views, the Gov-
ernment should have been precluded from responding with the contents of a book which 
Giese had read, in part, for as Judge Hufstedler noted: "We have no basis in human 
experience to assume that persons of 'good' character confine their reading matter to 
'good' books, or that persons who read peaceful books are peaceful people, or that persons 
who read books involving violence are violent people." [d. at 1207. 
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Secondly, as Judge Hufstedler perceived, since Giese did not 
purport to put forth a representative sample of the kinds of books 
that he read, but merely had incidentally read some of the books 
he sold, "there was no evidence on this score to contradict. "60 In 
addition, there was no "sharp contrast" between the eighteen 
books introduced by Giese and Revolution, as a number of Giese's 
exhibits ranged from liberal to far left to radical as did the spec-
trum of the writings inclusive in Revolution, a political anthol-
ogy.61 Giese's veracity as a witness was in no manner impeached 
by the contents of Revolution.82 
Moreover, as a practical matter, it is fairly clearthat Giese, 
and not the Government, was placed in a rebuttal posture regard-
ing the use of association or implication by literature. Giese's 
lawyer had him introduce the "representative sample" of the 
sorts of books he carried in his bookstore in an attempt, albeit ill-
conceived, to rebut the prosecution's evidence that REP books-
tore carried how-to-do-it books and pamphlets on explosives and 
violent revolution. The majority's assertion that Giese "put" his' 
character into issue through literary means, thus mandating in 
"fairness" that the prosecution be allowed to rebut in kind, in 
actuality turns the situation on its head. sa 
60. [d. at 1208 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). 
61. [d., at 1208 n.4. 
62. The use of a commercially published book as the prior inconsistent statement of 
a witness is unprecedented. And, as Judge Hufstedler noted, "Professor Wigmore would 
have been astonished to discover that he supported a view that any inferences whatever 
could be drawn about a witness' veracity from the manner in which a witness read aloud 
from a book." [d. at 1208. Besides, the majority's interpretation of Giese's act of reading 
patently ignores the "prosecutor's transparent purpose" in making the request-i.e., "to 
convey to the jury that the words of the author were the words of Giese." [d. 
63. The Ninth Circuit recently disposed of a similar argument in United States v. 
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977). Hearst likewise claimed that her waiver of 
her privilege against self-incrimination was involuntary because she was compelled to 
testify by the admission of highly prejudicial evidence. Caught between the "rock and 
the whirlpool," she argued that she had to testify in order to set the record straight. The 
Ninth Circuit distinguished her case, however, from Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 
219 (1968), in which testimony given to overcome the impact of an illegally obtained 
confession was held to be involuntary, on the basis that the prosecution in Hearst did not 
introduce any illegal or otherwise inadmissible evidence. The court held that a defendant's 
"subjective impressions" of what he is "forced" to do during trial are insufficient to render 
his testimony involuntary. [d. Since the majority in Giese specifically held that the prose-
cution's use of pamphlets in its case-in-chief was perfectly proper, Giese's "subjective 
impressions" of what he was forced to do in order to put on a defense could not save him 
from inadvertently putting his character into issue and impliedly waiving his first amend-
ment rights. 
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The significance of the case, however, clearly derives from 
the majority's landmark finding of an implied waiver of first 
amendment rights. Giese's alleged waiver of his constitutionally 
protected right not to have ideas contained in books he has read 
attributed to him is legally unprecedented. In view of the dearth 
of authority on the subject, the court analogized his case to that 
of the criminal defendant who takes the stand and then attempts 
to invoke the fifth amendment to bar cross-examination on rea-
sonably related matters. As a factual matter, Giese did not testify 
regarding the kinds of books he read, although, admittedly, he 
was not totally unfamiliar with the subject matter of several 
books introduced in the "representative sample" he sold in the 
REP bookstore. Even if the record "left no doubt" that Giese had 
in fact read "many" of them, as the majority surmised, the Gov-
ernment's detailed examination regarding the contents of 
Revolution-a book he had read but did not stock in his books-
tore-would not appear to have been reasonably related to the 
subject matter of his direct examination. 
United States v. Hearst,84 relied upon by the majority, is 
somewhat distinguishable. Hearst attempted to take the stand 
and testify regarding her captive existence from the moment of 
her kidnapping to the time of her arrest, and then invoke the fifth 
amendment regarding an identical line of questioning by the 
prosecutor directed, particularly to the "lost year" she failed to 
cover on direct examination. 
Even Giese "prefaced" his exhibits with a claim that he 
founded the bookstore in order to "propagate" his political point 
of view, as the majority claimed, it is still unreasonable to assume 
that he automatically subscribed to the social, economic or politi-
cal messages contained in each and every of the varied literary 
works he saw fit to carry. Moreover, if such were a reasonable 
assumption, the fact that Giese chose not to carry Revolution, a 
book with which he was admittedly familiar, suggested that it did 
not sufficiently mirror his political predelictions, contrary to the 
Government's assertion. 
Therefore, assuming for the moment that first amendment 
rights are subject to waiver, and even if an implied waiver of some 
degree was inferrable based on the facts-that Dr. Giese waived 
64. 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977). 
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his constitutional right to have the Government refrain from in-
troducing samples of the books he chose to sell in his books-
tore-the cross-examination which ensued surely exceeded the 
scope of the implied waiver. A properly circumscribed cross-
examination, i. e., one to the effect that the books he produced 
were not in fact representative of those he carried, would have 
been reasonably related to the scope of his direct examination 
and thus arguably permissible.85 
The court's unhesitating analogy, however, to waiver of the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is also sus-
pect from the standpoint of the constitutional rights hierarchy. 
It is generally accepted that the first amendment freedoms of 
speech, press and association occupy a preferred position in the 
hierarchy of constitutional freedoms due to the explicit protection 
accorded them and to their importance to a democratic society.ss 
A civilized society should not allow a waiver of the individual's 
fundamental right to his "individual freedom of mind,"s7 for the 
same reason that the society protects a criminal defendant 
against waiving all fundamental due process rights. At the very 
least, given the preeminence of first amendment protections, 
more precise standards for waiver should have been elucidated by 
the court. 
Generally, in instances of waiver, the act which constitutes 
the waiver must clearly indicate an intentional relinquishment of 
65. As Judge Hufstedler noted: "The Government introduced no evidence to show 
that, contrary to his testimony, the books that he introduced were not representative 
samples of the books he carried in his bookstore, [nor did it offer any] evidence that the 
book Revolution was .carried in his bookstore." 597 F .2d at 1208 (Hufstedler, J., dissent· 
ing). 
66. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967) ("Free speech is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly 
every other form of freedom, ... "); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) ("This 
right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth,. . . is fundamental 
to our free society."); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment·Freedom of Speech, 25 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964 (1974); Barnum, Constitutional Status of Public Protest Activity 
in Britain and in the United States, 1977 PUB. L. 310; Be Vier, First Amendment and 
Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 
299 (1977·78); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unravelling the Chilling 
Effect, 58 B.U.L. REV. 685 (1978); Note, First Amendment Limitations in Punishing 
Political Threats, 9 CONN. L. REv. 304 (1977); Note, Freedom of Speech: Evolution of the 
Enlightenment Function, 29 MERCER L. REV. 811 (1977·78); AnBstaplo, Book Review, 9 
Sw. U.L. REV. 273 (1977) (D. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH: FIRST AMEND' 
MENT FREEDOMS FROM WILSON TO FDR). 
67. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 714. 
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a known right or privilege in order to counteract the strong pre-
sumption against waiver of fundamental rights. os With respect to 
simultaneous waiver by an accused of several constitutional 
rights, for example, the trial judge must assume a protective 
posture and carry a weighty responsibility in determining 
whether the defendant has in fact made a voluntary, intelligent 
and competent waiver. Given the dominant position of the first 
amendment protections in the constitutional constellation, the 
presumption against waiver should be particularly strong, and 
any inadvertent or accidental waiver should be procedurally safe-
guarded. In Giese's case, not only were both he and his counsel 
clearly ignorant of the implications of his testimony, but also 
there is no indication that the trial court gave any consideration 
to the existence of an implied waiver of constitutional rights. On 
appeal the finding of an intentional and voluntary relinquish-
ment by Giese of a known constitutional right seems inconsistent 
with the objections of his counsel, which included a continuing 
objection on first amendment grounds to the introduction of 
Revolution's contents.89 
As Judge Hufstedler pointed out, the actual use made of the 
book by the Government was completely aberrant to the Consti-
tution,70 and the admission of Revolution was "no more constitu-
tionally permissible" had it been utilized for impeachment pur-
poses as was argued by the majority. "No inferences can constitu-
tionally be drawn about the character of book readers on the basis 
68. See, e.g., Brookhart v. Jains, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Glasser v. United States, 315 
U.S. 60, 70-71 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938); Mone v. Robinson, 430 
F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Dix, Waiver as an Independent Aspect of 
Criminal Procedure: Some Comments on Professor Westen's Suggestion, ARIz. ST. L.J. 
67 (1979); Dix. Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 
TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default. and the Burger 
Court, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1978). 
69. See note 12 supra. 
70. 597 F.2d at 1209 (Hufstedler. J., dissenting). Judge Hufstedler explained: 
The Government's theory, which it argued to the jury, was that 
the ideas of an author of a book may properly be attributed to 
the reader of the book and then used against him to prove 
disposition to commit a crime, motive to undertake criminal 
action, or proofthat he did the acts charged. None of these uses 
is constitutionally permissible. Freedom of speech would be 
totally destroyed if the shadow of the prosecutor fell across the 
pages of the books we read. Even during the evil thralldom of 
McCarthyism, we did not embrace the concept of guilt by book 
association. 
Id. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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of the books they read, [inasmuch as the] [a]bstract advocacy 
of violence is constitutionally protected."71 She noted that since 
the "corollary of the right to utter or to print advocacy of violence 
is the right to listen or to read violent exhortations," the use of 
"book reading, ... to impeach a person's character is utterly 
incompatible with constitutional protections afforded free 
speech. "72 
The Supreme Court has recognized, on numerous occasions, 
the existence of the constitutional right to receive information, 
either as an indispensable corollary to the right to disseminate 
information,73 or as elemental to the freedom of thought.74 In 
71. 597 F.2d at 1209. 
72. [d. In 1971, Justice Harlan had occasion to speak eloquently regarding the funda-
mental ideals of democratic society which depend for their livelihood upon the first 
amendment: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine 
in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and 
intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of 
public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shaH 
be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that 
use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable 
citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity 
and choice upon which our political system rests (citations 
omitted). 
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may 
often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offen-
sive utterance. . . . That the air may at times seem filled with 
verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of 
strength . . . . That is why .. [w I holly neutral futilities . . . 
come under the protection of free speech as fully as do Keats' 
poems or Donne's sermons ... ," and why "so long as the 
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet stan-
dards of acceptability." 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (citations omitted). 
73. See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963); Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). 
74. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), the Supreme Court pro-
claimed that: 
[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the first 
amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge. 
The right of freedom of speech and press includes not only the 
right to utter and print, but the right to distribute, the right to 
receive, the right to read (Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 
143) and freedom in inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom 
to teach .... 
Justice Stewart later expanded on this notion in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 
649 (1968): 
The first amendment guarantees liberty of human expression 
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Stanley v. Georgia,75 for example, the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a statute making it unlawful to possess obscene materials 
in the home, because it offended the "right to receive ideas, re-
gardless of their social worth," and violated the "right to be free, 
except in very limited circumstances, from the unwanted govern-
mental intrusions into one's privacy."76 
The Court perceived that the "test" of the freedom's 
in order to preserve in our Nation what Justice Holmes cal1ed 
a "free trade in ideas." . . . To that end, the Constitution 
protects more than just man's freedom to say or write or pub-
lish what he wants. It secures as wel1 the liberty of each man 
to decide for himself what he will read and to what he will 
listen. The Constitution guarantees, in short, a society of free 
choice. 
75. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
76. [d. at 564. Intel1ectual freedoms have been championed by philosophers since 
ideas were first committed to paper. Early, Spinoza spoke out against 
laws which decree what everyone must believe, and forbid ut-
terance against this or that opinion, [which) have too often 
been enacted to confirm or enlarge the power of those who 
dared not suffer free inquiry to be made, and have by a perver-
sion of authority turned the superstition of the mob into viol-
ence against opponents. 
B. SPINOZA, TRACTUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS 349 (London 1862). Montesquieu pursued a 
similar theme in his discourse on the law entitled L'Esprit des Lois, published in 1748. 
As a reknowned thinker of the times, he proclaimed against punishing thoughts or words: 
There was a law passed in England under Henry vm, by which 
whoever predicted the king's death was declared guilty of high 
treason. This law was extremely vague; the terror of despotic 
power is so great that it recoils upon those who exercise it. In 
the king's last illness, the physicians would not venture to say 
he was in danger; and surely they acted very right . . . . 
Marsyas dreamed that he had cut Dionysius' throat. Dionysius 
put him to death, pretending that he would never have 
dreamed of such a thing by night if he had not thought of it by 
day. This was a most tyrannical action: for though it had been 
the subject of his thoughts, yet he had made no attempt to-
wards it. The laws do not take upon them to punish any other 
than overt acts. . . . Words do not constitute an overt act; they 
remain only an idea. 
idea. 
1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 192-93 (1949) (emphasis added). 
Thomas Irwin Emerson might have had United States v. Giese in mind when he 
warned that "expression may be seriously inhibited when the speaker knows what he says 
can be used against him at a later time if some unforeseen action ensues, and can be taken 
into account by a jury in determining his state of mind in performing a subsequent act, 
or perhaps be the decisive factor in a jury's general verdict against him. T. EMERSON, 
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 405 (1970) (emphasis added). Judge Ely appar-
ently agreed and voted to grant the petition for a rehearing en banc in Giese, "believing 
that the original majority [0 )pinion constituted an impediment to the intel1ectual growth 
of our citizenry." 597 F.2d at 1213. 
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"substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart 
of the existing order."77 The Court noted that: 
We can have intellectual individualism and the 
rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional 
minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity 
and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harm-
less to others or to the state as those we deal with 
here, the price is not too great. But freedom to 
differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much. That would be the mere shadow of free-
dom. The test of its substance is the right to differ 
as to things that touch the heart of the existing 
order. 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion 
or force its citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein. If there are any circumstances which 
permit an exception, they do not now occur to US.78 
Moreover, the attribution to the reader of thoughts expressed 
by an author whom he has merely read plainly violates the first 
amendment's proscription against "guilt by association." In 
Schneiderman v. United States,78 for example, the Supreme 
Court recognized, the Government having conceded, that it was 
unsound to impute to the members of an organization the views 
espoused in organizational documents. Indeed, in Aptheker v. 
Secretary of State, 80 the Court rejected a rule imputing the beliefs 
of an organized political party to its members, even though the 
complainants in that case were in fact the party chairman and 
its chief theoretician. Recently, the First Circuit, in United States 
77. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943). Americans also 
struggled to rid the republic of the spectre of "thought crime" and to punish our citizens 
only for overt acts against the state. 'See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Cramer 
v. United States, 325 U.S. 1,28-30 (1944). 
78. 319 U.S. at 641-42. Giese's conviction stands in sharp contrast to time-honored, 
fundamental maxims regarding first amendment liberties. We are newly faced with the 
dismal prospect that a lighthearted comment once made by Mark Twain has become, 
ironically, a sad truism. Twain wrote: "It is by the goodness of God that in our country 
we have those three unspeakably precious things: freedom of speech, freedom of consci-
ence, and the prudence never to practice either of them." M. TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE 
EQUATOR 198 (1903). 
79. 320 U.S. 118, 147, 154 (1942). See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 
(1961); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945). 
80. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
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v. Spock, 81 declined to hold that a drafter of a document necessar-
ily adhered to, and intended to act upon, its illegal aspects. These 
cases surely prohibit the imputation of the views of an author of 
a commercial literary work to his readers. 
Giese's conviction might have been reversed on the basis of 
Stromberg v. California,82 in which the Supreme Court held that 
a conviction, based upon a record and statute which did not 
substantially exclude the possibility that it occurred in contrav-
ention of constitutional rights, must be reversed. In Street v. New 
York,83 the Supreme Court applied the Stromberg rule and re-
versed Street's conviction by general verdict, since it left open the 
possibility that he was convicted based on pure speech alone, 
. even though the uncontroverted proof of Street's act of flag burn-
ing provided a fully sufficient and constitutionally permissible 
basis for the conviction. Giese, on the other hand, was acquitted 
of the substantive counts in connection with the bombings, which 
tended to suggest that there was at least some question as to the 
existence of a fully sufficient and constitutionally permissible 
basis for his conspiracy conviction. 
Notwithstanding the prosecutor's flagrant misuse of the con-
tents of Revolution, the trial court's failure to give the jury special 
instructions cautioning it not to convict on the basis of first 
amendment activities, and the fact that the record did not indi-
cate that the jury did not base its verdict on safeguarded conduct, 
the Ninth Circuit held that the trial court's general conspiracy 
instructions "sufficiently warned the jury."84 The court main-
tained that "[a]lthough these instructions did not explicitly pro-
hibit the jury's consideration of First Amendment activities, they 
did, by their very terms and logic, negate the relevance to the 
verdict of Giese's protected speech, association, and assembly."85 
81. 416 F.2d 165, 178 (1st Cir. 1969). 
82. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). See also Bachel1ar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970); 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 113 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 6, 31·2 
(1965). 
83. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
84. 597 F.2d at 1198. 
85. [d. The majority explained: 
The jury could have convicted Giese only after finding that he 
"willfully and knowingly" joined a conspiracy formed "to com· 
mit and cause to be committed, certain offenses against the 
United States and other persons and institutions by means of 
or acts of violence, terrorism and destruction." Nothing could 
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E. SIGNIFICANCE 
The obvious significance of United States v. Giese is that, in 
the Ninth Circuit, criminal defendants can waive at least one of 
their first amendment protections. The Ninth Circuit has vir-
tually invited Government ingenuity to devise new theories of 
relevance upon which the introduction of first amendment mate-
rial may be sustained. 
Potentially far-reaching aspects of the case derive from what 
transpired during the Government's case-in-chief. Apparently, 
the prosecution may demonstrate the associational coalescence 
and hierarchical structure of an allegedly conspiratorial group by 
enlisting the aid of constitutionally protected activity. The activ-
ist defendant is especially vulnerable because his political activ-
ity may be used against him. His associates can turn state's evi-
dence and testify as to his abstract advocacy of violence. In fact, 
the Government may rest its conspiracy case almost entirely on 
evidence concerning the activist's discussions, literary habits, 
and advocacy to others. 
The implications of the Government's misuse of Revolution 
are equally frightening. Defendants and their counsel are strongly 
influenced to refrain from attempting to rebut the prosecution's 
literary evidence with other literature, lest an implied waiver of 
constitutional rights be found. At the moment, however, this as-
pect of the case is strictly limited to the somewhat bizarre facts. 
The majority recognized the first amendment implications inher-
ent in the use of Revolution, and, absent some affirmative con-
duct by an accused which can be construed as "throwing open the 
door" to his literary tastes, the Government should not be able 
to compel him to read from the most unpopular treatise found in 
his library. 
Lastly, the books one reads, while not the most effective 
method of proving or disproving a particular character trait, are 
now at least probative and thus competent evidence on this issue 
in the Ninth Circuit. 
[d. 
be clearer, or less threatening to First Amendment values. After 
hearing these instructions, no reasonable juror could have 
found that Giese joined the conspiracy solely by expressing 
opposition to the Vietnam War. A more direct and purposeful 
manifestation of intent was required to find that he joined the 
conspiracy "willfully and knowingly." 
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VII. NON -TESTIFYING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 
APPEAL: UNITED STATES V. COOK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
179 
During the past Survey term, a panel of the Ninth Circuit in 
United States v. Cook l decided issues relating to pre-trial identi-
fication, access to witnesses and the right to confrontation in a 
criminal action. The court also considered "whether a defendant, 
who elected not to testify during his trial, could preserve on ap-
peal his challenge to the trial judge's [preliminary] ruling on a 
motion for an order excluding evidence of his former robbery 
convictions. "2 
In this case, the trial court preliminarily ruled that if defen-
dant testified, the prosecution could present evidence of defen-
dant's past robbery convictions for impeachment purposes. The 
defendant did not testify at trial, and based his appeal, inter 
alia, on the argument that the lower court ruling effectively de-
nied him a chance to testify. The court, in an en banc opinion 
held that a defendant is not barred from appellate review of a 
trial judge's ruling admitting evidence of prior convictions, even 
if defendant does not testify as long as the defense: (1) estab-
lishes that he would testify if evidence of his priors is excluded, 
and (2) "sufficiently outline[s] the nature of his testimony so 
that the trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the neces-
sary balancing contemplated in Rule 609 [of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence].' '3 
The focus of this Note will be to clarify the issues posed by 
the Cook en bane opinion concerning Rule 609 and to examine 
the problem posed by the requirement of the testimonial record. 
1. 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (partially decided en bane per Goodwin, J.) 
(partially decided in panel per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were Trask, J. and 
Kellaher, D.J. sitting by designation) (filing separate opinions to the en bane opinion 
were Wallace, J., concurring; Kennedy, J.; dissenting in part and concurring in part, 
joined by Wright, Choy and Hug, JJ.; Sneed, J., dissenting in part and concurring in 
part; Hufstedler, J., dissenting, joined by Ely, J.), cert denied, 100 S. Ct. 706 (1980). 
2. 1d. at 1183. Traditionally, the admissibility of prior convictions of the witness has 
been entirely within the discretion of the trial court. However, in 1975, the Federal Rules 
of Evidence codified the standard against which admissibility is to be measured. FED. R. 
Evm. 609; see note 4 infra. 
3. 608 F.2d at 1186. 
105
Roper et al.: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
180 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:75 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Convictions 
Federal Rule of Evidence 6094 presently governs the admissi-
bility of evidence of prior convictions in federal court. This rule 
replaced the common law rule that anyone convicted of various 
crimes was incompetent to testify.s Rule 609 was the subject of 
extensive and heated legislative debate.' Although an in-depth 
examination of this debate is beyond the scope of this Note, a 
brief mention should be made of the four major phases through 
which the law passed, which may be simply characterized7 as fol-
4. FED. R. EVJD. Rule 609 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public 
record during cross· examination but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year 
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) in· 
volved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is 
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed 
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness 
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever 
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests 
of justice that the probative value of the conviction supported 
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its 
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 
10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the 
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written 
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such 
evidence. 
6. For a discussion of the common law rule that any person convicted of various 
crimes was incompetent to testify, see generally, 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAw 
OF EVIDENCE § 372 (16th ed. 1899); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 
43 (2d ed. 1972); 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 980 (Chadbourne 
rev. 1970); Boehm, Limiting the Use of Prior Felony Convictions to Impeach a Defen· 
dant· Witness in California Criminal Proceedings, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 136 (1977). This 
common law rule was abrogated by Rule 609. 
6. In United States v. Smith, 661 F.2d 348, 369·63, 366·69 (D.C. Cir. 1976), Judge 
McGowan set forth a detailed study of Rule 609, including its legislative history. See also 
United States v. Jackson, 406 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. N.Y. 1976) for further comment on the 
legislative history of Rule 609. 
For a critique and commentary on the statute, a selection of the legislative debate 
and an extensive bibliography, see 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 
(1976). 
7. These characterizations are simplified but not distorted. The word, "felony," for 
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lows: (1) evidence of any felony or any offense involving dishon-
esty or false statement is automatically admitted;8 (2) evidence 
of any felony is admitted unless the court determines that the 
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence of the conviction, and any offense involving dishonesty 
or false statement is automatically admitted;' (3) only evidence 
of a conviction for an offense involving dishonesty or false state-
ment is automatically admitted;IO (4) evidence of a conviction of 
a crime involving dishonesty or false statement is automatically 
admitted; a felony is only admitted if the court determines that 
the probative value of evidence outweighs the danger of unfair 
prejudice. II 
It should be noted that the legislature has tended to limit 
rather than to expand the use of prior convictions to impeach 
defendants. For example, under formulation number four, a 
felony conviction was presumed inadmissible unless the govern-
ment met the burden of showing that the probative value of 
the conviction outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice; 12 
under formulation number two, however, a conviction was pre-
instance, is used in place of "crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one 
year." FEn. R. EVID. Rule 609 (a)(l). 
8. This is basically the form of the rule as promulgated by the Supreme Court and 
transmitted to Congress. This formulation met stiff oppostion. Proposed Rules of Eui· 
dence: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on the Judiciary, House of Representa· 
tiues, 93rd Cong., 1st. Sess. Serial No.2. 29-30, 68-69, 105-14. 251-52120 CONGo REe. 2001 
(1973). The full text of this draft of the rule was: 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility 
of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is 
admissible but only if the crime, (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
which he was convicted, or, (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement regardless of the punishment. 
[d. (remarks of Congressman Hogan). 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year, unless the court determines that the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the 
evidence of the conviction, or (2) involved dishonesty or false 
statement. 
H.R. REp. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973). 
10. This is, the version as further amended by the House Judiciary Committee. The 
full text of the rule is: "(a) General rule.-For the purpose of attacking the credibility of 
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime 
involved dishonesty or false statement." Proposed Rules of Euidence, supra note 8. 
11. This is the formulation that was ultimately accepted by Congress. For the text of 
Rule 609, see note 4 supra. 
12. United States V. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50,52 (2d Cir. 1977) (few crimes, other than 
those involving dishonesty or false statement, are likely to be probative of a witness' 
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sumed admissible unless the prejudice outweighed its probat!ve 
value. More than a mere semantic shift, this change under-
scores the legislature's intent to limit the introduction of prior 
convictions. One reason for this is the often severe and some-
times unjust consequences of introducing evidence of prior 
convictions. 13 
Problems Facing A Defendant With a Prior Criminal Record 
The defendant with a criminal record faces several 
problems: (1) if the record is introduced at trial, the jury may 
well use the evidence of prior crimes for propensity purposes, 1. 
rather than for the purpose of assessing the defendant's credibil-
ity; (2) if the defendant chooses not to take the stand, his silence 
may be construed as an admission of guilt; and (3) the defen-
dant must comply with certain procedures in order to maintain 
his right to appeal an improper evidentiary ruling under which 
evidence of the priors were admitted. 
In Gordon v. United States, 15 Chief Justice Burger, then sit-
ting as a district court judge, discussed the purposes of impeach-
ment with prior convictions: Judge Burger commented: 
[W]e must look to the legitimate purpose of im-
peachment which is, of course, not to show that 
the accused who takes the stand is a "bad" person 
but rather to show background facts which bear 
directly on whether jurors ought to believe him 
rather than other and conflicting witnesses. In 
common human experience acts of deceit, fraud, 
cheating, or stealing, for example, are universally 
regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a 
man's honesty and integrity. Acts of violence on 
the other hand, which may result from a short 
temper, a combative nature, extreme provocation, 
or other causes, generally have little or no direct 
bearing on honesty and veracity. A "rule of 
thumb" thus should be that convictions which 
rest on dishonest conduct relate to credibility 
veracity). See also United States ·v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir., 1976) (Rule 609 
had effect of shifting the burden of persuasion to the government). 
13. See generally Boehm, supra note 5. 
14. That is the jury may infer that if the defendant committed such crimes in the 
past, it is more likely that he also committed the crime with which he is presently 
charged. 
15. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1967). 
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whereas those of violent or assaultive crimes gen-
erally do not; . . . 16 
183 
The use of prior convictions to impeach a defenant-witness 
is restricted in an attempt to avoid the possibility of a conviction 
simply because the jury thinks the defendant is a "bad man."17 
Prior convictions are supposed to be used by the jury for the sole 
purpose of assessing the defendant's credibility and not for any 
propensity purposes. While the defendant is entitled to a stan-
dard limiting instruction,18 when impeachment by prior convic-
tion is allowed, as Justice Jackson stated, it would be "naive" to 
assume that such an instruction can overcome the prejudicial ef-
fect of such evidence. IV Judge Learned Hand characterized lim-
ited instructions as requiring a "a mental gymnastic" of which a 
jury is incapable of performing.20 
The idea that juries tend to attach undue weight to a defen-
dant's prior record is substantiated by a study by Professors 
Kalven and Zeisel which showed that the jury acquittal rate de-
clined from forty-two to twenty-five percent in those trials where 
the defendant had been shown to have a criminal record.21 Sensi-
tive to this problem, some jurisdictions have gone so far as to 
limit the admissiblity of prior convictions to those situations in 
16. Id. at 940. 
17. United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977); Boehm, supra 
note 5, at 136. 
18. A limiting instruction is a charge to the jury to "consider the evidence only for 
the allowable purpose." C. MCCORMICK, supra note 5, at § 59. For example, one such 
limiting instruction reads as follows: 
Certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. 
At the time this evidence was admitted you were admonished 
that it could not be considered by you for any purpose other 
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted. 
You are again instructed that you must not consider such evi-
dence for any purpose except the limited purpose for which it 
was admitted. 
CALJIC No. 2.09 (4th ed. 1979). 
19. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949). 
20. Nash. v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932). 
21. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); see also McGowan, 
Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, [1970] Law & the Soc. Ord. 
1, 2 (relating how Judge McGowan, after being questioned about the American rule by 
English judges, was moved to remand a conviction of a defendant whose credibility had 
been impeached by use of prior conviction in Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. 
Cir. 1965»; Note, Procedural Protections of the Criminal Defendant-A Reevaluation of 
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Rule Excluding Evidence of Propensity 
to Commit Crimes, 78 fuRV. L. REv. 426 (1964). 
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which the accused attempts to establish his own good 
character.22 
The alternative of not taking the stand at all poses severe 
problems to the defendant: most jurors view defendant's failure 
to testify as an indication of guilt.23 Thus, a defendant with ad-
missible prior convictions is faced with a very difficult choice: 
either to take the stand and risk being convicted because the 
jury believes he is a "bad man," or not to take the stand and 
risk being convicted because the jury construes defendant's si-
lence as an admission of guilt. 
A further problem area concerning the use of prior convic-
tions is the preservation of defendant's right to appeal an im-
proper evidentiary ruling admitting the priors. This was the 
problem focused on by the Cook en banc decision. In United 
States v. Murray,24 a pre-Rule 609 decision, the Ninth Circuit 
held that the defendant was required to take the stand in order 
to preserve his right to appeal an improper evidentiary ruling. 
Under Murray, then, the defendant was in the very difficult posi-
tion of either taking the stand, having the prior convictions (im-
properly) introduced against him, and suffering the harmful 
prejudice caused by the priors; or not taking the stand and los-
ing his right to appeal. 
22. For example, HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 621·622 (Supp. 1975) states in pertinent part: 
[I]n a criminal case where the defendant takes the stand, the 
defendant may not be questioned or evidence introduced as to 
whether he has been convicted of any indictable or other of-
fense unless the defendant has himself introduced testimony 
for the sole purpose of establishing his credibility as a witness. 
In State v. Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 260, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (1971), the court held 
that the use of prior convictions to impeach a testifying defendant was unconstitutional. 
23. Statistics gathered by the American Institute of Public Opinion showed that 71% 
of the persons questioned believed that the accused's refusal to take the stand in reliance 
on the privilege was an indication of guilt. H. MEYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT? 29 (1959). As the Supreme Court suggested in Wilson v. United States, 149 
U.S. 60 (1893), other factors may influence the defendant's choice to forego the opportu-
nity to testify: "ExceBBive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to 
explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him will 
often confuse and embarrass (the defendant·witness) to such a degree as to increase 
rather than remove prejudices against him." [d. at 66. One author states that of 300 
defendants prosecuted by him, 23 elected not to take the stand and only one was acquit-
ted. A. TIwN, 1itUE STORIES 011 CRIME FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 98 (1939); 
see also Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to Testify, 26 YALE L.J. 464 (1916). 
24. 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 (1974). 
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C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING 
The Ninth Circuit identified two conflicting lines of cases 
within the circuit that have ruled on the question of whether a 
non-testifying defendant has the right to appellate review. In the 
first line of cases, the court has held that if a defendant refuses 
to testify at trial he thereby waives his right to appeal on the 
ground that, had he testified, his testimony would have been im-
peached by improperly admitted evidence of his past convic-
tions.25 There exists another class of cases, however, in which the 
court has considered the facts of a given case in order to decide 
whether a lower court made an improper ruling on whether evi-
dence of prior convictions should have been admitted. 26 The 
court noted that those cases denying judicial review were based 
on the common law rule that evidence of a felony conviction was 
always admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness, and 
that Federal Rule of Evidence 609 abrogated that common law 
rule. Since that line of cases was based on an overturned rule of 
law, the Cook court specifically overruled those cases. 
Having decided the narrow issue of whether a defendant has 
the right to appeal an in limine ruling on the admissibility of 
prior conviction evidence, the court went on to state, in dictum, 
the requirements for the exclusion of evidence of post convictions 
in future cases: (1) that a defendant establish that he will testify 
at trial if the challenged evidence is excluded, and (2) that the 
defense outline the nature of defendant's testimony so that the 
balancing test required by Rule 609 can be carried out.27 In this 
25. United States v. Murray, 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 854 
(1974). See United States v. Fulton, 549 F.2d 1323, 1326 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Walters, 477 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007 (1973). 
26. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1111 (1977) (evidence of non-testifying defendant's past convictions held admissible); 
United States v. Villegras, 487 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1973) (motion to exclude evidence of 
past convictions held admissible because irrelevant to issue of defendant's veracity). 
27. 608 F.2d at 1186-87. The Cook majority's testimonial record requirement may 
pose serious problems. In essence, the requirement serves as a broad discovery device for 
the prosecution. If the defendant fails to make such a record, he is penalized by waiving 
his right to appeal. 
The first serious problem is whether the defendant is acting under compulsion in 
"choosing" to make a testimonial record. The cost of the privilege not to make the testi-
monial record is the loss of the right to appeal. A second problem of constitutional di-
mension is whether the testimonial record requirement encroaches upon the defendant's 
fifth amendment right, "[not to be] ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Westerfield, The Conun-
drum of Criminal Discovery: Constitutional Arguments, ABA Standards, Federal Rules, 
and Kentucky Law, 64 Ky. L.J. 801, 810-19 (1976). 
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way, the lower court can state the basis for its in limine ruling, 
and a full record will be available for appellate review. Failure to 
establish such a record would constitute abandonment of the 
contention, and waiver of the right to appeal a ruling on the ad-
missibility of the impeachment evidence. 
On the facts, the court upheld the lower court's finding that 
the probative value of the challenged evidence outweighed its 
prejudicial effect. The court limited that finding to the present 
case, adding that not all past convictions for violent crimes 
would be admissible in every case. Approving a District of Co-
lumbia Circuit case,28 the court held that allowing in all past 
convictions of violent crimes would be impermissible under Fed-
eral Rule 609(a). Indeed, the court stated that only in "rare" 
cases would the facts justify an in limine ruling permitting the 
introduction of such evidence.2u 
D. CRITICISM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT MISAPPLIES THE BALANCING 
TEST 
In deciding Cook, the Ninth Circuit addressed two basic 
questions regarding the lower court ruling: (1) whether the pre-
liminary ruling to admit the priors was proper; and (2) if not, 
whether the improper ruling was harmless or prejudicial error. 
28. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
29. 608 F.2d at 1187. 
Rule 609 contains both mandatory and discretionary sections. Subsection (a)(2), the 
mandatory portion of Rule 609, provides that all crimes of dishonesty or false statements 
will be admitted. The rationale is that these crimes have a bearing on the defendant's 
credibility. Robbery, and crimes of a similar nature are admissible under this subsection. 
E.g., United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (petit larceny); United 
States V. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (shoplifting); United States V. Has-
tings, 577 F.2d 38, 41 (8th Cir. 1978) (narcotics); United States V. Ashley, 569 F.2d 975, 
978 (5th Cir. 1978) (shoplifting); United States V. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (lOth Cir. 
1978) (burglary); United States V. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1977) (shoplifting); 
United States V. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977) (importing cocaine); United States V. 
Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (armed robbery and assault); Virgin Islands V. Tes-
tamark, 528 F.2d 742, 743 (3d Cir. 1976) (petit larceny). 
If a prior conviction for robbery is to be admitted, it must be done so under subsec-
tion (8)(1), the discretionary portion of Rule 609. In order to admit a prior conviction 
under 609 (a)(l), the court must balance the probative value of the conviction as it bears 
on the defendant's credibility, against the possible prejudicial effect it will have on the 
jury. Though the trial court did not do this, the Ninth Circuit rule that, "[tlhe ruling did 
not constitute an abuse of discretion, as appropriate reasons could be given for it." 608 
F.2d at 1187. The logic behind the court's ruling is that, although the lower court did not 
properly perform the balancing test, had it done so, the prior convictions would have 
been admissible. 
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To determine the admissibility of defendant's criminal record, 
the Ninth Circuit independently performed the balancing as re-
quired in Rule 609(a)(1). That is, the court weighed the proba-
tive value of the challenged evidence against the possible 
prejudice to the defendant. In performing the 609 balancing test, 
the court looked to (1) the type of crime involved;30 (2) the age of 
the past conviction;31 and (3) the similarity between the prior 
conviction and the crime with which the defendant is presently 
charged.32 
It would appear upon an application of the above factors 
that the probative value of the prior convictions would be out-
weighed by their prejudicial effect. Cook's prior conviction was 
for robbery, a crime that does not bear much relevance to his 
credibility.33 Furthermore, the prior conviction for robbery was in 
1967, ten years prior to the instant case. This long time gap be-
tween the two crimes cast further doubt on the probative value 
of the prior conviction. 34 Finally, since the prior conviction was 
for robbery, the same crime with which defendant was currently 
charged, there was a great danger of undue prejudice. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, held that upon such a balance, 
the decision to admit the prior convictions was within the trial 
court's discretion. This is contrary to the legislative intent of 
Rule 609. The Cook rule seems to stand for the proposition that 
almost any prior felony conviction is admissible. Yet, this broad 
reading of admissibility of prior convictions is precisely the prac-
tice Congress intended to abrogate.35 
An alternative basis for the Cook decision could have been a 
finding that the ruling, though erroneous, constituted harmless 
30. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 
(1977) (smuggling rates higher on the "scale of veracity-related crimes" than a conviction 
of a violent crime). 
31. Id. 
32. United States v. Seamster, 565 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977) (the more similar 
the past conviction, the greater the danger of prejudice). 
33. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d at 828; United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 
362 (D.C. Cir. 1976); see also United States v. Hickey, 596 F.2d 1083, 1087 (let Cir.), 
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 107 (1979); United States v. Langston, 576 F.2d 1138, 1139 (5th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied. 439 U.S. 932 (1979); United States v. Fearwell, 595 F.2d 771, 777 
(D.C. Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 826 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 867 (1977). 
34. For the relevant statutory language of Rule 609(b), see note 10 supra. 
35. See notes 5 to 13 supra and accompanying text. 
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error. In her dissent, Judge Hufstedler accused the majority of 
blurring the issues of the erroneous nature of the ruling and the 
possible prejudicial effect of the ruling.3s Thus, in Judge Huf-
stedler's view, at least, the basis for the Cook decision is unclear. 
For this reason, an alternative basis for the ruling will be 
examined. 
If the Ninth Circuit had found the lower court's ruling im-
proper, they would have concluded that the improper lower court 
ruling constituted "harmless error," even though the appellate 
court did not have the benefit of a testimonial record. As men-
tioned above, the testimonial record is required by the Cook ma-
jority for the preservation of all future defendant's right to ap-
peal an improper ruling to admit prior convictions. The majority 
states that the purpose of the testimonial record is "so that the 
trial court, and the reviewing court, can do the necessary balanc-
ing contemplated in Rule 609."37 
The testimonial record, however, is relevant for two pur-
poses: first, to do the necessary balancing contemplated in Rule 
609, and second, to determine whether or not the lower court's 
erroneous ruling constituted harless error. This second purpose 
was explicitly stated in United States v. Fearwell. 38 
In Fearwell, the appellate court found that the lower court 
had improperly ruled defendant's prior attempted petit larceny 
convictions admissible. The defendant did not make a testimo-
nial record. The court held that "not knowing what Fearwell's 
testimony would have been leaves us unable to apply [the] test 
for harmless error."3S The court went on to say that though a 
testimonial record was not required to secure a ruling of harm-
less error from the court, it would be helpful. 40 
Not having such a testimonial record, the Fearwell court's 
solution was to "remand the record to the District Court for the 
limited purpose of taking the defendant's testimony (subject to 
36. 608 F.2d at 1192 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). "The majority does not directly 
address the question of Rule 609 error because it blends the two distinct issues of the 
existence of error with the existence of prejudice." 
37. [d. at 1186. 
38. 595 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
39. [d. at 779. 
40. [d. at 779 n.2. 
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the government's cross examination) so that the trial judge can 
in the first instance decide whether the error was harmless."4. 
Thus, Fearwell stands for the proposition that to determine 
whether or not an improper ruling (which caused the defendant 
not to testify) was harmless error, the defendant's testimony 
must be elicited. The lower court may then determine if the de-
fendant's testimony would more probably than not42 have 
altered the verdict. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Under ~he Cook rule, the result as reached in Fearwell could 
never occur. Either the defendant will have made a testimonial 
record, or he will have lost his right to appeal the ruling. The 
procedure required by Cook seems ultimately to be less cumber-
some than that of the District of Columbia Circuit.4s Because of 
the harsh result that inures from the defendant's failure to make 
a testimonial record, however, it seems less just. Under Cook, 
even a blatant abuse of discretion by the lower court judge would 
be unappealable unless the defendant had made a testimonial 
record, either in the presence of the jury or not. Whether or not 
to make a testimonial record, and preserve a non-testifying de-
fendant's right to appeal will thus be one more factor to be 
weighed in the defense strategy. 
In holding that the lower court's ruling was not an abuse of 
discretion, the Cook court has effectively lowered the standard 
for the admissibility of prior convictions. Under Cook, it now ap-
pears that a prior felony conviction may be admitted, whether or 
not the trial court goes through a charade of balancing the requi-
site 609 factors. This is a return to the earlier version of Rule 609 
which allowed the admission of any felony conviction. Given the 
legislative history of Rule 609, as well as the severe ramifications 
of the admission of prior convictions, the Cook decision will ulti-
mately have to be re-examined. 
Charles Ferrera 
41. 1d. at 779. 
42. United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977). 
43. United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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VITI. HEARSAY AND THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Tsinnijinnie, I the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed the issue of whether or not the marital privi-
lege may be invoked to prevent the introduction of a spouse's out-
of-court statement through the testimony of a third party. 
Norman Tsinnijinnie was indicted for the second degree 
murder of his mother-in-Iaw.2 The Government alleged that de-
fendant had driven his truck into his mother-in-Iaw's hogan with 
the intention of running her down and struck and killed her with 
his truck as she attempted to flee from him. His defense was that 
she had fallen down while fleeing from him and that he had run 
her over accidentally. 
At trial, defendant invoked the "anti-marital facts privi-
lege"3 to prevent his wife from testifying against him. Another 
witness, however, testified that moments after the truck ran over 
the victim, he heard the defendant's wife scream, "He 
[defendant] ran over my mother."· The defendant claimed that 
the admission of the witness's statement violated the marital 
privilege. On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit allowed the in-
troduction of this statement into evidence since it fell within the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the 
"marital privilege should not be extended to bar a witness from 
relating an excited utterance by a spouse."5 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1975, all privileges were subsumed under Rule 501 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.' Privileges, with respect to federal 
issues "shall be governed by the principles of the common law. 
. as interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience 
••• "7 The Supreme Court has recognized two marital privi-
1. 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. June, 1979) (per Nielsen, D.J., sitting by designation; the 
other panel members were Trask and Goodwin, JJ.), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 706 (1980). 
2. [d. at 1036. 
3. [d. See text accompanying notes 18·24 infra. 
4. 601 F.2d at 1037. 
5. [d. at 1039. 
6. FEn. R. EVID. 501. See generally 10 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 500.03·500.21 
(2d ed. 1976 & Supp. 1979·80). 
7. FED. R. EVID. 501 provides as follows: 
Except 8S otherwise required by the Constitution of the United .011 
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leges: confidential communications8 and the testimonial privi-
lege.' 
The confidential communications privilege relates to private 
communications between a husband and wife which are pre-
sumed confidentiaPO and are, therefore, privileged. In Wolfe u. 
United States, II the Supreme Court recognized the confidential 
communication privilege. The Court qualified that privilege, 
however, by noting that "[t]he privilege suppresses relevant tes-
timony and should be allowed only when it is plain that marital 
confidence cannot otherwise reasonably be preserved."12 
In assessing the propriety of the invocation of the confiden-
tial marital communications privilege, several factors are consid-
ered. The marriage must be a valid one,13 a common law marriage 
may suffice, if recognized by that state.14 The communication 
must have been made during the marriage, J5 but the privilege 
continues after death. IS Finally, despite some disagreement it 
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privi-
lege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdi-
vision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the com-
mon law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil 
actions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim 
or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, 
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or politi-
cal subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with 
State law. (Emphasis added). 
8. See Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951). 
9. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
10. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 
332 (1951). See generally 2 D. LoUlSELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 219 (1978); 
Borden, In Defense of the Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications, 39 A.t.A. 
LAw. 575 (1978). 
11. 291 U.S. 7 (1934). 
12. Id. at 17. 
13. United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Neeley, 475 F.2d 1136, 1137 
(4th Cir. 1973). See generally O'Brien, The Husband- Wife Evidentiary Privileges: Is Mar-
riage Really Necessary? 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411. 
14. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d at 748; United States v. White, 545 F.2d 
1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Boatwright, 446 F.2d 913,915 (5th Cir. 1971); 
United States v. McElrath, 377 F.2d 508, 510 (6th Cir. 1967). 
15. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1009 (2d Cir. 1943); Yoder v. United 
States, 80 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 1935). 
16. See generally 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 488 (rev. McNaughton 
1961). 
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seems that only communications and not acts are privileged. 17 
The testimonial privilege, commonly referred to as the "anti-
marital facts" privilege, prevents one spouse from testifying 
against the other, absent waiver.'8 In Hawkins v. United States, 19 
the Supreme Court addressed the testimonial privilege. In 
Hawkins, the Government asked that the court grant the privi-
lege to witness who was not the accused.20 The Government 
argued that voluntary testimony was a strong indication that the 
marriage was already gone, and thus, the policy offostering mari-
tal harmony would not be undermined.21 The Court rejected the 
Government's argument and stated that since "not all marital 
flare-ups are permanent, "22 the justification for protecting mar-
tial harmony continues to exist. Therefore, "the testimony of one 
spouse [is generally barred] against the other unless both con-
sent."23 
The issue before the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Tsinnijinnie was whether the "anti-marital facts" privilege pre-
vents a third party's statement relating an out-of-court statement 
made by a spouse to be introduced as evidence. In reaching its 
decision, the court balanced the considerations protecting mari-
tal harmony and confidential communications on the one hand 
and the need for disclosure of facts on the other. 24 
C. THE COURT'S REASONING 
The Tsinnijinnie court first considered whether to follow dic-
tum from a prior Ninth Circuit case25 which stated that the mari-
tal privilege precludes the introduction of a third person's testi-
17. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d at 1009 (2d Cir. 1943); see generally 8 J. 
WIGMORE, supra note 16, §§ 657, 658, 2337. 
18. 601 F.2d at 1037 citing Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
19. 358 U.S. 74 (1958). 
20. [d. at 77. 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 78. Recently, the Supreme Court in Trammel v. United States, No. 78-5705 
(Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 1980) re-examined the Hawkins rule to determine whether an accused 
may invoke the privilege against adverse spousal testimony to prevent the introduction 
of a spouse's voluntary testimony. The Court left in tact the confidential communications 
privilege (see notes 10-12 supra) but modified Hawkins so that the privilege to testify vests 
in the witness-spouse. 
24. 601 F.2d at 1037-39. 
25. Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954 
(1964). In Peek, the court stated that a third person could not relate a statement by one 
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mony relating a statement made by a spouse.28 Although this 
dictum had previously been followed in the Ninth Circuit,27 and 
was adopted by the Fifth Circuit,28 the Tsinnijinnie court did not 
feel it was "bound by dicta from prior cases. "21 
The court then examined the application of the privilege "in 
the light of reason and experience, "30 focusing on "whether there 
are sound reasons for applying the spousal [marital] privilege to 
bar testimony of third persons. "31 On the one hand, the court 
acknowledged that "privileges are inherently barriers to the fact 
finding mission of trial courts. "32 The court noted that the marital 
privilege has been the subject of harsh criticisms.33 These criti· 
cisms are directed towards the rule's failure to serve any purpose, 
and the fact that it is increasingly being used as "mechanisms for 
conceal[ing] the relevant facts."s. 
The Tsinnijinnie court next turned to an examination of the 
justifications for the marital privilege outlined in Hawkins v. 
United States3S : to preserve marital harmony, and to avoid pit· 
ting one spouse against the other. The court noted that where, 
however, the privilege is asserted because a third person relates 
spouse against another where defendant spouse could have invoked the marital privilege 
to preclude the admission of the original statement. However, this was dictum as the 
privilege had been waived. 
26. Id. at 943. 
27. United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978) (spouse's statements admit-
ted as admissions of a co-conspirator); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 
1954), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1957) (Peek-type language was dictum because the 
privilege had been waived). 
28. United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1971); Ivey v. United States, 
344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965). 
29. 601 F.2d at 1058 quoting Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
30. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
31. 601 F.2d at 1038. 
32. Id. See generally C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 86 at 173 (2d ed. Cleary ed. 
1972); Borden, supra note 10; Fawal, Questioning the Marital Privilege: A Medieval Phi-
losophy In a Modern World, 7 CUM. L. REv. 307 (1976). 
33. 601 F.2d at 1038. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 16 at § 2232; 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 405, at 87 (1969). 
34. 601 F.2d at 1038 quoting C~ MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 79, at 165 (2d ed. Cleary 
ed. 1972). The author continues: 
The policy. . . of maintaining the (marital) privilege. . . is a 
matter of emotion and sentiment. All of us have a feeling of 
indelicacy and want of decorum in prying into the secrets of 
husband and wife. We (should) realize ... that this motive of 
delicacy, while worthy and desirable, will not stand in the bal-
ance with the need for disclosure in court of the facts upon 
which a man's life, liberty, or estate may depend. 
Id. § 86, at 173. 
35. 358 U.S. at 77. 78 (1958). 
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a spouse's out-of-court statement, it is highly unlikely that either 
goal is served.3s The court reasoned that a third person offers a 
"convenient buffer" which eliminates the chance of marital fric-
tion being engendered through the introduction of the spouse's 
statement.37 Furthermore, a spouse would not make damaging 
statements about the other spouse unless the marriage had dete-
riorated to the point that a dissolution was inevitable.3s 
D. CRITICISM: THE ILLUSION OF THE "BUFFER" AND "DETERIORATED 
MARRIAGE" RATIONALE 
The court's statement that a third person presents a conven-
ient buffer which eliminates any possibility of marital friction is 
illusory. When a third person testifies, that party simply conveys 
the other spouse's statement. The fact that the words are spoken 
in court by a third party does nothing to reduce marital friction. 
The Fifth Circuit, in Ivey v. United States,39 disregarded any 
"buffer" rationale. Ivey commented directly upon the type of 
hearsay problem encountered by the Tsinnijinnie court, stating: 
"She might as well be permitted to testify against her husband 
in open court as to permit the introduction of a statement she had 
made against him out of court."40 
36. 601 F.2d at 1038. 
37. Id., quoting United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1968). In 
Mackiewicz, the Second Circuit admitted hearsay statements made by one spouse impli. 
eating the other, reasoning that since the testimony was one step removed from actual 
testimony. marital frictions would not be aggravated. Accord, United States v. Cleveland, 
477 F.2d 310, 313 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360, 1364 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1972). Commentators have suggested that Mackiewicz is the better rule. 
A person holds no privilege to prevent his or her spouse from 
making adverse statements abroad in the world, and if this 
occurs and is revealed in court, it is the {act of the out·of-court 
conduct o{ the spouse, not the advent of the trial, which is the 
source of any strain upon the marriage. 
2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, § 218 at 624. 
This reasoning seems puzzling. I{ it is "the {act of the out-of-court conduct and not 
of the spouse and not the advent of the trial, which is the source of any strain," then the 
third person would not insulate the marriage from friction. The friction is generated from 
the out-of-court conduct and its ensuing legal ramifications. It appears that the only way 
to avoid marital strain in this situation is to exclude the statements under the privilege. 
What seems to pervade this issue is an attempt to reconcile the admission of the hearsay 
statements with the policy of fostering marital harmony. The truth of the matter is that 
admitting hearsay statements does cause marital friction; however, marital friction will 
not "stand in the balance with the need for disclosure." See note 34 supra. 
38. 601 F.2d at 1039. 
39. 344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965). 
40. Id. at 772. 
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The Ninth Circuit asserted that a spouse would not make 
damaging statements unless the marriage were in a severely dete-
riorated state. A spouse may make a damaging statement with 
no malicious intent whatsoever. The statement could be made 
inadvertently, or blurted out as an excited utterance, as it was in 
the present case, or it could be made innocently, without any 
knowledge whatsoever of its potentially damaging effect. At any 
rate, Hawkins expressly rejects the argument that voluntary ad-
verse testimony is a strong indication that a marriage is already 
gone. 41 
E. CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts in Tsinnijinnie, the result reached by the 
Ninth Circuit is correct. It was apparent that the Tsinnijinnie's 
marriage had deteriorated and therefore, the third party testi-
mony could have little detrimental impact on their marriage. 
However, this decision might be interpreted more broadly, as 
holding that third party testimony relating extrajudicial spousal 
statements, will always be admitted. This should not be the rule. 
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence grants a federal 
court wide discretion in interpreting the rules of privileges. In 
determining whether or not a privilege applies, a court should 
balance the conflicting interests. In favor of applying the privilege 
is the interest of preserving harmonious marriages, while on the 
other hand, admitting relevant and probative evidence from 
which a trier of fact can reach a just decision, serves to counter-
balance that interest. While the result in Tsinnijinnie may have 
justified withholding the privilege, a lower court should not be 
precluded from balancing the conflicting interests presented by 
a different and compelling set of facts. 
Charles Ferrera 
IX. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW 
& PROCEDURE 
In United States v. But/alo, 591 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. Jan., 
1979), defendant sought a reversal of his conviction on the ground 
that the evidence used to convict him was a result of a search 
conducted on the basis of an affidavit containing material mis-
statement by the government affiant. The Ninth Circuit, relying 
on the two-prong test enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) affirmed the judgment 
41. 358 U.S. at 77. 
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of conviction finding (1) the information in the affidavit did not 
constitute intentional misstatements, and (2) even with the chal-
lenged material excised, the affidavit contained' other material 
which would support a showing of probable cause. 
In United States u. Smith, 595 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. Dec., 
1978), the court examined whether a false statement by a gov-
ernment affiant will invalidate a search warrant. Once again re-
lying on Franks u. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the court, re-
luctant to extend the rule of exclusion to negligent omissions or 
good faith mistakes held that erroneous assumptions made by a 
federal agent on the basis of information he received, does not 
amount to reckless inclusion of false statements. 
In United States u. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. Sept., 
1978), federal agents investigating a mail fraud scheme entered 
defendant's apartment without a warrant or probable cause to 
believe that a person who had committed a felony was hiding in 
defendant's apartment. Defendant was convicted of being an ac-
cessory after the fact. On appeal, the court noted that the issue 
of whether, absent exigent circumstances, police officers who 
have probable cause to arrest a person whom they reasonably 
believe to be in a particular dwelling may enter without a war-
rant in order to carry out the arrest, has never been resolved by 
either the Supreme Court or within the Ninth Circuit. Joining 
the District of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit, the 
Prescott court held that the police must obtain a warrant before 
entry to carry out the arrest. 
In United States u. Radlick, 581 F .2d 225 (9th Cir. Aug., 
1978), the court found it necessary to remand a case for determi-
nation of whether there was a reasonable explanation for federal 
officers proceeding without obtaining a federal search warrant. In 
Radlick, a state search warrant was issued, but the participation 
of the federal officers in the case left no doubt that the investiga-
tion was so pervasive that it was sufficiently "federal" as to re-
quire compliance under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure or an explanation for non-compliance. The court 
adopted the Second Circuit's test for suppression of evidence 
which looks to whether there is evidence of intentional and delib-
erate disregard of a provision in the Rule, and remanded the 
case for a determination on this issue. 
In United States u. Romero, 585 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. Aug., 
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1978), the Ninth Circuit held a federal search warrant to be valid 
based on information obtained independently and prior to the 
illegal state warrant and seizure of incriminating evidence. The 
state warrant was invalidated on the basis that the items to be 
seized were described too broadly. The court found that the evi-
dence· seized under the federal warrant was not the fruit of the 
invalid state search and the evidence was not required to be sup-
pressed on the ground that the federal warrant had been merely 
an attempt to cure a prior illegal search. The court further held 
that the government's failure to inform the United States magis-
trate in its search warrant that evidence sought under federal 
warrant had been previously suppressed by state court was not a 
basis for invalidating federal warrants. 
Judge Merrill filed a dissenting opinion arguing that when a 
state is under a suppression order, it has a duty to return the 
seized evidence to the defendant. Until the state has returned 
the evidence, the evidence is immune from federal seizure. Judge 
Merrill found it improper on the part of state and federal offi-
cials to have refrained from returning the evidence until federal 
seizure had been accomplished, and therefore would have 
reversed. 
In United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. Aug., 
1978), a lawful customs search of a package mailed from Thai-
land to an address in the United States revealed ten plastic bags 
of heroin in the hollowed out walls of the package. Agents of the 
Drug Enforcement Administration removed the bags and substi-
tuted bags of white powder and two bags of heroin. Additionally, 
electronic devices were placed inside the parcel which emitted 
beeping signals allowing the agents to follow the parcel. The 
Ninth Circuit, applying a two step analysis required in situations 
involving the use of electronic surveillance devices found (1) the 
initial customs search of the package and insertion of the device 
was lawful, and (2) the continued surveillance, i.e., transmitting 
the location of the package by electronic signal is merely an aid 
to what could be accomplished by other permissible techniques 
of surveillance. Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the placement 
in a package of such a device did not constitute an unlawful 
search in violation of the fourth amendment. The court reasoned 
that since there was "reasonable cause to suspect" contraband, 
the initial opening of the package was lawful and because the 
transmitting of the package's location by electronic signal was 
. 
123
Roper et al.: Criminal Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
198 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:75 
seen to be merely an aid to what could be accomplished by vis-
ual surveillance, there was no fourth amendment violation. 
In United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871 (9th Cir. May, 
1979), the Ninth Circuit addressed the issues involving the scope 
of corporate searches and the application of the felony provision 
in the Bank Secrecy Act. In Beusch, the government seized cer-
tain items that were allegedly unrelated to the offending transac-
tion and which served as the basis for misdemeanor convictions. 
The court, however, held that where ledgers and files all contain-
ed incriminating evidence regarding transactions, failure to sepa-
rate the ledgers and files and take only those portions dealing 
specifically with the transactions did not constitute an imper-
missible general search. The court reasoned that a general rule 
requiring ledgers and files to be separated would substantially 
increase the amount of time required to conduct a search. In ad-
dition, this type of search would require the use of auditors, 
bookkeepers and accountants, thereby aggravating the intrusive-
ness of the searc h. 
Regarding the scope of the Bank Secrecy Act, the court held 
that a series of currency transfers which, by themselves, consti-
tute misdemeanors, may also constitue felonious activity if they 
show a pattern of illegal activity and exceed $100,000 over a 
twelve month period. Judge Bright, concurring and dissenting in 
part, did not agree with the majority's expansive reading of the 
felony provision under the Bank Secrecy Act, and would not 
have elevated the several misdemeanor convictions to felonies 
when the violations were unrelated to any other type of activity 
that might be considered illegal. 
The court in United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 
Mar., 1979), held that an FBI agent's conduct in interviewing a 
defendant without permission of counsel could not be construed 
as a violation of the right to counsel requiring dismissal of the 
indictment on the theory that it interfered with the attorney-cli-
ent relationship. The court based its holding on the fact that the 
interview was terminated shortly after it had begun and that the 
interview was not undertaken to obtain incriminating statements 
but to offer a dismissal of charges in exchange for information. 
Further, the court found that although the FBI agents should 
not have spoken to the defendant, there was no indication that 
defendant suffered any prejudice because of the agent's remark. 
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In United States v. Newell, 578 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. July, 
1978), the court held that although a serviceman had been ap-
pointed counsel in connection with changes of unauthorized ab-
sence, the failure of military investigators to determine whether 
the serviceman was represented by counsel when interviewed as 
an arson suspect did not violate any rights under military law of 
effective assistance of counsel. The court also ruled that the right 
to counsel of a serviceman prosecuted in federal court, and the 
remedies for violation of that right, are controlled by federal ci-
vilian law rather than the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
In United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. Apr., 
1979) (per curiam), defendant argued that the denial of his Mo-
tion for Substitution of Appointed Counsel deprived him of effec-
tive assistance of counsel at trial. Defendant and his court-ap-
pointed counsel appeared before the judge about one month 
before trial to make the motion on ground that defendant and 
his counsel were totally incompatible. Defendant renewed his 
motion three weeks later. The motion was denied although both 
defendant and his attorney confirmed that the relationship be-
tween the two was bad. When faced with the choice of going to 
trial with the original attorney or defending himself pro se, de-
fendant went to trial with his court-appointed counsel. Relying 
on Brown v. Cravens, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970), the court 
held that in so denying the motion, the lower court had deprived 
defendant of effective assistance of counsel. 
In United States v. Rosales, 584 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. Aug., 
1978), the court ruled that in order for a party's co-conspirator's 
statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy to be ad-
missable, there must exist independent evidence, sufficient to 
make it a prima facie case of conspiracy. The court ruled that 
sufficient evidence existed in the present case to admit the testi-
mony of an undercover agent. The evidence of the conspiracy 
need not be sufficient to compel a conviction. All that is required 
is that the evidence support a conviction. 
In United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. Feb., 
1978) (per curiam), the court held that a juror who had two sons 
who were imprisoned for murder and robbery in connection with 
an attempt to acquire heroin was not impartial in a trial for con-
spiracy to possess heroin. The court also ruled that only state-
ments of a co-conspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy 
were admissable as an exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, mere 
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conversations between conspirators are not admissable as decla-
rations in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
In United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) 
the court held that in the absence of any indication of a lack of 
trustworthiness in the procedure of recording license plate num-
bers of cars passing through the Mexican border, that that date 
could be admitted under the "public records" exception to the 
hearsay rule in a narcotics case. The court also ruled that where 
the lower court admitted data cards containing those lists of li-
cense numbers under the "business records" rather than the 
"public records" exception, no error was committed . 
• 
In Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. Nov., 1978) 
the Ninth Circuit rejected a per se rule that any investigatory 
questioning during prison confinement constitutes custodial in-
terrogation requiring Miranda warnings. The court recognized 
the unique prison setting where the questioning took place, and 
'applied both the reasonable person standard and free to leave 
standard concluding that this situation amounted to no more 
than on-the-scene questioning. Therefore, no Miranda warnings 
were required. Judge Anderson filed a dissenting opinion con-
tending that the majority's enunciated test is both unrealistic 
and unworkable. 
In United States v. Nick, 604 F .2d 1199 (9th Cir. Oct., 
1979), the Ninth Circuit considered whether statements made by 
a victim and reported in the testimony of victim's mother and 
physician violated the hearsay rule or the confrontation clause. 
The court also considered whether the defendant's confession 
was taken in violation of the Miranda ruling. 
Defendant was arrested for sexually assaulting a three-year-
old boy, picked up and driven to jail. At that time, the defen-
dant was advised of his Miranda rights, whereupon defendant 
asked the policemen to look in defendant's bedroom for a paper 
with defendant's lawyer's name and address on it. The police-
man was unable to find the paper until after defendant had 
signed a waiver form, confessed and had been appointed counsel. 
Relying on United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482 
(9th Cir. 1978)(en bane), the court of appeal held that although 
defendant had effectively asserted his right to counsel, he had 
later waived those rights by signing the waiver form. The physi-
cian's retelling of the defendant's statements were admitted 
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under the exception to the hearsay rule admitting statements 
made to a physician for diagnostic purposes. FED. R. EVID. § 
803(4). Testimony of the victim's mother retelling the victim's 
out of court statements was admitted under the "excited utter-
ances" exception to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. § 803(2). 
Finding that the victim-declarant had not been subjected to 
cross-examination, the court of appeals considered whether the 
victim's out of court statement should have been admitted over 
an objection on the ground that defendant was not given the op-
portunity to confront his accuser. Ruling that the availability of 
cross-examination was not the sole criterion for testing the ad-
missibility of hearsay evidence, the court held that in view of the 
fact that the evidence had high probative value, was highly relia-
ble, was unquestionably material, and was the best evidence 
available, the statement was properly admitted over the confron-
tation clause objection. 
In United States v. Pantohan, 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. May, 
1979), the court of appeal affirmed the conviction for the unlaw-
ful possession of a sawed-off shotgun (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d». De-
fendant claimed that: (1) because certain of his self-incriminat-
ing statements were made during plea-bargaining, that these 
statements were improperly admitted; (2) because those state-
ments were inadmissible but were heard by the grand jury, 
the indictment should have been quashed; and (3) the lower 
court improperly failed to give a specific intent instruction for 
the crime charged. 
Relying on United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 
(5th Cir. Nov., 1978) (en banc), the court held that in order to 
determine whether plea bargaining has taken place, a court 
should determine whether the accused subjectively believed plea 
negotiation was taking place at the time, and whether that belief 
was reasonable under the circumstances. The court ruled that 
although defendant may have subjectively believed plea bargain-
ing was taking place, his belief was unreasonable under the 
circumstances. Therefore, the statements were properly ad-
mitted. Because the statements were admissible, they were prop-
erly before the grand jury, and the indictment was valid. Defen-
dant's claim that the lower court improperly failed to give a 
specific intent instruction was rejected on the ground that 
§ 5861(d) is not a specific intent crime. 
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In Jett v. Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. July, 1978), the 
court held that although no charges had been brought against a 
prison inmate who was the prime suspect in a prison stabbling, 
the district court properly appointed counsel for him. The court 
also ruled that because no charges had been brought against the 
suspect, nor was there a grand jury investigation pending, the 
lower court lacked jurisdiction to enter a discovery order. 
In United States v. Guido, 597 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. May, 
1979), defendants were convicted in both Arizona and California 
district courts on charges of conspiracy to possess marijuana 
with intent to distribute. Although the convictions covered dif-
ferent periods of time, defendants argued that they were identi-
cal and therefore should not be considered as separate conspira-
cies. The Ninth Circuit found that the conspiracies involved the 
same objectives, the same key participants, the same source, the 
same distribution and coverted one period of time and therefore 
held the conspiracies to be one single continuing conspiracy. 
In United States v. Peterson, 592 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. Jan., 
1979), the court held that a criminal defendant who fails to re-
port to the marshal's office after having been ordered by the 
court that the sentence was to commence immediately, is "in cus-
tody" and guilty of escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). Judge 
Chambers filed a dissenting opinion arguing for acquittal on the 
basis of the government's failure to sufficiently prove escape 
from custody in its indictment. 
In United States v. Anguloa, 598 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. June, 
1979), the issue concerned problems which arose with regard to 
translations of defendant's testimony by two interpreters ap-
pointed by the court. The first translator who misinterpreted 
portions of the defendant's testimony was replaced by the court 
clerk at the prosecutor's request alone. The replacement inter-
preter, also misinterpreted portions of the defendant's testimony 
and, further, made disparaging remarks about the defendant. 
As a result of the prosecutor's action and resulting further con-
fusion in the translations, the defendant contended he had been 
denied due process. The court held that the prosecutor's ex 
parte actions in substituting interpreters was improper; how-
ever, defendant was not prejudiced. The prosecutor did not at-
tempt to obtain any tactical advantage and was apparently 
motivated by a desire to obtain a more accurate interpreter. 
128
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/8
1980] CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE 203 
Further, prompt and fqrceful instructions to the jury. by the 
court to disregard any disparaging comments about the defen-
dant made by the second interpreter cured any prejudice which 
might have arisen. 
In United States v. Hayes, 590 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. Jan., 
1979), the court dealt with the issue of whether under § 5032 of 
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, the district court has dis-
cretion to reject the tendered admission of the juvenile delin-
quency information before a transfer motion has been filed. The 
court held that, based on analogy to the adult criminal prosecu-
tion process, the district court impliedly had the discretion to 
accept or reject admission of juvenile delinquency information. 
The court also held that the district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in refusing to accept the plea where the court knew that 
a request for authority to move to transfer the juvenile for adult 
prosecution was pending. 
In Heinz v. McNutt, 582 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. Sept., 1978), 
the court held that a Washington statute permitting automatic 
parole revocation for parolees convicted of crimes while on parole 
is an unconstitutional denial of due process. The court based its 
holding on Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), where the 
Supreme Court enunciated standards and procedures to be fol-
lowed when parole is revoked. 
In United States v. Edick, 597 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. May, 
1979), the defendant was convicted on a two-count indictment of 
possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. The defendant 
was first sentenced to three years on count one; his sentence of 
five years on count two was suspended. Subsequently, he was 
found to be in violation of his probation under count two. The 
district court revoked his probation and imposed a new sentence 
of three years imprisonment. The issue before the court of ap-
peals was whether these consecutive sentences could be imposed 
on the multiple counts where the firearms violations arose from a 
single transaction. The court held they could not be so imposed 
and, as a result, the illegal sentences had to be vacated and the 
case remanded for rehearing. 
In United States v. Knowles, 594 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. Apr., 
1979), the court dealt with the issue of government failure to 
comply with the Jencks Act. The Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 35(0) 
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requires that the government produce any statement by a wit-
ness which relates to the subject matter to which the witness has 
testified. The Ninth Circuit held that a transcript of a witness's 
testimony before a grand jury must be produced under the Act. 
The court further held that failure to comply with the Jencks 
Act does not per se require a new trial, but does call for a strict 
application of the harmless error standard. 
In United States v. Bergeman, 592 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. Jan., 
1979), the court held that although defendant's prior conviction 
for receiving stolen property had been expunged by statute, de-
fendant was still a "convicted felon" for purposes of the federal 
statute. Section 922(h)(l) of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act (18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq.) makes it unlawful for 
any person who has been convicted in any court of a crime pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to receive 
any firearm or ammunition that has been shipped or transported 
in interstate or foreign commerce. Although acknowledging a 
conflict within the Ninth Circuit on the issue of whether federal 
or state law governs a person's status as a convicted felon, the 
majority resolved the issue in favor of federal law. District Judge 
Takasugi, sitting by designation, filed a dissenting opinion, argu-
ing that this conflict has not yet been resolved. Judge Takasugi 
would adopt the views expressed by the Fifth Circuit and resolve 
the conflict in favor of the state's own definition. 
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